The impact of the ‘war on terror’ on Birmingham’s Pakistani/Kashmiri Muslims’ perceptions of the state, the police and Islamic identities by Ahmed, Shamila Kouser
THE IMPACT OF THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ 
ON BIRMINGHAM’S PAKISTANI / KASHMIRI 
MUSLIMS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE STATE, 
THE POLICE AND ISLAMIC IDENTITIES 
 
by 
 
 
SHAMILA KOUSER AHMED 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to 
The University of Birmingham 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute of Applied Social Studies 
College of Social Sciences 
The University of Birmingham 
July 2012
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. 
The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work 
are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by 
any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of 
the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores British Muslims’ counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’ through 
revealing the impact of the dominant ‘war on terror’ discourse created by the state. The 
research explores the counter discourse through investigating the impact of the ‘war on 
terror’ on Birmingham’s Pakistani / Kashmiri Muslims’ perceptions of the state, the 
police and Islamic identities before the ‘war on terror’ and since the ‘war on terror’.  
 
The theoretical perspectives of cosmopolitanism and citizenship are used as a foundation 
from which the ‘war on terror’ and the role of the state and the police in the ‘war on 
terror’ can be deconstructed, critiqued and reconstructed according to Muslim citizens’ 
perceptions. 
 
In particular attention is paid to the challenges and difficulties the 32 respondents 
interviewed for the research have faced since the ‘war on terror’. Many themes emerged 
through this framework and the core themes were injustice, legitimacy and human rights. 
The impact of the ‘war on terror’ showed the battle for Islamic identity construction 
versus resistance and the negative impact of regulatory discourses on perceptions of 
commonality, unity and shared identities.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The ‘war on terror’ has become a core focus of academia with many different disciplines, 
including international relations (Aas, 2007; Hussain, 2007; Aradau and Munster, 2009), 
political science (Spence, 2005; Innes, 2006; Thomas, 2009), sociology (Poynting and 
Mason, 2007; Nash, 2009) and criminology (Friedrichs, 2009; Panthazis and Pemberton, 
2009; Walklate and Mythen, 2010) exploring the multifaceted nature of the ‘war on 
terror’. This thesis aims to contribute to existing literature on the impact of the ‘war on 
terror’ through providing British Muslims’ counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’. In 
particular the research will contribute to knowledge through drawing on the theoretical 
perspectives of cosmopolitanism and citizenship and conducting empirical research on 
how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted British Muslims’ perceptions of the state, the police 
and their Islamic identities. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the focus of the 
research through detailing why the ‘war on terror’ is likely to have changed British 
Muslims’ perceptions of the state and the police and impacted their Islamic identities.   
The events of September 11th1 were seen as something new and marked an evident 
example of the world’s superpower, America, being targeted with the sole aim being 
destruction (Brassett, 2008; De Goede, 2008; Mythen and Walklate, 2008). However, 
Silke (2008, p.28) argues although 9/11 was the most destructive terrorist assault in 
recorded history, the subsequent ‘war on terror’ has led to ‘far bloodier conflicts’. 
Following the attacks of 9/11 the phrase, ‘war on terror’ was used by the Bush 
administration (The New Republic Online, 2006). Consequently this phrase has become a 
discourse which has been used to define the terrorist attacks of September 11th, identify 
and construct the enemy and continues to shape, international and national efforts to 
counter terrorism. Therefore, not only were the attacks of September 11th significant but 
                                                 
1 Also referred to as ‘9/11’. 
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the ‘war on terror’ response in relation to these attacks has become important through 
making relevant issues of human rights, legality, integration and identities, which are 
explored in this research. Feldman and Wilson (2003) note how the response has also 
been referred to as World War IV, thus signifying the magnitude of the perceived threat 
and risk of the enemy. Beck (2006, p.139) argues  
 
‘only when the word ‘war’ fell from the lips of the president – ‘a war has 
been declared on America’ – did the terrorist attack become political 
terrorism and then global terrorism, even though America continues to 
pursue this ‘enemy’ not as an enemy but as a criminal against humanity, 
devoid of rights’.  
 
From Beck’s (2006) quote it is clear that the response to the attacks was framed 
internationally and further, how these words conveyed and continue to convey the 
constructed limits of the ‘war on terror’. For example, Bush when defining the ‘war on 
terror’ said, ‘our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not 
end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated’ 
(cited in Lyon, 2001, p.1). It is therefore the response to the attacks of September 11th 
which raises questions regarding civil liberties and human rights because the enemies 
have been constructed as being outside humanity (Walker, 2005b; Aradau, and Munster, 
2009).  
When deconstructing the ‘war on terror’, one notable point of interest has been 
the international dimension and it has been argued that the west has not perceived such a 
magnitude of threat and risk since the ‘cold war’ (Ruggiero, 2007; Pain, 2009). Foreign 
policy aimed at reducing the terrorist risk has involved military action in Afghanistan and 
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Iraq and the creation of terrorist prisons - Abu Ghraib and even terrorist islands - 
Guantanamo Bay (Hussain, 2007; Welch, 2008). The ‘war on terror’ has become the 
common term used to denote the ideological conflict against Islamic militants, justifying 
the use of military action abroad and the introduction of controversial counter terrorism 
legislation in the UK. The first dimension of the ‘war on terror’ that this thesis is 
concerned with exploring is the international level and more specifically, the construction 
of an enemy void of humanity and thus, human rights. The construction of the enemy 
within the ‘war on terror’ is likely to have changed British Muslims’ perceptions of the 
state and the police because of the constructed association of the enemy with Islamic 
identities.  
In relation to the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on British Muslims’ Islamic 
identities, the second dimension of the ‘war on terror’ this thesis is concerned with is the 
focus on Islamic identities on both the international level (Howell, 2006; Selcuk and 
Fine, 2007; Cesari, 2009) and the national level (Rehman, 2007; Panthazis and 
Pemberton, 2009; Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009) in the ‘war on terror’. For example, 
following the attacks of 9/11, Mythen and Walklate (2008) coined the term ‘new 
terrorism’ to denote how the focus of ‘new terrorism’ is on the actions of extreme Islamic 
fundamentalist groups and not the terrorist violence practiced by organizations such as 
the Irish Republican Army. The ‘war on terror’ thus marks the linkage of Islamic 
identities with international war and within this ‘new terrorists’ have been constructed as 
being ‘inspired by religious extremism’ and as not being ‘predisposed to political 
negotiation or military deterrence’ (Howard and Sawyer 2004 cited in Pantazis and 
Pemberton, 2009, p.648). Thus, the ‘war on terror’ focuses on religious identities and it is 
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for this reason this research explores Islamic identities and not Muslim identities because 
Muslim identities also convey a focus on cultural identity2.  
In terms of the UK national context, the concepts of risk and threat associated with 
Islamic identities in the ‘war on terror’ transcended from the international level to the 
national level. The most notable example of the UK state effort to counter the threat and 
risk of terrorism has been through the introduction of counter terrorism legislation. The 
introduction of this legislation has not only made relevant issues of legality (Gearty, 
2004; Stone, 2004; Walker, 2005b; Grabosky, 2008), but also citizenship (Mueller, 2004; 
Lyon, 2007; Thomas, 2009) and led to an increased focus on the compatibility of Islamic 
identities with British identities (Johnson, 2002; Kundnani, 2007). Although the UK has a 
long history of legislation to counter terrorism the ‘war on terror’ has been 
conceptualized as something different, marking a deviation from the ways in which the 
state has responded to traditional terrorism. Since the events of September 11th the 
counter terrorism legislation3 introduced has produced concerns regarding civil liberties 
and human rights because this legislation contests the limits of democracy and the rule of 
law (Tadros, 2007; Stohl, 2008). Poynting and Mason (2007, p.62) state ‘western nations 
began to focus on ‘new’ security agendas with Islamic extremism being the ‘new global 
figure of threat and enmity’ and one of the notable features of the ‘war on terror’ was the 
introduction of absolute security measures.   
 
‘Constructed as a dominant political rhetoric, the ‘war on terror’ defines an 
existential threat that, owing to its magnitude, necessitates that exceptional 
                                                 
2 For further discussion see chapter 3. 
3 The collective term for the Terrorism Act 2000, Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA) and Terrorism Act 2006. Although the Terrorism Act 2000 was 
introduced before the events of September 11th it has been included under what this research conceptualizes 
as ‘counter terrorism legislation’ because it has become part of the ideological construction of the ‘war on 
terror’ and part of the legislative framework against Islamic terrorism and Islamic militants.  
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security measures be taken’. (Gill, 2006, p.42 cited in Mythen and 
Walklate, 2008, p.225) 
 
The ‘war on terror’ response by the state was aggressive, utilizing a utilitarian premise to 
justify the introduction of controversial legislation. The counter terrorism legislation has 
been compared with places such as Zimbabwe and apartheid South Africa, a direct 
comparison being the detention provisions and South Africa’s apartheid Terrorism Act of 
1967 (IHRC, 2005). Questions regarding citizenship and legality have become important 
because this legislation extended and redefined reasonable suspicion, evidence-based 
criminal justice processes, with the pre-crime logic of security overtaking the post-crime 
orientation of criminal justice (Zedner, 2007; McCulloch and Pickering, 2009). Within 
the ‘war on terror’ counter terrorism legislation has been introduced which marks a 
deviation from traditional substantive law (statutory or written law that governs rights 
and the obligations of those who are subject to it), and procedural law (the rules by which 
a court hears and determines what happens in civil or criminal proceedings). The 
introduction of counter terrorism legislation in the ‘war on terror’ has led to questions 
regarding police legitimacy and policing by consent (Innes, 2006; Grabosky, 2008; 
Klausen, 2009). It is because counter terrorism legislation justifies pre-crime at the 
expense of due process that counter terrorism policing reflects a form of policing where 
due process is not prioritized. This is of central importance given that due process 
prioritizes fairness, justice and liberty – which are vital components of citizens’ legal 
status and legal rights. Thus, in short those who form the suspect community are at risk 
of reduced legal status and thus reduced citizenship rights (Gearty 2004; Stone, 2004) 
and it is for these reasons the research focuses on how British Muslims’ perceptions of 
the state and the police have changed since the ‘war on terror’. The legislative response 
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of the state to 9/11 and the impact of counter terrorism legislation on policing form the 
third dimension of the ‘war on terror’ this research will focus on.  
The legislative response increasingly has implications for the criminalization of 
those who possess Islamic identities and since the ‘war on terror’ wider discourses 
around Islamic identities and British identities have constructed these identities with 
concepts of loyalty, leading to questions regarding the co-existence and compatibility of 
these identities (Johnson, 2002). Although the ‘war on terror’ has largely homogenized 
Islamic identities, it does focus on some Islamic groups more than others, such as Salafis 
and Wahhabis. Thompson (2006) argues that fundamentalism and radicalism are 
concepts where there is confusion because fundamentalisms range from peaceful to 
violent and from active to passive. Therefore, in reality Islamic political radicalism is a 
form of fundamentalism within which there are various groups for example, Al Qaeda, 
Hamas, Hezbollah, the Sunni insurrection and the Mahdi army in Iraq. However, all these 
groups have different motivations, for example Al Qaeda is very different from the Salafi 
movement but what the ‘war on terror’ and label ‘fundamentalism’ does, it creates one 
category within which all groups are placed, leading to the constructed enemy. Therefore, 
the term is much contested, as for Muslims it can mean a return to the Quran or a spiritual 
connection with Islam, but in the ‘war on terror’ this extent of religiosity has been 
interpreted as problematic. Due to the extent of religiosity being problematic this 
demonstrates how the ‘war on terror’ is focused on Islamic identity, thus justifying why 
this research is predominantly concerned with how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted 
Islamic identities. Further, it is because this research is concerned with revealing how the 
‘war on terror’ has impacted each respondent’s Islamic identity, and therefore how the 
impact differs for each respondent that Islamic identities is used.  
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The ‘war on terror’ has been discussed in relation to the international and UK national 
context, counter terrorism legislation, policing and Islamic identities. The general aim of 
this research is to collect rich data from extensive interviews which will be used to form a 
counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’ through revealing the impact of the dominant 
‘war on terror’ discourse created by the state. To understand the counter discourse, I will 
explore the ways in which the ‘war on terror’ has impacted respondents’ perceptions of 
the state, the police and their Islamic identities. The research engages with the state 
centric ‘war on terror’ discourse, as it is essential to understand this discourse so that the 
counter discourse of British Muslims can be understood. The task of engaging with the 
state centric ‘war on terror’ discourse and contributing to an understanding of the impact 
of the ‘war on terror’ on British Muslims will be reconciled through drawing on the 
concept of the ‘subaltern counter publics’. The ‘subaltern counter publics’ refers to 
‘subordinate groups inventing and circulating counter discourses’ (Fraser, 1995, p.291 
cited in Pedziwiatr, 2007, p.269). Therefore, in the context of the ‘war on terror’ 
‘subaltern counter publics’ signal  
 
parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups 
invent and circulate counter discourses to formulate oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs’ (Fraser, 1992, cited 
in Sparks, 1997, p.85).  
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I will use interview data from British Muslims to explore their beliefs and interpretations 
regarding the ‘war on terror’ and explore the ideas of their counter discourse4. Fraser 
(1990, p.67-68 cited in Chong and Wan, 2010) argues that subordinated groups have 
been active in constituting subaltern counter publics and the subaltern counter publics are 
spaces of negotiation, interpretation and withdrawal.  
Within the ‘war on terror’ the excluded and subordinated could be interpreted as 
being British Muslim citizens, since they have been at the forefront of counter terrorism 
legislation introduced as part of the ‘war on terror’. However, even though it is British 
Muslims’ Islamic identity which has been constructed as problematic, leading to their 
construction as a ‘suspect community’ (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009) wider counter 
discourses have emerged in the form of criticisms. For example, Stella Rimington, former 
head of the British intelligence service M15 has criticized the ‘war on terror’ as a ‘huge 
over-reaction’, and has decried the militarization and politicization of the U.S. efforts to 
be the wrong approach to terrorism (cited in Norton-Taylor, 2008). Internationally, it has 
been stated that when the Bush administration said ‘war’ it meant war in the sense of 
people being commanded to go and kill other people (Garton-Ash, 2006), with critics 
arguing that the ‘war on terror’ has been used to justify human rights abuses (Amnesty 
2009). It is for this reason in March 2009 the International Commission of Jurists urged 
the Obama administration to drop the phrase ‘war on terror’. The commission said the 
term had given the Bush administration ‘spurious justification to a range of human rights 
and humanitarian law violations’ including detention practices and interrogation methods 
that the International Committee of the Red Cross has described as torture (Wilson and 
Al Kamen, 2009, p.1). Critics of the ‘war on terror’ have produced counter discourses, 
and these counter discourses reinstate with critique the tenets of the ‘war on terror’, 
                                                 4 It should be noted that although ‘counter discourse’ is used this research will consider the existence of ‘counter discourses’ through demonstrating differences in respondents’ perceptions of the state, the police and their Islamic identities in the data chapters.  
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indeed challenging the discourse of the ‘war on terror’ and actions of the US and UK 
within the ‘war on terror’. 
The process of considering the voices of the less dominant and powerful is one by 
which another perspective is considered, the possibility for new meanings and 
understandings are carved open. There exists a real need to consider the counter 
discourse of British Muslims because although there has been a growth in counter 
terrorism research and research on Muslim communities within the counter terrorism 
context, there has also been a growing critique into how this research is conducted. 
Firstly, Spalek, El Awa and McDonald (2009) argue that terrorism research has often 
been dominated by state-centric perspectives and similarly, Gunning (2007a, p.367) 
states ‘terrorism studies’ tends to accept uncritically the framing of the ‘terrorism 
problem’ by the state’. Secondly, Jackson (2007) argues that terrorism studies are 
dominated with weak methods and theories and Spalek, El Awa and McDonald (2009) 
argue, that because terrorism research has relied on secondary sources, the research has 
failed to provide an understanding of counter-terrorism through the perspectives and 
experiences of those experiencing state repression. According to Gunning (2007a, p.376) 
a critical approach would move  
 
‘beyond the state as the sole legitimate referent…. to the wider notion of 
human security and an analysis of how ‘terrorism’ and counter-terrorism 
affect the security of all… including such concerns as social justice, 
inequality, ‘structural violence’, culture and discrimination’.  
 
Breen Smyth (2007, p.260) explores the challenges of researching terrorism, in particular 
the need to ‘avoid replicating hegemonic accounts while still engaging with dominant 
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discourses’. As already stated the research will overcome the difficulties of engaging 
with the dominant discourse without re-producing the dominant discourse through the use 
of ‘subaltern counter publics’. However, although the research will provide empirical 
evidence it is also of importance that weak theories are not used and as Gunning (2007b) 
suggests, wider notions of security and justice are used so that the state is not used as the 
definer of harm. Thus, the wider analytical framework is what is important in ensuring 
that the narratives to emerge are not state centric and the interview data is interpreted 
according to the concepts which are important to respondents. In order to facilitate the 
emergence of a counter discourse the theoretical perspectives of cosmopolitanism and 
citizenship will be used to analyze the interview data.    
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
According to Dallmayr (2003) cosmopolitanism has a long history, one in which the 
ideas of Socrates were adopted by Cynics, Stoics, Christian and Muslim thinkers and 
later by enlightenment thinkers. Although cosmopolitanism is a contested theory and 
open to interpretation it remains useful in the social sciences (Walker, 2005a; Brassett 
2008) and Dower (2008) states it is the ideas of justice, responsibility and human rights 
which make it useful to research. Cosmopolitanism will be used as it firstly, 
conceptualizes the state as having duties to citizens - the state is not ‘thought of as 
ontologically privileged’ (Held, 2005, p.10) and therefore the voices of the marginalized 
can be privileged in a way which contributes to understanding the real concerns of those 
subject to the ‘war on terror’. Secondly, the ‘war on terror’ due to its global dimension 
requires a broad geographical focus (Friedrichs, 2009) and cosmopolitanism considers 
both the international level and the national level. Thirdly, at its core - cosmopolitanism 
includes themes of human rights, justice, cultural diversity and identities. These are all 
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themes that the ‘war on terror’ has made relevant through the introduction of counter 
terrorism legislation and the focus of ‘new terror’ on Islamic identities. Finally, it is 
through using cosmopolitanism, with its focus on human rights and prioritization of 
cultural diversity and subjectivity that the counter discourse will actually consider human 
suffering from the perspective of British Muslims. This will ensure that the counter 
discourse incorporates perceptions of harm and oppression – and thus prioritize the 
effects of the ‘war on terror’ rather than focus on the intention of the state, which would 
risk the danger of contributing to a state centric perspective.  
In conjunction to cosmopolitanism, citizenship will be used. Citizenship involves 
both the state and citizens - it emphasizes the role of the state in terms of the duties owed 
by the state to citizens. For example, Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, (2003, p.154) 
state citizenship includes four dimensions which are ‘legal status, rights, political and 
other forms of participation in society, and a sense of belonging’, Carens (2000) 
identifies three components of citizenship, the legal dimension, the political dimension 
and the psychological dimension. In this way citizenship can be conceptualized as a legal 
status, since with citizenship comes rights and the state has a duty to meet these rights 
(Smith, 2007; Nash, 2009). The role of the state in the ‘war on terror’ and the relationship 
between the state and its citizens has become a point of focus because the ‘war on terror’ 
has impacted the legal dimension of citizenship through re-defining the legal status of 
citizens suspected of terrorist activity (Mueller, 2004; Lyon, 2007; Thomas, 2009). 
Further, through exploring citizenship and the social contract, the role of the police can 
be explored because citizenship embeds human rights in institutions such as the state and 
the police and more specifically in statutes such as the Human Rights Act 1998 (Gearty 
2004; Stone, 2004). This research is concerned with how the state and the police, since 
the ‘war on terror’ have impacted British Muslims Islamic identities and citizenship 
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allows the role of the state to be considered in relation to identities and British Muslims’ 
feelings of belonging (Carens 2000; McPhee 2005). 
There are various parallels between citizenship and cosmopolitanism, for example 
Benhabib (2004, 2007, 2008 cited in Nash, 2009, p.1068) ‘has developed the argument 
that citizenship itself is now becoming cosmopolitan through developments in human 
rights, especially within Europe’. Therefore, part of the growing inter-linkage between 
citizenship and cosmopolitanism can be attributed to changes in authority which are 
taking place beyond the nation state. Lyon (2007) argues that globalization has weakened 
the category of national citizenship. The ‘war on terror’ actually demonstrates what Lyon 
(2007) means because the ‘war on terror’ is a discourse that has been informed by the 
international level. This has led Findlay (2003, p.326 cited in Aas, 2007, p.287) to 
suggest that  
 
‘in cases such as terrorism, the state as the definer of crime and the 
monopolist of punishment gives way to global declarations of collective 
(cultural) deviance’.  
 
Therefore, it could be argued that the ‘war on terror’, through being defined as a global 
war combines the need for citizenship and cosmopolitanism, especially given that both 
theoretical perspectives incorporate themes of identity, justice and human rights and warn 
of the dangers of the state not maintaining its duties on citizens’ sense of belonging and 
identities. This chapter has explored how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted the state, the 
police and the discourse associated with Islamic identities. This research specifically 
focuses on the legislative response of the state to 9/11 and the impact of counter terrorism 
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legislation on policing and how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted British Muslims’ Islamic 
identities. 
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CHAPTER 1: COSMOPOLITANISM, CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
‘WAR ON TERROR’ 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical perspectives of citizenship and 
cosmopolitanism which frame the research. The ‘war on terror’ has made relevant the 
theoretical perspectives of cosmopolitanism and citizenship through impacting 
Muslim citizens’ legal rights, sense of belonging, and constructing their Islamic 
identity as a risky suspect identity.  
The chapter will demonstrate the relevance of these theories to the ‘war on 
terror’ and more specifically, how both theories are useful in understanding and 
deconstructing the ‘war on terror’. Cosmopolitanism turns our attention to themes of 
equal moral worth and responsibility, and it is through the language of human rights 
that the state can be opened up, and as Beck (2006) suggests, externally examined. 
Thus, cosmopolitanism provides a framework in which the state centric ‘war on 
terror’ can be critically examined. Citizenship compliments the use of 
cosmopolitanism because it provides a framework within which the state is 
conceptualized as having a duty to British citizens. Thus, important concepts such as 
legal rights and justice can be explored. The chapter also explores how both theories 
facilitate in providing a counter discourse because they emphasize subjectivity and 
therefore, how the actions of the state impact citizens’ feelings, perceptions and 
attitudes. It is because both provide a framework in which the actions of the state are 
related to citizens’ feelings of loyalty, attachment, belonging and identities (Carens, 
2000; McPhee. 2005; Beck, 2006) that they compliment the aim of the research which 
is to provide British Muslims’ counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’. 
 
MARSHALL AND CITIZENSHIP  
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A variety of different disciplines have utilized citizenship. For example, according to 
Turner (2009) political philosophy is primarily concerned with formal rights such as 
the right to vote, whereas within sociology the attention is on the social and economic 
conditions which shape citizenship. T.H. Marshall’s essay ‘Citizenship and Social 
Class’ (1950) was groundbreaking in providing a way of understanding the 
relationship between the state and citizens. Marshall divided citizenship into three 
parts, namely, civil, political and social rights. It was through the concept of rights 
that Marshall related the state to citizens as through the attribution of rights the state 
had a direct relationship with its citizens. In terms of rights, Marshall focused on 
social rights, and the welfare and economic conditions needed to ensure social rights 
(Turner, 2009). Lister (2005, p.476) argues Marshall used his conception of 
citizenship as an ideal because he ‘is arguing that full membership of the community 
requires civil, political and social rights of citizenship’. Therefore, when focusing on 
welfare and economic conditions Marshall was concerned with the conditions 
required for achieving ideal citizenship. Thus, Marshall’s predominant focus was civil 
rights and social rights, not legal rights. For example, Marshall focussed on the 
existence of institutions such as courts as a means of giving rights expression, rather 
than focussing on what the legal rights actually were.  
However, citizenship from the discipline of criminology is predominantly 
concerned with the legal rights of citizens’ and legal institutions. Criminology 
emphasizes the role of the state in providing legal rights through a social contract in 
which the police have a vital role in enforcing the legal rights of citizens and 
protecting the interests of the state. In its simplest form citizenship could be described 
as a theory which is useful in exploring the relationship between the state and 
citizens, whereby institutions constitute the means through which the state is 
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connected to citizens and citizens are connected to the state. Therefore, an important 
part of citizenship is the state. Copp (1999 cited in Copp, 2005) defines the state as a 
system of institutions and a territory in which the legal system of the state is carried 
out. This is the definition used in this thesis since this research is concerned with 
exploring the relationship between the state and its institutions - in this case the 
relationship between the state and the police in the ‘war on terror’. Further, 
criminological perspectives on citizenship focus on the power of the state and how 
this power is used by the state to control crime. For example, Garland (1996, p.448) 
states,  
 
‘the notion that a single sovereign power could govern all social life was 
enhanced in the mid-nineteenth century by the creation of a strong state 
apparatus, and in particular, by the development of a public police force 
which came to be regarded, however inaccurately, as having a professional 
monopoly over the function of crime control’.  
 
Therefore, the modern state emerged as the primary source of power, able to govern 
society through the dispersal of power to institutions, which would constitute ‘state 
apparatus’. Through relating the state to power and crime control, the role of the state 
in the ‘war on terror’ can be understood because in the ‘war on terror’ the state has 
used its power to introduce counter terrorism legislation aimed at crime control. 
However, states also influence and shape cultural and social meaning and therefore do 
not merely impact political and legal institutions (Benhabib, 2002 cited in Bloemraad, 
Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2003). Although in this thesis the state is primarily 
conceptualized in terms of legal and political institutions, the role of the state in 
17 
 
influencing meanings associated with culture, religion and more specifically, 
identities is not omitted. Therefore, this research considers how the state has 
constructed British Muslims’ Islamic identity since the ‘war on terror’ and how this 
has impacted their Islamic identities. 
Other than the lack of focus on legal rights, a further dominant critique of 
Marshall’s work has been the exclusion of ethnic, religious and other minority 
identities (Turner, 2009). More specifically,  
 
‘Marshall’s definition of citizenship is derived from ‘deeply middle-class, 
English, male and white ‘cultural values’ (Smith 1999, p. 214) that do not 
take individual subjectivities and cultural differences into account, 
particularly those of women, children, and racialized minorities’ 
(Benhabib, 2002; Brysk, 2004; Maher, 2004; Mann, 2001; Yuval-Davis 
1997 cited in Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2003, p.157).  
 
In the post colonial era of globalisation, citizenship must account for diversity and 
how ethnic, religious and cultural identities are accommodated within Britain. 
Further, values and subjectivities need to be accounted for and therefore although 
Marshall’s work has been influential, it could be considered ‘outdated’ and as 
conceptually inadequate in explaining contemporary citizenship. This thesis is 
primarily concerned with the criminological understanding of citizenship, since this 
perspective explores the notion of legal rights in greater detail than political 
philosophy and sociology. However, literature taken from these disciplines also 
informs how citizenship is utilized in the thesis as is now explored.  
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CITIZENSHIP, LEGAL STATUS, MINORITIES AND IDENTITIES 
Drawing on the two major criticisms made of Marshall’s work, namely the failure to 
include minority identities and legal rights, this section introduces the complexity of 
citizenship. The aspects that this thesis is predominately concerned with, the legal 
rights of citizens, minority identities – in particular religious identity and the impact 
of citizenship on identities and citizens’ perceptions are explored.   
Citizenship as previously stated involves both the state and citizens and liberal 
notions of citizenship (Locke, 1988; Rawls, 1971, 1993) emphasize the role of the 
state in terms of the duties owed by the state to citizens. In this way citizenship can be 
conceptualized as a legal status, since with citizenship comes rights and the state has a 
duty to meet these rights (Nash, 2009). Broader conceptions of citizenship also 
include legal status, for example Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, (2003, p.154) 
argue that citizenship includes four dimensions which are ‘legal status, rights, 
political and other forms of participation in society, and a sense of belonging’. 
Faulkner (2003) summarizes the evolution of rights stating that in the contemporary 
era citizens’ rights are those rights which are guaranteed by constitutions, for example 
the European Convention on Human Rights or by statutes such as the Human Rights 
Act 1998 or the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000. However, many of these 
rights as codified in the Human Rights Act 1998 are deeply embedded in the 
principles of legality (Gearty, 1994) and the social contract (Stone, 2004). The social 
contract and principles of legality are relevant to this research, as they allow the state 
to be understood in terms of the state’s legal obligation to meet citizens’ rights and 
within the ‘war on terror’ those suspected of terrorist activity have reduced legal 
rights.  
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It was during the late 18th century and early 19th century that secular 
ideologies of reason and objectivity replaced divine ideologies. Divine ideologies 
were premised on the concept of ‘laws of nature’, whereby human behaviour was 
thought to be the command of god. Reformers during this period were concerned with 
the power of legal institutions and Beccaria (cited in Agozino, 2004, p.345) in  
 
‘Treatise on Crime and Punishment’ condemned the arbitrary power 
exercised by judges and called for a rational application of the law based 
on the principle of equality’.  
 
The seventeenth century theorists of civil society based their argument on the concept 
of a social contract. For them,  
 
‘a civil society (societas civilis) was a rule of law in which citizens gave 
up the freedom of the state of nature in exchange for the guarantee of 
certain rights – security for Hobbes plus liberty and property for Locke’ 
(Kaldor, 2000, p.2).  
 
Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul (2003) argue that the language of rights and 
social contract remain a central part of contemporary citizenship. The social contract 
established duties and responsibilities on both the state towards citizens and on the 
citizen towards the state and according to Walker and Boyeskie (2001), through doing 
so it formed the basis of the law. Therefore, the law dictated power, in the form of 
rights and responsibilities to which both the state and citizen had to adhere. For 
example, the power of the state could only be exercised when citizens’ legal status 
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and rights had been maintained and it was found by judges that the law had been 
broken. The period was one of transition leading to the language of rights which 
attributed citizens with procedural legal rights. One of the most important concepts to 
emerge was that of equality because as Allan (1979 cited in Gearty, 2004) states, 
equality is regarded as an aspect of equal citizenship. The establishment of legal 
rights and principles such as equality would minimize the power of the state to 
associate unequal citizenship with minorities and thus certain identities.  
The legal rights which emerged during this period have become known by 
citizens as their natural legal rights, rights which if deviated from would be perceived 
as injustice and unequal legal citizenship. As Garland (1996, p.448) states  
 
‘over time, the control of crime and the protection of citizens from 
criminal depredations have come to form a part of the promise which the 
state holds out to its citizen-subjects’.  
 
This thesis utilizes the social contract conception of legal rights, holding that the state 
owes citizens protection and a violation of legal rights as set out in statutes and 
constitutions is a denial of citizenship rights and thus injustice. Legal rights as set out 
in statutes and a broader understanding of legal rights from the social contract are 
used because counter terrorism legislation within the ‘war on terror’ has deviated 
from many of the principles of legality upon which the modern state and criminal 
justice system were based. Further, through considering the legal principles which 
constitute citizens’ natural rights it is possible to understand Muslim citizens’ 
interpretation of how they believe the ‘war on terror’ has impacted citizenship. 
However, although the law as stated had the purpose of providing both the state and 
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citizens with rights and duties, the law can also serve to provide commonality, justice 
and social stability. For example, the law can promote equality and commonality 
through treating all citizens the same irrespective of their minority identity.  
Britain has a long history of policies of integration leading Bloemraad, 
Korteweg and Yurdakul (2003, p.154) to ask - ‘What happens to citizenship, as a 
potential force of justice, equality, and national cohesion, when large numbers of 
people from diverse linguistic, ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural backgrounds cross 
state boundaries?’ Multiculturalism is generally viewed as the idea that ethnic, racial, 
cultural and religious diversity should be recognized and accommodated (Kymlicka, 
1995, 2001; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Parekh, 2006; Taylor, 1994 cited in 
Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2003). However, Lister (2005) argues that 
granting some groups cultural rights / multicultural rights or rights that the 
mainstream does not have goes against the idea of equal citizenship and equal status. 
Further, the attribution of such rights can lead to social divisions and exclusion 
through emphasizing and establishing differences. When discussing cultural rights, 
from a criminological perspective the emphasis is on the need for state intervention to 
be legitimate and proportionate, and Falkner (2003) highlights that at the very least 
the state should provide the opportunity for voices to be heard, so that minorities can 
make decisions based on their communities. However, Falkner (2003) goes on to 
mention that such an approach might be too tolerant through not insisting on the 
existence of a unified culture. Thus, in terms of minorities rights from a 
criminological perspective, notions of justice, fairness and legitimacy are key 
concepts. 
Pocock, 1995; Magnette, 2005; Smith, 1997; Yuval-Davis 1997 (cited in 
Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2003) state that citizenship has a history of 
22 
 
excluding on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and class. Similarly, 
Falkner (2003) notes how the word ‘citizen’ incorporates a sense of those who belong 
from those who do not and Hussain and Bagguley (2005) argue that citizenship both 
creates social divisions and exclusion and is seen as the remedy to overcome social 
divisions and exclusion. The issue of accommodating diversity and state treatment of 
minority identities through models of integration has gained importance since 9/11. 
Within the ‘war on terror’ Muslims’ Islamic identities have been subject to 
demonization (Mueller, 2004; Lyon, 2007; Thomas, 2009) and over policing (Zedner, 
2007; McCulloch and Pickering, 2009) with questions emerging regarding the 
compatibility of Islamic identities with British identities (Johnson, 2002; Kundnani, 
2007). Although the accommodation of minority identities in relation to citizenship 
and rights has been much written about, Hussain and Bagguley (2005) argue research 
exploring citizens’ perceptions, thoughts and feelings about citizenship has been 
neglected. In this research, Muslim citizens’ perspectives on citizenship are 
important. One of the aims of the research is to explore the extent to which Muslim 
citizens perceive the ‘war on terror’ to have impacted notions of justice, fairness and 
legitimacy in relation to state policies towards them. Therefore, this research will 
contribute to existing knowledge through gaining empirical research on citizens’ 
perceptions, thoughts and feelings about citizenship, which as Hussain and Bagguley 
(2005) argue has been neglected.  
 Citizenship also details the complexities of integration, for example, McPhee 
(2005) argues that integrating minority groups into the nation state is difficult. 
Integration is about the accommodation of difference and as is now explored it 
requires a balance between the identities and cultures of the minorities and the 
majority. There are many difficulties, firstly, there is the issue of commonality, to 
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what extent should this be part of policy, and commonality be encouraged by the 
state. The idea of commonality has been clearly expressed in ideas of community 
cohesion. Secondly, which identities should be the focus of policy and to what extent 
does the state administer rights on the basis of these identities. Carens (2000) states 
under a liberal framework, ‘justice as fairness’ (Rawls, 1971 cited in Carens, 2000) 
conveys the idea that the state should provide citizens with choice and freedom 
therefore ensuring equality. It is the freedom of identities and equality associated with 
all identities which is important.  
McPhee (2005) uses the concepts of the whole and parts, the whole is the 
national identity and the parts are religious, cultural and other identities. However, it 
is the way in which the whole is balanced with the parts, the means through which 
state policy encourages assimilation for the sake of the whole and recognizes the 
parts, religious, ethnic and cultural minorities which impact minorities’ sense of 
citizenship and identities. McPhee (2005) argues in order to gain loyalty a state must 
recognize minority groups, both as individuals and as part of their community or 
group because through the attribution of minority rights loyalty is established. The 
ideas provided by McPhee (2005) are of relevance to the research, especially the idea 
of loyalty. The ‘war on terror’ has made relevant debates regarding the compatibility 
of a British and Islamic identity and further, the phrase ‘home grown suicide bomber’ 
introduces and associates the concept of risk to loyalty. Further, given that the 
research is of a retrospective dimension the idea of how Muslim citizens have moved 
from the part to the whole, if indeed they have is of particular importance and it will 
be of interest to see if the change in state policies from one that was predominantly 
based on their Asian identity to one that has become more religiously Islamically 
defined has impacted feelings of loyalty and integration.  
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CITIZENSHIP, SUBJECTIVITY AND SOCIAL COHESION 
As stated earlier, Hussain and Bagguley (2005) argue that citizens’ perceptions, 
thoughts and feelings about citizenship have been neglected. This thesis will use the 
ideas presented by McPhee (2005) in conjunction to the work of Carens (2000) and 
more generally the criminological understanding of citizenship already discussed to 
analyze Muslims’ perceptions of the state and the police before and after the ‘war on 
terror’. Carens (2000) identifies three components of citizenship, the legal dimension, 
the political dimension and the psychological dimension. The inclusion of the 
psychological dimension makes this work on citizenship relevant to this research. 
Like Marshall (1950) Carens (2000, p.162) takes the dimensions of citizenship to 
mean a unified entity arguing that three dimensions of citizenship ‘interact with each 
other in complex ways’. Therefore, a change in the legal dimension can positively or 
negatively impact the psychological dimension. The discourse of law constructs the 
boundaries of citizenship through defining the legal status of citizens, ‘the formal 
rights and duties that one possesses as a member of a political community’ (Carens, 
2000, p.162). However, where equality is not tied to citizenship and thus the state and 
the police both maintain a system whereby legal inequality exists then the 
psychological dimension of citizenship will be impacted negatively. Carens (2000) 
argues that the psychological dimension of citizenship is citizen’s subjective sense of 
belonging and identification. In this way the perceptions by citizens of their legal 
rights and equality are vital not only for their sense of belonging but also their 
identities. The psychological dimension of citizenship is important as it conveys 
‘one’s sense of emotional attachment, identification, and loyalty’ (Carens, 2000, 
p.166). This might then suggest that there are deeper dimensions to citizenship which 
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are important and a product of how minorities perceive the state. The emphasis on 
citizens’ sense of belonging and emotional attachment makes Caren’s (2000) work 
useful, as this research is concerned with exploring Muslim citizens’ perceptions of 
the legal dimension and political dimension of citizenship since the ‘war on terror’ 
and how these have impacted their sense of belonging and emotional attachment to 
their British identity and Islamic identities. 
Although the impact of the legal dimension and political dimension of 
citizenship on the psychological dimension will be explored, citizenship also offers a 
useful way of thinking about commonality in society. Since the ‘war on terror’ social 
cohesion has become problematic with Muslims’ Islamic identities constructed as 
problematic and an increase in Islamophobic attacks (Sheridan, 2006). Bloemraad, 
Korteweg and Yurdakul (2003, p.157) argue ‘citizenship rights and legal status 
promote participation and a sense of belonging, which in turn facilitate social 
cohesion and common political projects’. Similarly, Parekh (2002 cited in Faulkner, 
2003, p.288) argues citizenship  
 
‘demands a sense of common ‘belonging’ so that members of minority or 
disadvantaged groups can feel at home in their wider society (Parekh, 
2002), and also in the sense that the majority recognize those groups as 
members of their own society and show them the same consideration and 
respect’ (Faulkner, 2003, p.288).  
 
Rawls (1993, cited in Johnson, 2009) claims that when members of society have a 
choice of affiliation in any group they choose this ensures they are treated fairly by 
key political and social institutions. Further, this serves another function that of 
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achieving what Rawls (1971 cited in Johnson, 2009) calls 'overlapping consensus'. It 
is through the state providing equal citizenship based on justice, human rights and 
social responsibility (Johnson, 2009) that consensus is achieved in society, as only 
then can the state rely on its people to create an equal and tolerant society. The state 
has a privileged position in maintaining consensus and unity in society because as 
Carens (2000, p.9) argues it is through equality that society works because this 
ensures that ‘certain norms, attitudes, and dispositions’ are ‘widely shared among the 
population’. Returning to the original idea proposed by McPhee (2005) about moving 
from the part (minority identity) to the whole (national identity), McPhee (2005, p.2) 
states  
 
‘for this movement from the part to the whole to take place, there must be 
some attraction, association and affiliation to provide the confidence 
necessary for successful integration’.  
 
The process of the placement of identities through citizenship can unite citizens through 
emphasizing commonality and the state practicing equality or can create communities 
which are marginalized, criminalized and otherized, when inequality is part of state 
policy and law. Institutional neglect and inequality therefore not only shape identities 
and impact attachments but also impact how citizens relate to each other and perceive 
each other. This is of relevance to the research as the research will explore how 
Muslim citizens view society and how they perceive relations between themselves 
and non Muslims to have been impacted since the ‘war on terror’ and further the role 
of the state and the police in either promoting unity or creating difference.  
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The state and the police have a privileged role in determining how the political 
and legal dimension of citizenship not only impact attachment and belonging but also 
societal interactions. Citizenship defines identities, for example, Shklar (1991) 
distinguishes between citizenship as a social status and citizenship as the 
manifestation of national identity. It is the social status which citizenship conveys 
which contributes to the individual's sense of self and identity. As Wetherall (2009, 
p.11) states, ‘self-conscious community identities may arise through an act of 
categorization or intervention from an external agency’. Essentially the legal and 
political tenets of citizenship are based on categorization and intervene in the lives of 
citizens since they provide both a legal and political framework in which citizens 
operate. It has therefore been argued that communities are not pre-existing, but rather 
‘community identity is constructed through external structural factors, government 
policies and institutional neglect – that community’ is constructed as much by the 
state as individuals (Alexander, 2009, p.121). 
Equal citizenship is therefore very important in shaping citizens’ perceptions 
of the state and their own subjective identities. According to Runciman (1966 cited in 
Deutsch, 2006, p.24), ‘fraternal deprivation occurs when a person feels his group is 
disadvantaged in relation to another group’ and egoistical deprivation involves one 
feeing relatively deprived according to individuals within their own group with 
Deutsch (2006) arguing that relative deprivation is more critical than absolute 
deprivation in stimulating dissatisfaction. Institutions like the state and police not only 
impact internal identities but also maintain identities as a process because as (Becker, 
1963 cited in Spalek, 2008) states the powerful groups which have political power 
have the greatest capacity to impose labels upon people. Thus, Foucault (cited in 
Kahani-Hopkins, 2002 cited in Hussain, 2004) argues that identities are in fact 
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shifting and temporary constructions. In this way it is possible to conceptualize 
identity as a process and thus research Muslims’ identities in relation to the social 
context before the ‘war on terror’ and after the ‘war on terror’. Where the state and 
the police are concerned, it could be argued that in the ‘war on terror’ these 
institutions have greatly impacted Muslims’ Islamic identities. It is because the state 
and the police possess the power to criminalize and moreover the power to influence 
the most important aspect of citizenship, that of legal status and legal rights, that they 
could be said to produce legal identities. Further, the idea of relative deprivation is of 
importance to this research because the ‘war on terror’ has focused on Muslims’ 
Islamic identity and many of the citizens subjected to counter terrorism legislation 
have been Muslims (Travis, 2009). Therefore, it will be of interest to see the extent to 
which Muslim citizens perceive relative deprivation where counter terrorism 
legislation is concerned, the dissatisfaction this has stimulated and the impact of this 
on their identities and feelings of belonging.  
Deutsch (2006) refers to the relationship between external oppression and the 
impact of this on the internal image. Deutsch (2006) argues that oppressed groups are 
often under pressure to conform to and internalize the dominant group’s images of 
their group, with dominated groups often having a double identity, one defined by the 
dominant group and the other coming from membership in one’s own group. Thus, 
two different sets of identities emerge, one which conforms to the dominant 
constructed image and one which is resistant to the dominant construction and a 
product of subjectivity. And further, there are variations of the extent to which a 
citizen conforms to their constructed image and the extent to which they internalize 
such an image. This research is also concerned with Muslims’ resistance to the 
application of labels by those in authority. Although the extent to which a label can be 
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resisted is dependent on the power of those imposing the label, the fight for resistance 
and thus ‘self determination’, as opposed to ‘domination’ (Jenkins, 2000, p.10) is a 
point of interest. Fundamental to the issue of resistance are a variety of complexities, 
because ‘each one of us is a complex collection of loyalties, associations, beliefs and 
personal perspectives’ (McPhee, 2005, p.1). Therefore the concept of resistance and 
domination highlight diversity, inter-individual and intra-individual differences and 
this research will consider how Muslim citizens have been dominated by and resisted 
the various constructions of their identities, most notability their Islamic identities in 
the ‘war on terror’.  
Although many strands of citizenship have been identified and it has been 
demonstrated how these are useful to the research, citizenship is rooted to the state 
and the territory of the state and therefore in conjunction with citizenship 
cosmopolitanism will be used. Prior to discussing how cosmopolitanism will facilitate 
citizenship in providing the framework for this research the specific weaknesses of 
citizenship – weaknesses that justify the use of cosmopolitanism are discussed. 
Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul (2003) detail how citizenship is rooted to 
national identity and national identity is geographically determined according to the 
boarders of a state. Ong (2005 cited in Turner, 2009, p.71) states ‘the world we live in 
is increasingly global and we need models of citizenship that can better cope with 
multiculturalism, ethnic diversity, migration and the modern diaspora’. The ‘war on 
terror’ cannot only be analyzed from a perspective which omits the international / 
global level because territories that exist beyond the nation state have influenced the 
‘war on terror’ – as is explained in the next chapter.  
However, a perspective which analyzes the ‘war on terror’ from the 
international / global level without considering the role of the state is also inadequate.  
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‘Hannah Arendt (1951 cited in Turner, 2009, p.71) criticized the notion of 
inalienable universal rights that are assumed to exist independently of any 
state, but she noted that once the rights of citizenship had been removed, 
there is no political authority left to defend people as human beings. 
Human rights that cannot be enforced by a sovereign authority are simply 
abstractions. Ultimately the fundamental ‘right to have rights’ is only 
meaningful for people who already have membership of a state’.  
 
Therefore although a perspective is needed which goes beyond the nation state, 
citizenship is still required because as Loader and Walker (2007, p.13) argue ‘states 
are the main source of capacity, the main reference point of legitimacy – thus 
consigning international institutions to a kind of delegated legitimacy at best’. Muslim 
citizens’ understanding of the ‘war on terror’ is a product of the international level, 
the state and the police because effectively, it is the actions of the state which 
constitute perceptions of justice or injustice and which impact identities. In this way 
citizenship is useful in explaining Muslim citizens’ relationship with the state and 
how the actions of the state and the police in the ‘war on terror’ have impacted 
perceptions and Muslims’ Islamic identities. But in order for the international 
dimensions of the ‘war on terror’ to be accounted for and more specifically wider 
notions of belonging, justice and humanity – all of which the ‘war on terror’ has made 
relevant, cosmopolitanism is used in conjunction to citizenship.  
 
COSMOPOLITANISM 
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According to Dallmayr (2003) cosmopolitanism has a long history, one in which the 
ideas of Socrates were adopted by Cynics, Stoics, Christian and Muslim thinkers and 
later by enlightenment thinkers. Dallmayr (2003) refers to how Kant, like other 
enlightenment thinkers advocated a political order based on reason and Kant was in 
fact influenced by ancient Stoic cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism has been used by 
many disciplines and Hudson (2008, p.280) states that writers such as ‘Seyla 
Benhabib (2004) and Jurgen Habermas (Borradori, 2003); social theorists such as 
Zygmunt Bauman (2004), and philosophers such as Derrida (Borradori, 2003) 
have’… ‘appealed to Kant’s writing on cosmopolitanism, seeing it as a perspective 
which can bring Levinas’s moral theory into the political realm of justice and social 
change’. Brassett (2008) states that although there is no definition of what 
cosmopolitanism actually is cosmopolitanism thinking is an indispensable part of the 
social sciences. Similarly Walker (2005a) states, because it has engaged widespread 
academic interests it has become difficult to develop a single meaning, although this 
does not mean the term is intellectually redundant. The tenets of cosmopolitanism, 
namely its incorporation of global justice, identities – cultural and universal and 
global citizenship make it useful to this research.  
 
COSMOPOLITANISM, THE COSMOPOLITAN AND CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY 
One of the themes of cosmopolitanism is identity and that cultural diversity can exist 
within the global realm of humanity. Cosmopolitanism elucidates to the type of 
identity which could exist within the global realm of humanity making global 
governance and ethics possible. ‘Someone who is attached to a particular place or 
home with its cultural particularities but takes pleasure from the presence of other, 
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different places that are home to other different people’ (Appiah, 1996, p. 22 cited in 
Kaldor, 2000, p.6). Cosmpolitanism thus conveys a certain image or ideal type of 
individual, referred to as a cosmopolitan. Similarly, Kaldor (2000) like Appiah (1996) 
stresses difference when defining a cosmopolitan. Kaldor, (2000) defines a 
cosmopolitan as someone who is knowledgeable about different cultures and 
language. The idea is that if someone is knowledgeable about difference then they are 
also acceptant of difference. In this way tolerance of difference is linked to 
globalization and the idea that identities are not simply defined according to the 
territory of the nation state. Rather, as Hudson (2008, p.284) argues the cosmopolitan 
identity is ‘a pick-and-mix of globally available ingredients of identity, building a 
progressive and inclusive self-image’. Therefore, when defining the cosmopolitan - 
choice of identities, multiple affiliations and multiple attachments are stressed as 
being a reality. 
However, it could be said that the idea of cultural diversity within the unity of 
the global realm of humanity is an abstract ideal as there are many complexities. The 
idea of a global, universal identity leads to the question – what form and values 
should such an identity have? Kaldor (2000) envisages the global identity as being 
one which is synonymous with human rights. Kaldor (2000) links human rights with 
multiple identities, saying that Kant envisaged a global system in which everyone had 
the right to hospitality and thus because human rights exist at the global level they 
would constitute the binding force within which multiple identities could exist. Dower 
(2008, p.9) explains how ‘the Stoics accepted the idea of concentric rings of identity – 
accepting the idea of being a citizen of the world did not involve rejecting one’s 
identity as a member of a family, local community or a larger political community’. 
In this way the unity would be the global community of humanity and within this 
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there would be diversity, notably those signifying attachment of national identity, 
cultural identity, religious identity and so forth. Within cosmopolitanism world citizen 
denotes the emphasis on common humanity (Couture and Nielsen, 2005). Although 
the idea of a common humanity, one based on human rights in which multiple 
identities can exist is important in cosmopolitanism, the existence of a common 
humanity can be dangerous if the voices of minorities or subaltern groups, as Walker 
(2005a) argues, are silenced in the process. Further, Dower (2008, p.6) states  
 
‘all too often, especially in the past, there has been an inappropriate 
projection of values onto the rest of the world, whether explicitly in the 
name of cosmopolitanism or in other ways. But the response to this should 
not be to reject cosmopolitanism but to fashion a form of cosmopolitanism 
which avoids these criticisms’.  
 
Thus, from a cosmopolitan perspective the existence of universal values is very much 
dependent on how cultural identities or identities of difference are incorporated within 
the macro universal identity. 
Much has been written about the negotiation of identities within the macro 
universal identity and the dangers of silently walking into or advocating a 
homogenous macro identity at the expense of more micro identities. Beck and Grande 
(2007, p.71), when referring to this negotiation warn about the dangers of hierarchy 
stating ‘differences should neither be arranged hierarchically nor should they be 
replaced by common norms, values and standards; rather, they should be accepted as 
such and even have a positive value placed on them’. In this way difference is 
embraced and conceptualized as providing fluidity and as adding depth, creation and 
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choice – therefore it could be argued that subjectivity and personal freedom are 
prioritized. However, Walker (2005a) argues that although cosmopolitanism 
advocates the importance of all cultures, without prioritizing any, or giving greater 
importance to any, this can transcend into cultural relativism. For this reason Walker 
(2005a) presses the importance of universalism based on humanity whereby 
commonality exists but not at the expense of universalism leading to processes of 
cultural imperialism. Beck and Grande (2007, p.71) use ‘cosmopolitan realism’ to 
refer to how differences can exist within unity and cosmopolitan realism basically 
means the recognition of the legitimate interests of others and their inclusion in the 
calculation of one’s own interests’. The idea of legitimacy is closely linked to 
citizenship and in particular McPhee (2005) in the sense of how the state incorporates 
minorities and thus parts into the whole. Cosmopolitan ideas of identity are of 
relevance to the research and the logic of identity demonstrates this. 
According to Hudson (2008, p.279) ‘the logic of identity/difference imposes a 
false unity on groups defined by difference, and it imposes a false emphasis on a 
single characteristic on individuals’. Similarly, Beck (2006, p.25) argues that, within 
the national outlook there is  
 
‘the prison error of identity. According to this view, each human being has 
one native country, which he cannot choose, he is born into it and it 
conforms to the either/or logic of nations and the associated stereotypes’.  
 
Beck (2006, p.25) argues that within the prison error of identity, ‘people with strange-
sounding names find themselves repeatedly subjected to cross-examination’. It could 
be said that the prison error of identity has become increasingly relevant in the ‘war 
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on terror’ because the discourse associated with ‘new terrorism’ is one whereby 
Muslim citizens are predominantly subject to counter terrorism measures based on 
constructed stereotypes of the terrorist (as is explained in the following chapter). It 
could therefore be argued that with the increase in police powers under counter 
terrorism legislation and the creation of Muslims’ Islamic identity as representing a 
threat in the ‘war on terror’ this has contributed to the extent that the logic of identity 
is used by the state and the police. Further, the introduction of counter terrorism 
legislation has contributed to the damage and harm the ‘false emphasis on a single 
characteristic’ (Hudson, 2008, p.279) means, as under counter terrorism legislation it 
can lead to house arrest or detention. The logic of identity therefore interacts with the 
legal rights and the status of citizens suspected of terrorism in the ‘war on terror’.  
 
GLOBALIZATION, COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE UMMA 
Identity cannot be bound to territory, especially in the contemporary era where events 
like the ‘war on terror’ transcend national territories and inform global notions of 
threat and risk. Although Naussbaum (1994 cited in Khatib, 2003) states that 
globalization has led to questions regarding the significance of the nation, the role of 
the state remains of upmost importance given that it is primarily through the state that 
citizenship and thus legal rights are enacted. However, it could be argued that 
globalization has made cosmopolitanism a more useful perspective.  
According to Kaldor (2003), globalization is a process which includes 
exclusion, fragmentation and homogenization and integration, interconnectedness and 
diversity. Kaldor (2003) goes further in arguing that since the loss of legitimacy by 
post colonial states many wars have been fought in the name of establishing political 
identity so that power can be achieved. In the contemporary era identity has become 
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of global significance and through the need to establish power global identities have 
come to represent a growing source of exclusion – to the extent that differences of 
identity have been used to legitimise exclusion and war. The existence of identity as 
causes of war has led Young (2003, p.390) to argue that ‘not only are there strong 
parallels between the dynamics of crime and the desire to punish, but that there are 
close similarities between violence associated with ‘common’ criminality and the 
violence of war and terrorism’. In both cases labels of identity act to exclude, 
perpetuate injustice and lead to acts of oppression and aggression. Kaldor (2000) 
remarks on how social formations which exclude on the basis of identity are of a 
transitional nature meaning that on the basis of identity one can be an outsider in their 
own national territory in which they are a citizen but also an outsider beyond their 
national territory and this is a defining feature of new wars. In this way it is possible 
to appreciate Gilroy’s use of the word diaspora – Hudson states  
 
‘Gilroy suggests diaspora as a concept that better represents identity in the 
world. He talks of diaspora, not in the usual sense of the great dispersals of 
peoples who share ethnicity, culture and history (such as a Jewish diaspora 
or an African diaspora), but in the sense of a diffused experience and 
understanding of identity’ (Hudson, 2008, p.280).  
 
Given that exclusion and injustice are prevalent in the nation state and beyond, it is 
possible to comprehend how they can act to unite understandings of identity and 
experiences between individuals that do not share citizenship to the same country but 
share a religious identity.  
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The ‘war on terror’ has accelerated the rate at which experiences and 
understandings of identity are shared between Muslims. As Bosworth, Bowling and 
Lee (2008, p.263) argue the ‘new’ security agenda of terrorism and Islamic 
fundamentalism ‘has become seen as the ‘dark side’ of globalization linking 
migration to crime, smuggling, terrorism and the policy issues of ‘law and order’ 
across the globe’. The ‘war on terror’ has accelerated the need for global harmony, 
tightened the negative discourses associated with Muslims’ Islamic identity and 
impacted Muslims’ own perceptions of unity. The use of cosmopolitanism can 
facilitate an understanding of these processes and the umma identity through allowing 
Muslim citizens to relate their feelings of belonging and attachment to identities 
beyond the state territory.  
The umma represents the global community of Muslims and according to 
Sadiki (2002, p.49)  
 
‘Islam today is a truly globalised and polycentric community with more 
than one billion adherents, representing different regions, nationalities, 
ethnic backgrounds, languages and social classes, and varying degrees of 
social mobility and literacy’.  
 
Sadiki (2002) argues that the events of September 11th are an example of bad 
globalization because they have disempowered Muslims. What Sadiki (2002) means, 
is that the ‘war on terror’ has acted to exclude and marginalize Muslims. Therefore, 
shared experiences of injustice as based on Islamic identity have unified the umma. 
The ‘war on terror’ transcends localization and globalization leading to what 
Ehteshami (1997, p.180 cited in Khatib, 2003, p.392) calls ‘the emotional, spiritual 
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and political response of Muslims to an acute and continuing social, economic and 
political crisis’. In this way globalization and global events like the ‘war on terror’ do 
not just lead to a stronger sense of shared identity but also impact emotions and 
feelings thereby meaning that events across the globe can feel as personal as events 
that are local. The umma identity can thus be an identity which exacerbates pain but 
also provides unity. For example, recent research by Hussain and Choudhury (2007) 
found that amongst British Muslims there has been a shift to a more universal Islam 
which downplays cultural differences. Therefore, although the umma identity 
represents a global point of unity for Muslims this is not at the expense of a 
cosmopolitan identity as one is based on Islam and the other on humanity and human 
rights. This research will explore the different notions of these global identities and 
how they interact with Muslims perceptions of citizenship, belonging and unity to 
both their British and Islamic identity.  
 
COSMOPOLITANISM AND CITIZENSHIP 
Although there has been an increase in the use of cosmopolitanism in the social 
sciences in recent years, in criminology there has been much criticism of the 
relationship between criminology and the state. Hillyard, Sims, Tombs and Whyte 
(2004 cited in Friedrichs, 2009) argue that the discipline has served the interests of 
the state and through emphasizing a wider agenda of human rights cosmopolitanism 
can be used to critique the state and is therefore similar to developments in 
criminology made through works such as Stanley Cohen’s ‘States of Denial’, which 
calls for more criminology to incorporate violations of human rights. 
Citizenship from a criminological perspective, as already stated emphasizes 
concepts such as legitimacy and due process and therefore liberty and rights. 
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Cosmopolitanism is very similar, according to this perspective the state has certain 
duties, firstly that ‘every human being has a right to have her or his vital interest met, 
regardless of nationality or citizenship’ (Jones, 1999, pp.15–17 cited in Sypnowich 
2005, p.56). Therefore, identities should not lead to differential citizenship. Secondly, 
‘it rules out positions that attach no moral value to some people, or that weigh the 
value people have differentially according to characteristics like ethnicity, race, or 
nationality’ (Brock and Brighouse, 2005, p.4). Therefore where no moral values are 
associated with certain identities, the extent to which the citizen feels part of the 
national and wider community of ideals (Held, 2005) will be damaged. Within this 
perspective the principle of equality is essential and the state has a duty to maintain 
equality through making sure that every group is treated equally.  
Cosmopolitanism warns of the dangers of the state deviating from 
cosmopolitan law, which is about maintaining universal human rights and ensuring 
that every citizen has equal liberty. Cosmopolitanism places importance on 
perceptions and it is perceptions of inequality by citizens which make state deviations 
from cosmopolitan law problematic. As Beck (2006, p.19) states ‘the choice to 
become or remain an ‘alien’ or a ‘non-national’ is not as a general rule voluntary, but 
a response to acute need, political repression’. Beck (2006, p.167) states ‘Europe 
sows the seeds of disappointment from which hatred springs’. Perceptions of 
repression lead to changes in identity, a sense of detachment because they negatively 
impact on the psychological dimension of citizenship. In this way both 
cosmopolitanism and citizenship place a duty on the state and highlight that where the 
state, or apparatus of the state fail in these duties then citizens’ loyalty, sense of 
justice and belonging will be impacted. These perspectives are relevant to the 
research as the introduction of controversial counter terrorism legislation and the 
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wider ‘war on terror’ has been seen to negatively impact Muslim citizens’ sense of 
belonging. 
There are various other parallels between citizenship and cosmopolitanism, for 
example Benhabib, (2003, 2004 cited in Nash, 2009, p.168) ‘has developed the 
argument that citizenship itself is now becoming cosmopolitan through developments 
in human rights, especially within Europe’ and within cosmopolitanism Couture and 
Nielsen, (2005) use the phrase world citizen. Therefore, part of the growing inter-
linkage between citizenship and cosmopolitanism can be attributed to changes in 
authority which are taking place beyond the nation state. However, citizenship and 
cosmopolitanism are also compatible because both share a focus on human rights. 
Held (2005 cited in Smith, 2007, p.37) states  
 
‘cosmopolitanism is commonly interpreted as a transformative political 
project, geared towards entrenching human rights, democracy and cultural 
diversity in an age of globalization’.  
 
This has a direct similarity with the criminological idea of citizenship and the 
emergence of the language of rights, as Nash (2009, p.1068) argues  
 
‘human rights and citizenship have long been closely entwined; indeed 
historically they share similar roots in liberal individualism. This is clearly 
expressed in the great 18th-century declarations of the ‘rights of man’, the 
recognition that ‘all men are created equal‘, born with inalienable natural 
rights’.  
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Nash (2009) highlights how the emergence of individual autonomy, equality and 
innocent until proven guilty are what we now interpret as human rights. Human rights 
is closely tied to the theme of ethics, which is about having a responsibility in 
ensuring that others are not harmed, as Dower (2008, p.8) states ‘cosmopolitanism at 
the very least takes seriously the idea that we – as individuals and as collectivities 
such as states or companies – have duties not to harm other people in other parts of 
the world (or if we do there have to be very strong reasons justifying this)’. Similarly, 
Brock and Brighouse, (2005) describe the process as one in which if each human has 
equal moral worth then this creates moral responsibilities. The cosmopolitan ideal is 
that ‘the life of everyone matters, and matters equally’ (Couture and Nielsen, 2005, 
p.183). In this way not only do citizens owe a responsibility to each other but so does 
the state and due to justice being a prominent theme in cosmopolitanism the duty to 
not harm citizens can be likened to the idea of the social contract – where the state has 
to act within the boundaries of legitimacy. Through using both citizenship and 
cosmopolitanism this research will maintain a non state centric position and do as 
Gunning (2007a, p.376) suggests which is to ‘move beyond the state as the sole 
legitimate referent…. to the wider notion of human security’.  
 
COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP 
Within the idea of humanity and global governance it has been argued that citizenship 
should remain as the nation state is needed. Nash (2009) contends that modern states 
serve citizens whist also upholding principles of universal rights. Therefore, for Nash 
(2009) the two can co-exist, Turner (2009) highlights the necessity of the state 
because it provides people with a sense of belonging and identity that comes from 
being rooted to a territory. Many of the tensions between global governance and 
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national governance are down to a belief that global peace and human rights could be 
better secured beyond the nation state. For example, Nash (2009) identifies different 
distinctions of citizenship through using cosmopolitan citizenship – one based on 
human rights. There are ‘super-citizens’ which according to Nash (2009, p.1073)  
 
‘have all the rights of citizens but increasingly, in a globalizing, 
deregulated political economy, citizenship does not tie them to states 
because they own the means of production’. There are marginal citizens 
‘who have full citizenship rights but who nevertheless do not enjoy full 
citizenship status: economically, by relative poverty; and socially, by 
racism’ (Nash 2009, p.1073).  
 
It could be said that they suffer the logic of identity as assumptions are made about 
their identity which lead to unequal citizenship. Therefore, within the ‘war on terror’ 
those deemed as possessing risky identities, framed along the lines of possessing an 
Islamic identity could be understood as ‘marginal citizens’ as they are at risk of being 
afforded relative legal rights.  
Citizenship and cosmopolitanism can also be applied to how the ‘war on 
terror’ has been constructed and more specifically suspects of terrorism. A discussion 
of this facilitates an understanding of the measures taken by the state and the police in 
countering terrorism and further how such measures are likely to impact perceptions. 
Terrorism was constructed in terms of a binary, as Brassett (2008) argues terrorists 
were constructed as being barbaric and in direct opposition to cosmopolitans who 
were constructed as being civilized and as forming the global community. Much of 
the actions taken by western states as part of the ‘war on terror’ are based on the 
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discourses of threat, risk etc created and the creation of a discourse around the enemy. 
When identifying the features needed to create a good enemy Young (2003, p.400) 
identifies the following features –  
 
‘we must be able to convince ourselves that: (1) they are the cause of a 
large part of our problems; (2) they are intrinsically different from us—
inherently evil, intrinsically wicked, etc. This process of resentment and 
dehumanization allows us to separate them off from the rest of humanity 
(us) but it also permits us to harden ourselves to deal with the special 
instance of a threat’.  
 
To take the ideas presented by Young (2003) firstly, as Bosworth and Guild (2008) 
argue although terrorism has been constructed as being a foreign problem the London 
bombings of 7th July 2005 should challenge this as three of the four bombers were 
British and thus the problem was a British problem not one that had been created 
elsewhere. To take the second point about the enemy needing to be constructed as 
being different, terrorists have been constructed as being outside humanity and 
therefore as not deserving due process. However, as Young (2003, p.396) points out, 
although this was an attempt to portray terrorists as not being part of humanity ‘the 
socially excluded do not, exist in some ‘elsewhere’ cut off spatially, socially and 
morally from the wider society’. They are therefore part of the same humanity, if for 
no other reason than the fact that they too occupy a space on earth. Thus, having 
separated terrorists from humanity an image of what is at risk and in need of 
protection is created and this served the purpose of establishing legitimacy in actions 
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taken to counter terrorism. It is for this reason that Flores (2005, p.124 cited in 
Ruggiero, 2007, p.219) argues  
 
‘we are back to the justifications of the colonial era, where a strong and 
sincere feeling associated with the civilizing mission was accompanied by 
inevitable military action. The current paradox of the West seems to be the 
pursuit of universal principles and rights, while violating both in the name 
of its own most immediate interests and justifying historically and 
theoretically such violations’.  
 
Aradau and Munster (2009) comment on how the creation of the enemy as being 
unworthy of rights and humanity serves the purpose of creating domestic and 
international law and similarly, Deriu, 2005; Fine, 2006; Zolo, 2000 (cited in 
Ruggiero 2007) argue that the notion of humanitarian violence serves to legitimize re-
colonisation whereby the label inhumane is used to justify punishment.  
Cosmopolitan ideas of humanity were used in the construction of terrorism, as 
Stephens argues ‘[p]eople were asked to choose: either they were with the British 
people, and the British government representing ‘our way of life’, or they were with 
the people who acted through terrorism’ (Brassett, 2008, p.324). In this way the state 
manufactured legitimacy, enforcing an either or binary whereby those questioning the 
introduction of legislation which deviates from due process could be accused of being 
against British values. Thus, cosmopolitanism with its themes of democracy, human 
rights and humanity can be used to explain how the ‘war on terror’ was constructed. 
Further, it can be used as a way of exploring the ideas which were used to introduce 
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counter terrorism which deviates from the social contract of citizenship and more 
generally accelerates the creation of the ‘marginal citizen’ (Nash, 2009).  
 
COSMOPOLITANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Although citizenship elucidates the role of the state since citizenship is primarily 
confined to the territory of the nation state, cosmopolitanism emphasizes rights which 
exist beyond the state. Therefore, within cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan law is 
associated with human rights and further, as Nash (2009) contends that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights with its legalistic language outlines the moral principles 
which should govern state activities. Kaldor (2000, p.7) argues the two main 
components of cosmopolitan law are the ‘Laws of War and Human Rights Law’. 
However although cosmopolitan law could be said to be any law which exists beyond 
the nation state / European level and is concerned with human rights, Walker (2005a, 
p.6) highlights the tensions between what he calls the ‘thin’ level, the ‘social 
commitments associated with a set of common obligations at the global level’ and 
‘thicker’ local obligation. Of concern to Walker (2005a) is how a range of diverse 
perceptions and ideals can be negotiated and made to fit within the ‘thin’ level. This is 
very similar to the discussion provided of the cosmopolitan ideal of achieving unity 
without omitting cultural diversity.  
However, Walker (2005a) does concede that the United Nations have made 
progress in facilitating the existence of international law and this has been progressive 
because the approach adopted has treated individuals as cosmopolitan subjects and 
thus as subjects of international law. The existence of institutions such as the United 
Nations has led Benhabib (2007 cited in Nash, 2009) to also comment on the 
existence of a relationship between the global level and citizens via human rights. 
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Benhabib (2007, p.32 cited in Nash, 2009, p.1069) in particular focuses on how 
human rights have created a cosmopolitan political community in which ‘citizens and 
non citizens are authors of the law and not mere subjects of the law’. Therefore, Nash 
(2009) contends that citizenship is in fact becoming cosmopolitanized because a form 
of justice is available and being extended to non citizens and it could be argued that 
states are becoming cosmopolitan because human rights are placing a duty onto 
states.  
Nash (2009) traces the events which have led to the legalization of human 
rights that transformed international law. According to Nash (2009) there have been 
two major changes in international law, firstly individuals became accountable for 
violations of the laws of war and secondly, human rights became a system introduced 
to limit how a state could treat its own citizens. Nash (2009) further adds the second 
development was extended with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)5. 
According to Dower (2008) the introduction of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was aimed at ensuring that responsibility for protecting individuals’ human 
rights resided with the state and this has been enhanced by a more cosmopolitan turn. 
The universal level is therefore tied to states through human rights and human rights 
could also be interpreted as forming a relationship between individuals and the 
universal level. Therefore, through the perspective of cosmopolitanism, the state is 
conceptualized as having duties and responsibilities.  
The emergence of rights placed a burden upon the state to ensure that legal 
rights are always maintained and the rights which emerged during the enlightenment 
are rights that are central to cosmopolitanism. Both the enlightenment and 
                                                 
5 As Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has it: 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status … (Nash, 2009, p.1071). 
 
47 
 
cosmopolitanism elucidate the importance of core human rights, such as the right to 
be assumed innocent until proven guilty and whereas the enlightenment acted to 
curtail the power of the state through the introduction of these legal rights, 
cosmopolitanism places a burden on the state to maintain such rights through the 
language of universal human rights. There are vast similarities between the 
enlightenment and cosmopolitanism and where counter terrorism legislation has 
violated due process and enlightenment principles it has also violated cosmopolitan 
law. It should briefly be noted that the European level also dictates rights, for example 
the European Convention of Human Rights. Burgenthal et al., (2002, p.172 cited in 
Nash, 2009, p.1071) states that ‘the cosmopolitan law of human rights is especially 
well developed in Europe, with the European Court of Human Rights effectively 
acting as a ‘constitutional court for civil and political rights’ for all the member states 
of the Council of Europe’. However, here the issue is enforcement because the 
European Court can only recommend action to a state if violations of human rights 
have been found to exist.  
The way in which terrorism has been constructed has made the enforcement of 
human rights problematic. For example, the ‘war on terror’ has undermined the extent 
to which universal fundamental rights can unite all diversity and difference and 
therefore be a stronger force to unite humanity than any value of difference (Hudson, 
2008). This has been facilitated by the construction of the terrorist and further through 
the introduction of counter terrorism legislation which according to Welch and 
Schuster, (2005, p.345–7 cited in Bosworth, Bowling and Lee, 2008, p.265) 
exemplifies ‘a globalizing culture of control’ driven by ‘perceptions of difference and 
putative threats’. The discourse of human rights is useful to this research given that 
the ‘war on terror’ undermines human rights and human rights are features of both 
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citizenship and cosmopolitanism. Matthews and Kauzlarich, (2007) argue that 
violations of human rights should be used to form definitions of crime rather than 
state manufactured definitions. Given that this research is exploring Muslim citizens’ 
perceptions, any use of state manufactured definitions of crime would narrow the 
narratives that emerge. Further, when exploring citizenship themes of loyalty, 
belonging and attachment emerged and from within cosmopolitanism as Beck (2006) 
has noted political repression practiced by the state impacts identity. Therefore, the 
broader definition of state crime will be used - ‘individuals or groups of individuals 
who have experienced economic, cultural, or physical harm, pain, exclusion, or 
exploitation because of tacit or explicit state actions or policies which violate law or 
generally defined human rights’, (Kauzlarich et al, 2001, p.176). This definition 
includes pain and exclusion and thus is a definition in which loyalty, belonging and 
attachment can be placed through considering the wider impact of the ‘war on terror’ 
on British Muslims.  
 
COSMOPOLITANISM AND JUSTICE 
This research is concerned with how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted Muslim 
citizens’ perceptions of the state and police and uses the concepts of legal rights, legal 
status and human rights from citizenship and cosmopolitanism to explore these 
perceptions. To further facilitate this exploration the concepts of justice and injustice 
are also useful, especially given that the measures taken by the state and the police in 
the ‘war on terror’ predispose and indeed facilitate the existence of injustice (Liberty, 
2004; Liberty, 2007a). According to Hudson (Hudson, 2006, 2007, 2008 cited 
Hudson, 2008, p.276) cosmopolitanism developed ‘as an ideal to underpin models of 
justice’.  
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‘Justice has a legal – political aspect, and an ethical aspect. It requires 
keeping the rules of international law, respecting legal and political 
conventions nationally and internationally, but it also demands respect for 
the other just because she is a human’ (Hudson, 2009, p.715).  
 
Justice is therefore a multifaceted concept as it incorporates an ethical dimension 
which using cosmopolitanism could be said to be the idea that every individual is part 
of humanity and thus an ethics of responsibility including human rights is owed to all 
individuals. And the political dimension, keeping in line with political 
cosmopolitanism could be the ways in which justice is administered and more 
specifically, how the concept of justice actually intrudes into citizens’ lives through 
experiences, perceptions and their subjectivity. Bertram (2005) argues is essential for 
justice to be perceived and for cosmopolitan law to be maintained and it will be of 
interest to see how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted perceptions of justice. 
Justice can be defined as a process, rather than a mere concept when 
discussing how justice shapes individuals’ perceptions because evaluations of 
injustice do not come to simply exist but are informed through various factors like 
equality and resources. Deutsch (2006) contends that although the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights does not state that all individuals should be treated 
identically – it does highlight that systematic disparities should not exist between the 
social conditions and the rights of people and therefore all individuals should have the 
same opportunities. The notion of justice thus appears to be linked to opportunities 
with Hudson (2009, p. 703) stating ‘justice is a political concept; it is concerned with 
dealing fairly with all parties…’ ‘Doing justice means giving what is due’. This 
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exploration of justice facilitates an understanding of how justice is not simply an 
abstract concept but is rather a concept which demonstrates how opportunities and 
rights and thus justice can exist when every individual is given what is due. It could 
therefore be argued that the existence of justice is about the mechanism through 
which justice is implemented and further, individuals’ understanding of justice, since 
they ultimately decide on whether they have been given the rights and opportunities 
due to them. The linkage between resources and justice presented by Turner (2007b) 
further demonstrates the importance of subjectivity because Turner (2007b, p.301) 
argues  
 
‘resources are typically distributed unequally, and so inequalities are almost 
always part of justice evaluations. As a general rule, inequalities generate 
negative emotions by those who receive less than others, primarily because 
the former makes justice evaluations that they are not getting their fair 
share’.  
 
When referring to justice, Turner (2007b) highlights how resources are part of the 
process of justice. Thus, it is the implementation of justice in the form of the 
resources and opportunities which either positively adhere to individuals’ perceptions 
of what is due or can negatively adhere to individuals’ perceptions of what is due.  
Another key factor which contributes to judgments about justice is legitimacy 
‘which can make it seem right and proper that some should receive more than others’ 
(Zelditch & Walker, 1984 cited in Turner, 2007b, p.301). However, the issue of 
legitimacy gives rise to the circumstances under which an unequal distribution of 
rights are perceived as being legitimate. The issue of legitimacy can be related to 
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relative deprivation and according to Deutsch (2006, p.24) ‘the greater the magnitude 
of relative deprivation, the greater the sense of injustice that will be experienced by 
the oppressed’. Therefore, judgments of deprivation are informed by a comparative 
consideration of resources and ‘an individual may feel doubly deprived: as an 
individual and as a group member’ (Deutsch, 2006, p.24). Keltner, Horberg and Oveis 
(2006) state that concerns over what is just and fair are the glue of social living, with 
Schwartz and Sagiv, (1995 cited in Karstedt, 2002, p.309) arguing ‘that moral values 
of justice and fairness concern all cultures’. Perceptions of justice and fairness are 
important and this suggests that where the state does not maintain equality injustice 
will be perceived. Further, moral mandates are important and outcomes and 
procedures will be perceived as illegitimate if they are not consistent with perceivers’ 
moral mandates (Skitka, 2002, p.589 cited in Napier and Tyler, 2008). The 
importance of perceived equality is that equal treatment by the state and the police 
translates into ‘equal moral worth’ (Brock and Brighouse, 2005). It informs citizens 
of their value and as Bertram (2005, p.78) states citizens must  
 
‘be granted by others an unforced recognition of their moral status, a person 
who lacks a sense of themselves as a significant presence in the world and 
therefore of their own agency, will hardly be able to form, revise, and 
pursue a conception of good’.  
 
Smith (2009) found that suffering a police wrong can be an extremely disturbing 
experience, damaging self-esteem and self confidence, with Deutsch (2006) stating 
that the victim of oppression may lose his / her sensitivity towards injustice and be 
less committed to the institutions which produce such injustice.  
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The emphasis is on subjective evaluations and a key point of interest in this 
research will be how changes in the law, those implemented through counter 
terrorism legislation are perceived and more specifically if they are perceived as being 
legitimate, even though they compromise the existence of due process for suspects of 
terrorism. Further, through using the idea of relative deprivation it will be explored if 
Muslim citizens perceive counter terrorism legislation as specifically targeting their 
Islamic identity and if this is the case how it relates to evaluations of justice. Butler 
(1997, p.139, cited in Frost and Hoggett, 2008, p.449) states, that ‘loss cannot be 
worked through when there is no public recognition or discourse through which it 
might be named and mourned’. According to Deutsch (2006, p.24), a victim of 
injustice may be outraged by his / her experience and challenge the victimizer, 
however, if the ‘victimizer is more powerful and has the support of the legal and other 
institutions of the society, the victim will realize that it would be dangerous to act on 
his outrage or even to express it’. Therefore perceptions of justice relate to moral 
beliefs and counter terrorism legislation has an enormous capacity to negatively 
impact British Muslims’ perceptions if they perceive a sense of loss in their legal 
rights, which they perceive as being illegitimate.  
 
OPPRESSION AND BIOGRAPHICAL COSMOPOLITANISM 
The concept of oppression can be used to link perceptions of justice / injustice of the 
structural level to the societal level and thus tie the macro level of the state and state 
institutions with the micro level of society and even identity. Deutsch (2006) 
highlights the levels of injustice involved in oppression. These levels transcend from 
oppression at the level of the state, for example, procedural injustice includes the 
legal rights attributed to citizens - to the societal level where as Harvey (1999 cited in 
53 
 
Deutsch, 2006, p.10)  notes ‘civilized oppression’ is used to characterize the everyday 
processes of oppression in normal life‘. Deutsch (2006) refers to civilized oppression 
emerging when the state enforces rules and procedures which regulate the social 
institutions of the society and produce inequality and to interactive power, which 
involves those who are powerful repeating the subordinate status of a group. This 
research considers how the ‘war on terror’ and more specifically the actions of the 
state in the ‘war on terror’ have influenced society because as Foucault, (1978, 1980 
cited in Mythen and Walklate, 2008, p.229) states it is through the discourses created 
by dominant institutions that people understand risk and discourses shape human 
behaviour through ‘generating ‘truths’ about society that are ‘interiorized’ by 
individuals’. Civilized oppression is the injustice groups suffer as a result of the 
cultural stereotypes which are used to support injustice and moral exclusion is the 
product (Young, 1990, cited in Deutsch, 2006). It will be of interest to see how 
Muslim citizens believe the ‘war on terror’ discourse created by the state has 
impacted societal perceptions and interactions and the impact of this on Muslims’ 
Islamic identities. 
However, it could be argued that although justice and oppression have become 
increasingly significant at the national and local level, since the ‘war on terror’ 
perceptions are also informed by the international level. As Aas (2007, p.284) states, 
‘transnational flows and connections are shaping contemporary life more than ever, 
influencing our perceptions of community, identity and culture’. Within 
cosmopolitanism the term cosmopolitanization is used to refer to the 
interconnectedness between the local and the global. Beck (2002, p.23) states, 
‘globalization is about localization as well’ because ‘cosmopolitanism means: rooted 
cosmopolitanism, having ‘roots’ and ‘wings’ at the same time’. Similarly, Ruggiero 
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(2007) refers to how cosmopolitanism refers to individuals’ capacity to live locally 
while also being connected to global issues and interpreting global issues via the local 
and vice versa. Ruggiero (2007) places importance on the subjective dimension 
through emphasizing interpretation and thus the extent to which the two levels 
interact is down to perception and subjectivity. Cosmopolitanization is therefore a 
way of connecting the global level with the local level and exploring counter 
discourses because as Beck (2006, p.73) states cosmopolitanization is ‘a second-order 
level of self-destructive civilization that transcends the nation-state and infiltrates our 
innermost thoughts and feelings, experiences and expectations’. Within 
cosmopolitanism perceptions are also prioritized through the notion of ‘biographical 
cosmopolitanization’ ‘which means that the contradictions of the world are unequally 
distributed not just out there but also at the centre of one’s own life’ (Beck, 2006, 
p.43). Biographical cosmopolitanization is based on perceptions and the extent to 
which the concept is applicable is dependent on perceptions of contradictions and 
inequality at both the international level and the national level. Further, in conjunction 
to the notion of biographical cosmopolitanization there is cosmopolitan empathy, 
‘where the suffering of persons in other global regions and cultures no longer 
conforms to the ‘friend–foe’ divide, but can provoke sympathy for the hardships of 
fellow humans’ (Hudson, 2008, p.284). Beck (2006, p.5) created the phrase the 
‘globalization of emotions’ and related it to foreign policy in the ‘war on terror’. 
What the war in Iraq made transparent was how even mass protests could not stop the 
war, and according to Beck (2006, p.2) ‘for the first time a war was treated as an 
event in global domestic politics, with the whole of humanity participating 
simultaneously through the mass media’, and ‘the protests were driven by what one 
might call the ‘globalization of emotions’, (Beck 2006, p.5). Taking ideas of loyalty, 
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attachment and belonging - biographical cosmopolitanization allows us to understand 
how loyalty, attachment and belonging are not simply confined to citizenship and the 
nation state because globalization interacts with feelings of loyalty, attachment and 
belonging. Therefore, the construction of the ‘war on terror’ and enactment of counter 
terrorism legislation in Britain have facilitated the existence of injustice as a 
transitional concept and ideas such as oppression, and the globalization of emotions 
are of relevance to this research because of the international dynamics of the ‘war on 
terror’. 
 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter has explored the theoretical perspectives of cosmopolitanism and 
citizenship which frame the research, showing how their usage in the thesis is 
informed by wider literature, what particular aspects of each theory will be used and 
how they are relevant and useful to the research. In terms of making a contribution 
this research will make a contribution through conducting empirical research on the 
‘war on terror’ and more specifically through providing a counter discourse which is 
framed by these theories. The relationship between these theories has been 
demonstrated showing how both incorporate notions of justice, identity and human 
rights. However, the differences between both – namely the focus of cosmopolitanism 
at the global level and the focus of citizenship at the national level have also been 
discussed, thus justifying how each contribute to the research.  
In terms of a contribution, it has been discussed how both are relevant to 
understanding how the ‘war on terror’ has been constructed, (as the ‘war on terror’ 
has made concepts of justice, identity, rights, human rights important) and secondly, 
how the concepts of justice, identity, and human rights also facilitate an 
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understanding of Muslim citizens’ perceptions. Therefore, this thesis takes the ‘war 
on terror’ and places it within these theories in order to demonstrate how these 
perspectives are relevant to ‘the war on terror’ and more specifically to understanding 
British Muslims’ counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’. 
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CHAPTER 2: LEGAL RIGHTS, INTEGRATION POLICIES AND 
THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ 
The ‘war on terror’ has impacted the legal and political dimension of citizenship 
through the introduction of counter terrorism legislation and changes in policies of 
integration. Shklar (1991) states citizenship conveys social status and therefore 
impacts citizens’ sense of self and identity. Essentially, the legal and political tenets 
of citizenship are based on categorization and intervene into the lives of citizens since 
they provide both a legal and political framework in which citizens operate 
(Wetherall, 2009). Policies at the level of the state essentialize identities as they 
‘imply an internal sameness an external difference or otherness’ (Werbner, 1997, 
p.228) and can lead to social divisions and exclusion (Hussain and Bagguley, 2005). 
It is because identities are processes that are shaped by external factors that this 
research explores the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on Muslims’ Islamic identities 
(Alexander, 2009). The aim of this research is to provide a counter discourse to the 
‘war on terror’, one which considers Muslim citizens’ perceptions of the state and the 
police and the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on their Islamic identities. This chapter 
examines the changes in law and policies of integration since the ‘war on terror’ and 
the implication of these changes for British Muslims.  
Firstly, the chapter explores citizens’ legal rights and the statutes which 
provide a framework for these rights in order to demonstrate the implications of 
counter terrorism legislation on the rights of those suspected of terrorist activity. In 
terms of the thesis providing a counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’, the changes in 
law are an important part of how British Muslims’ perceive the state and the police. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the legal dimension of citizenship impacts 
citizens’ identities, feelings of belonging and the emotional attachment to their 
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various identities, (Carens, 2000; McPhee, 2005), Secondly, this chapter also explores 
how the ‘war on terror’ has changed policies of integration and the impact of these 
changes on Muslim citizens. Therefore, the chapter details state policies towards 
Muslim citizens such as multiculturalism and community cohesion. Through 
exploring state policies it is explored how such policies have framed Muslim citizens 
according to different identities, as multiculturalism was primarily based on cultural 
identity and community cohesion has prioritized Muslims’ Islamic identity. 
Therefore, the chapter demonstrates how the ‘war on terror’ is likely to have impacted 
British Muslims’ perceptions of the state and the police and their Islamic identities 
through exploring how the state has framed Muslim citizens’ identities through 
policies of integration and the law. 
 
MUSLIM IDENTITY AND INTEGRATION POLICIES BEFORE THE ‘WAR 
ON TERROR’ 
This opening section discusses the relationship between the state and Muslim 
community before the ‘war on terror’ through policies of integration. It should be 
noted that although the chapter predominantly deals with Muslims’ Islamic identities, 
since Muslims’ Islamic identities have not always been the focus of state policies, this 
chapter also explores the other identities which Muslims possess. However, the 
section also explores the contested meaning of ethnic, religious and cultural identities 
and the demographics of Muslim identities in Britain.  
Britain’s Muslim population stands at about 1.6 million (ONS, 2004) and the 
2001 census showed that Muslims represented the second-largest religion in Britain. 
Where the City of Birmingham is concerned, ‘there are 192, 000 Muslims’ in 
Birmingham’ (Peach, 2005, p.28), this translates into nine per cent of all 1.6 million 
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British Muslims and 16 per cent of Britain’s entire Pakistani population of 658,000 
are in the city of Birmingham (ONS 2004). The British Muslim population has a 
younger age structure when compared to the average for other religious groups. ‘One-
third of the Muslim population is aged 0-15 compared to the average for the whole 
population of 20 per cent’ (Peach, 2005, p.26) and almost 60% of Britain’s Muslim 
population has been born in the UK (Anwar & Qadir, 2003, p.7 cited in Seddon, 
2004, p.2). This makes the issue of ethnicity very complex and it could be argued that 
there are two forms of ethnic identities which are relevant to British Muslims. Firstly, 
utilizing the definition by Horowitz (1985; Smith, 1986; Connor, 1994; Hastings, 
1997 cited in Mitchell, 2006, p.1138) ethnicity is a sense ‘of peoplehood based on a 
sense of shared descent and belonging’; here the emphasis placed on shared descent 
could prioritize Muslims’ Pakistani identity. Secondly, according to Mitchell (2006, 
p.1138), this first definition should be ‘coupled with political national ideals or 
attachment to a specific territory’. Here with the emphasis being on national territory, 
it could be argued that Muslims’ British identity is their primary ethnicity, since 
Muslims occupy the territory of Britain. Therefore, ethnicity incorporates both 
historical roots and current ones whereby it can represent ‘a complex collection of 
loyalties’ (McPhee, 2005, p.1).  
Moving onto the complexity of defining religious identities, generally a 
‘religion is a name we give to a complex set of social practices which structure 
individual agency, and are in turn recursively structured by it’ (Woodhead 2008, 
p.55).  However, the extent to which Muslims’ Islamic identities structure agency is 
highly individualized because as Ansari (2005) argues, they are multiple religious 
identities which range from devout adherence to orthodox Islamic practice, to 
nominal affiliation. Although religiosity is one point of diversity, it has been 
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argued that religious identities intersect with other identities, such as cultural and 
ethnic identities. For example, Carens (2000, p.42) argues that  
 
‘for some Islam may be primarily a cultural marker that has little bearing on 
the norms that guide their actions in public and private life. For others, the 
commitment to Islam is at the centre, guiding every activity and choice, for 
many, it is something in between’.  
 
Therefore, a cultural religious identity is one whereby there is no religious 
participation but identification with the religion (Demerath 2001 cited in Mitchell, 
2006). The subjective application of Muslim identity could therefore be void of 
specific Islamic content and although secular and religious appear to be two binary 
opposites, Mitchell (2006) argues that they are in fact associated because even secular 
identities have religious content.  
The complexity of Islamic identities, how they intersect with other forms of 
identity and indeed the individual variations within those who label themselves as 
being a Muslim means that a subjective definition is used in this research. Although a 
subjective definition is used it is necessary to consider what unites Muslims 
irrespective of individual differences so that Muslim identity is attributed meaning. 
According to Ramadan (2004, p.9 cited in McPhee, 2005, p.7), a  
 
‘Muslim's essential identity is his religion because in the end nothing else 
has any value: Above and beyond the diversity of their national cultures 
(Muslims), the essence of their faith, their identity, their being in the world 
is the same; they define themselves on the basis of points of reference that 
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explain their sense of belonging to the same community of faith, and at the 
same time, more profoundly, root them in the universe of Islam’.  
 
Therefore, faith is essentially the point of unity within Islamic identities and it has 
been argued that Islam for many constitutes a communal identity and something from 
which Muslims cannot and do not wish to distance themselves (Sandel, 1982 cited in 
Carens, 2000). Thus, even though for some Muslims their Muslim identity may be a 
cultural identity or a secular identity it is the fact that this label represents their 
belonging to the Muslim community which makes it important.  
However, prior to the Northern Riots and the ‘war on terror’, Muslims’ 
Islamic identity was not the focus of state policies and thus it could be argued that the 
state didn’t impact Muslims’ Islamic identities. Multiculturalism was the framework 
for minority communities where ‘special representative rights and multicultural rights 
were concerned with inclusion, seeking to address difference and promote equality 
and integration’ (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994 cited in Lister, 2005, p.487). 
Multiculturalism as an integration policy was concerned with ethnic identities rather 
than religious identities and it was the Rushdie affair of the 1980’s which contributed 
to an emerging discourse surrounding British Muslims and their religious identity. 
The Rushdie Affair was prompted by revulsion towards Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses 
in 1988. This revulsion according to Kabbani (2002) forced an invisible community, 
the Muslim community into the open. It was the response to this book which provided 
the context in which a negative stereotype of British Muslims was formed. As Brah 
(2006) argues, a simplistic and dangerous binary emerged; opponents of the book 
were represented as deluded, backward and uncivilized in contrast to the supposedly 
enlightened liberal supporters of Rushdie.  
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The perpetuation of negative stereotypes by the media changed the 
constructed discourse associated with Muslims, which had the impact of changing the 
‘Paki-bashing’ of the 1970s which was essentially anti-Asian, to a discourse which 
had highly salient anti-Islamic elements (Lewis, 1994). The impact of the Rushdie 
affair to unite Muslim communities was evident; political action took place under the 
banner of Muslims’ religious identity, with organizations formed such as the British 
Muslim Action Front (Lewis, 1994). The policy of multiculturalism was based on 
ethnic identities and coloured racism because as Modood and Ahmed (2007) argue, 
religious identities were marginalized in state policy. This marginalization became a 
point of anger for Muslims during the Rushdie affair because Muslims wanted a 
change in legislation which would recognize their religious identity. According to 
Modood and Ahmad (2007) groups asserting their rights based on ethnic and racial 
identity were encouraged, but when Muslims wanted the same rights, such 
assertiveness was perceived as a threat to multiculturalism rather than as a positive 
move in the equalities struggle.  
However, although the Rushdie affair did bring Islamic identities into the 
public sphere, the extent to which the Rushdie affair had a long term impact on 
Muslims’ Islamic identities is questionable. Where law and order was concerned, 
Muslims remained under the banner of their Asian identity as there was no 
differentiation within ‘Asian criminality’. This is of significance because the Asian 
identity dismissed intra Asian religious differences and united these differences of 
religious identity through emphasizing a shared culture, thus the focus on Muslim 
youth was conveyed through a focus on Asian youth, with young Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi people being referred to as ‘conformists’ (Werbner and Modood, 1997). 
Further, according to Burnett (2004), the dominant stereotype associated with ‘Asian’ 
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focused on cultural factors, more specifically those rooted in family life and thus, ‘the 
construction of ‘Asian criminality’ assumed a very different character from that of 
black or white ‘criminalities’ (Phillips and Bowling, 2002, p.587).  
Religious identities and religious rights came to the forefront in 2001 when 
riots took place in the Northern cities of Oldham, Bradford and Burnley. Burnett 
(2004) argues that the riots were the result of marginalized and frustrated Asian youth 
involving violence between white and Asian men, with the police following an 
agenda of control. These riots have been compared with those in the 1980s (Brixton), 
with Michael (2004) arguing both riots stemmed from marginalized minorities, Asian 
and Afro-Caribbean youth trying to defend their communities. In particular, Muslim 
men were fighting against what they perceived to be religious intolerance from the 
British National Party. Allen (2005, p.55) states  
 
‘in a BNP publication circulated in Oldham, the party called for Whites to 
boycott local businesses, not those owned by Chinese or Hindus…only 
Muslims as it’s their community we need to pressure’.  
 
Religious intolerance was specifically directed at Muslims because of their Islamic 
identities and this is evident from the literature which targeted Islam.  
Bagguley and Hussain (2003b cited in Michael, 2004) argue that the response 
of the state to these riots did not involve the use of a law and disorder framework, 
unlike the disturbance of the 1980s, however this is much disputed. Alexander (2000 
cited in Kalra, 2006) states that statistical data only weakly indicated an emerging 
pattern of criminalization of Muslim youth, however, ethnographic work and the 
reports into the disturbances (four in total, from Oldham, Burnley, by Ted Cantle and 
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Lord Denham) offer a different picture. It has been detailed how the reports into the 
disturbances contributed to the criminalization of Muslim youth with the legal 
response (arrests, conviction and punishment) perpetuating this construction. Firstly, 
overall ‘395 people were arrested during the riots, the majority of whom were Muslim 
young men’ (Kalra, 2006, p.240). Secondly, there was the issue of mitigating 
circumstances, despite CCTV footage showing racist chanting the judge ordered the 
jury to disallow the charge of incitement to racial hatred. Thirdly, sentencing varied 
from between three to five years for serious offences, and according to Kalra (2006, 
p.241) when compared to the sentences given to the white young people arrested, 
there is much more cause for concern, ‘only twelve white people were arrested 
following the Oldham riots and they were given sentences of nine months each’.  
The riots of the 1980’s highlighted that in order for a law and order discourse 
to be legitimized the communities onto which a law and order response is used have 
to be created as problematic and as is now discussed the reports into the riots 
facilitated a negative construction of Muslim communities. The reports published into 
the riots, with the main report being the Cantle Report, were published after the 
events of September 11th, and marked a stark contrast with previous state policy 
towards Muslim communities. Multiculturalism was blamed for leading to divided 
societies and ‘commentators from both right and left pronounced and embraced the 
death of multiculturalism’ (Kundnani, 2002; Goodhart, 2004 cited in Alexander, 
2009, p.115). Multiculturalism was seen as contributing to the riots because critics 
argued that differential citizenship in the form of minority rights had contributed to 
citizens not wanting to collectively belong to the nation state. A policy of community 
cohesion emerged to remedy communities living ‘parallel lives’, with Muslim 
communities, in particular their Islamic identities blamed for leading them to 
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segregate themselves. As Burnett (2004) states, Muslim ideology was portrayed as 
dangerous and as being in direct conflict with the ‘civilized’ west. 
According to Michael (2004) because the reports were published after the 
events of September 11th, the reports into the riots attracted more media attention than 
would have otherwise been the case. With multiculturalism having been declared 
dead and portrayed as a contributory factor to the riots in the political domain, the 
Cantle Report placed emphasis on the need for a ‘greater sense of citizenship’ (2001: 
10 cited in Joppke, 2004,  p.251). The concept of community cohesion emerged, a 
framework for citizenship which deviated greatly from that of multiculturalism and in 
‘the report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain – the Parekh 
Report (CFMEB, 2000) – a cohesive community is defined as having a common 
vision and a shared sense of belonging’ (Wetherell, 2009, p.7).  
 
‘Community cohesion was established as a value-driven, theoretical 
perception, one that makes assumptions about the identities and beliefs of 
those who come under its remit’ (Burnett, 2004, p.8).  
 
On the state policy level a shift had taken place and Muslim communities were 
constructed as ‘the community which needs to be ‘cohered’ into white British 
communities’ (Wetherell, 2009, p.7). Through attributing blame onto Muslim 
communities, not only was a law and order discourse created as legitimate and 
necessary but further, emphasis was taken off the real issues. For example, Bagguley 
and Hussain (cited in Michael, 2004, p.9) argue that the reports had avoided 
examining wider political and social questions, such as ‘issues surrounding white 
racism’.  
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The response of the state through associating values with identities produced a 
discourse of British ‘values’ through otherizing Muslims because as Burnett (2004, 
p.3) states the theoretical and ideological under-pinning of nation hood ‘supports a 
view of citizenship that relies upon the criminalization of communities’. The riots had 
a profound impact on Muslims’ Islamic identities with the term ‘Asian’ ceasing to 
have much content as a political category’ (Modood and Ahmad, 2007, p.187). It was 
in this context that the events of September 11th took place and Muslims’ Islamic 
identities became an increasing point of debate and contention in terms of the legal, 
political and psychological dimensions of citizenship. Prior to discussing the ‘war on 
terror’ and the introduction of counter terrorism legislation the chapter explores the 
legal dimension of citizenship and legislation covering the legal status of citizens.  
 
LEGAL RIGHTS, THE POLICE AND CITIZENSHIP BEFORE THE ‘WAR 
ON TERROR’ 
The previous chapter discussed citizenship through the criminological perspective of 
the social contract and the subsequent emergence of the language of rights. Zedner 
(2007) argues that in the post 9/11 security era the values which emerged during the 
enlightenment have become increasingly relevant. This is because the ‘war on terror’ 
has deviated from the core legal rights that were established and a discussion of these 
rights facilitates an understanding of how a deviation from these rights is likely to 
impact Muslim citizens’ perceptions of the state and the police. As stated in the 
previous chapter during the late 18th century and early 19th century concepts of liberty 
and equality emerged, concepts which placed a duty on the state towards citizens 
(Garland, 1996; Walker and Boyeskie, 2001; Gearty, 2004).   
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During this period procedures which clearly articulated the legal rights of 
citizens were introduced. The first of these procedures is that the law is fixed and 
known. Lacey (2002) refers to the idea that the criminal law must be known as a 
principle of legality and / or rule of law. Beccaria (cited in McLaughlin et al, 2004. 
p.18) stated that when a fixed code of law exists ‘citizens acquire a sense of security 
because it enables them to calculate accurately the inconvenience of a misdeed’. This 
was premised on the belief that where the law was not fixed or known the state would 
have an unfair advantage. Further, with the emphasis being on ‘reason’ as opposed to 
human behaviour being the command of god only those who knew the law and chose 
to deviate from the law would be punished. Therefore, a secular view of the citizen 
emerged because citizens were conceptualized as possessing individual autonomy and 
reason. Interestingly, cosmopolitanism and citizenship share this view of the citizen. 
From a cosmopolitan perspective, the individual is conceptualized as having the 
reasoning ability to extend hospitality towards fellow humans and appreciate cultural 
diversity. From citizenship, Carens (2000) uses a framework which emphasizes 
citizens’ capacity to base their psychological subjective sense of citizenship on their 
treatment by the state.  
Secondly, this legal view of citizens as possessing autonomy dictated the 
procedures which emerged and govern criminal law. Once a citizen was suspected of 
having broken the law, the use of a criminal trial would determine their guilt whilst 
also maintaining their legal rights. The criminal trial is based on ensuring that only 
the guilty are punished and that any form of punishment is proportionate to the 
offence committed. Faulkner (2003) states how the criminal trial and punishment are 
both relevant to ideas of citizenship because they exist as a means through which 
fairness, respect for citizens’ dignity and generally the defendants legal rights which 
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form part of citizenship are enacted. The third concept is the presumption of 
innocence because procedural law, ‘the formally established norms according to 
which individuals or groups are adjudged guilty or innocent’ (Robinson, 1997 cited in 
Lacey, 2002, p.265) exists on the basis of the presumption of innocence. This view 
had a moral basis acting to protect the citizen against punishment where intention did 
not exist (Tadros, 2007) and therefore the prosecution must prove guilt and intention 
to a standard which is beyond reasonable doubt. Standards such as beyond reasonable 
doubt together with the individual autonomy of law formed the procedural legal rights 
of citizenship. Essentially what this period marked was the emergence of a set of 
concepts which became the foundations of law and justice and together these concepts 
formed due process. Due process is the principle that the government must respect all 
of a person's legal rights, instead of just some or most of those legal rights. According 
to Allan (1979, p.223 cited in Gearty 2004, p.63) ‘the rule of law amounts to a 
sophisticated doctrine of constitutionalism, revealing law as the antithesis of 
arbitrariness or the assertion of will or power’.  
However, although in principle, as has been discussed, concepts of justice, 
legal rights and equality became synonymous with citizenship leading to the existence 
of legal rights for citizens, the dominant concept of risk has led to differential 
citizenship. Burnett (2004, p.13) contends that state policies have specific goals and it 
is through these policies that the ‘state seeks to reframe the contract between citizen 
and state’. Both legislation and state policies are the result of socio-political 
circumstances meaning that the terms of the contract can change. State policies, 
especially those within the legal remit influence the construction of criminality 
through a law and order framework because as Hudson (2003, p.65 cited in Walklate 
and Mythen, 2008, p.218) states ‘suspect people do not have (actually) to commit 
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crimes to be identified as criminal’. Although ‘state-defined identity categories can 
have a profound impact on individuals’ conception of themselves’ (Skerry 2000 cited 
in Pedziwiatr, 2007, p.275), the law and order framework is perhaps much more 
powerful in impacting and shaping identities, since it is through the attribution of risk 
and suspicion onto peoples that suspect populations come to be defined as suspect 
populations. The relationship between the state, the law and the citizen has been 
discussed and fundamental to this relationship are various criminal justice agencies 
such as the police, the prison and probation service. This thesis focuses on the impact 
of the ‘war on terror’ on the police, since it is the agency of the police that enacts the 
law and is therefore likely to shape Muslim citizens’ perceptions of the ‘war on 
terror’.  
Although the role of the police has come under increased scrutiny since the 
‘war on terror’ the source of policing legitimacy has always been contested. 
According to Faulkner (2003, p.298), the authority and legitimacy of the British 
police is not derived from the state but rather ‘from the consent and confidence of the 
citizens whom they serve’. Unlike Reiner (2000), who states that the government 
invest the authority and power they have under the social contract in the police as 
agents of the law. The concept of legitimacy may not seem very important but it is the 
idea of legitimacy which dictates if the primary role of the police is seen to serve the 
state or communities – which has increasing importance within the counter terrorism 
context. In the previous chapter it was stated that the police are part of the apparatus 
of the state, this is because the criminal justice system is a tool of social control 
representing the power of the state, and it is the police that are ‘empowered to 
investigate crime, search for evidence, arrest suspected offenders and question them’ 
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(Allan, 2001, p.2). Therefore, as Waddington (2000, cited in Bowling and Foster, 
2002, p.980) argues,  
 
‘the police are sanctioned to use coercive force and can intrude into the 
private lives of citizens in ways that would be exceptionable or downright 
illegal if undertaken by anyone else’.  
 
This research does not conceptualize the police as having an either or role and thus 
recognizes that as Faulkner (2003, p.297) states the  
 
‘police are part of the apparatus of the state, their duty is to the state and 
their role is to carry out the state’s duty to protect honest and innocent 
citizens from the damage caused by crime and people who commit it’.  
 
But also recognizes that the police as Squire (1999, p.9) argues, are a public service 
that are accountable to local people because  
 
‘a whole range of initiatives from neighbourhood watch to large-scale inter-
agency initiatives, have not only exposed police decision-making to wider 
audiences but also typically acted to channel more demands towards the 
police’.  
 
The tensions between the aims of the police and different agencies which constitute 
the police are discussed further in relation to the ‘war on terror’ because the 
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introduction of counter terrorism legislation has further compounded the contested 
role of the police. 
However, the purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate the power of the 
police and how this power has been balanced with due process. The relationship 
between the state, the police and the citizen is set out in substantive law, which details 
what the criminal law is and procedural law which governs exactly how the police 
administer criminal law. Procedural law and the legal rights of citizens restrict the 
power of the police through providing a framework in which the police must operate. 
Sanders and Young (2002, p.1035) demonstrate the nature of this framework,  
 
‘as soon as the police challenge any individual whom they have any reason 
to suspect, an adversarial relationship is formed… this triggers due process 
protections, such as the caution against self-incrimination and the 
requirement of ‘reasonable’ suspicion for the exercise of coercive 
powers…On arrest the suspect is generally taken to a police station and 
detained. This triggers further due process protections, such as a right of 
access to lawyers’.  
 
Therefore, due process covers every part of the relationship between the police and 
suspect, from suspicion to conviction. However, although due process exists to ensure 
citizens’ legal rights are maintained there is a long history of discrimination and 
amplification of risk where ‘black’ communities are concerned. Practices such as 
‘Nigger Hunting’ were common and involved police officers actively searching for 
‘blacks’ to enforce their authority (Hunte, 1996, cited in Bowling, 1999). Risk was 
associated with identity with Holdaway’s (1996) findings in 1983 leading him to 
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conclude that the concept of ‘race’ was used to categorize people according to notions 
of criminality. The existence of a harsh, identity based form of policing led John 
(1970 cited in Cook and Hudson, 1993) to conclude, following his study of 
Handsworth, that there was deep resentment by older and younger ‘blacks’ with their 
social position, lack of legal rights and the discrimination and the breakdown in 
relations between the police and the ‘black’ communities could lead to confrontations 
and urban unrest. Urban unrest did surface in the 1980s, with the main concern of the 
Scarman Report (1981) being the Brixton riots. Cashmore (2004, p.374) found the 
relationship was based on mutual distrust, suspicion, and resentment, with one youth 
stating: ‘We’re fighting for our rights – against the police’. It is important that 
equality exists because the work of Gaskell and Smith (1985), which was conducted 
in the 1980s led them to conclude that ‘blacks’ feel police hostility as a group 
experience. Therefore, the issue of legal status and rights is essential, as where 
inequality is perceived then resentment and hostility is felt towards the police.  
This chronology of police discrimination is of greater concern given that the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) was introduced which provided a 
framework for the exercise of police powers ‘covering stop and search (Code A), 
entry to premises (Code B), detention and questioning (Code C), identification (Code 
D), and tape recording of interviews (Code E)’ (Stone, 2004, p.45). Further, the 
concept of reasonable suspicion was defined thus reducing the discretion of the 
police. The Code of Practice on stop-and-search issued by the Home Office under the 
authority of PACE states that ‘there must be some objective basis’ for the suspicion 
(para. 1.6), which ‘can never be supported on the basis of personal factors alone’ 
(para. 1.7)’ (Sanders and Young, 2002, p.1038). Therefore as Stone (2004, p.47) 
states, ‘color, age, hairstyle and clothing, or previous convictions cannot be used in 
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isolation, or in combination with each other as the sole basis for a reasonable 
suspicion justifying a search’. The need for an objective basis meant that an 
individual’s identity should not be a factor in determining stop and search.  
The Macpherson Inquiry was conducted into the death of Stephen Lawrence 
and after having concluded that institutional racism does exist in the Metropolitan 
Police Service (Met) the report made seventy recommendations. The Met were 
encouraged to  
 
‘examine every aspect of their policies and practices to access whether the 
outcome of their actions creates or sustains patterns of discrimination’ 
(Macpherson, 1999, p.45.24).  
 
The response of the state to the Macpherson Report was to establish a Ministerial 
Priority for the police service. This involved the need to increase trust and confidence 
in policing amongst minority ethnic communities (Home Office 1999a). However, a 
subsequent Home Office (1999b) report concluded that the service had failed to fully 
implement the recommendations made to it by the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, with 
Chief Inspector Leroy Logan, Head of the Metropolitan Police Service’s Black Police 
Association, stating that the Metropolitan Police were still institutionally racist (cited 
in Dodd, 2004). Therefore, it has been argued that regardless of what the Macpherson 
Report set out to achieve, discrimination and racist still exist within the police and it 
was in this context that counter terrorism legislation was introduced. 
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However, prior to discussing ‘new terrorism6’ there is a need to discuss the 
state response to terrorism before the events of September 11th, thereby showing how 
the ‘war on terror’ response deviated from established counter terrorism legislation. 
The UK has a history of terrorism legislation7 and this legislation was introduced to 
counter the terrorist threat associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and more 
generally the Northern Ireland Troubles. This set of legislation incorporated three 
features which link legal status to identities. Firstly, as Hillyard (1997 cited in 
Matassa and Newburn, 2003) states, Northern Ireland was a site for extending 
surveillance through developing new technologies. Secondly, the purpose of the 
legislation and arrests under this terrorist legislation was to gather intelligence, gain 
informers and screen the Irish community (Hillyard, 1993 cited in Matassa and 
Newburn, 2003). Finally, it was through the attribution of suspicion onto Irish 
communities that policies such as shoot-to-kill were practiced by the British Army 
and Royal Ulster Constabulary and targeted at a group possessing a certain identity. 
However, what also marks this legislation apart from non terrorism legislation was 
the emphasis and importance placed on pre-crime. Loader and Sparks (2002) and 
Zedner (2000) state that a focus of pre-empting threats was established and existent 
prior to the introduction of counter terrorism legislation8. Pre-crime is the existence of 
suspicion without charge as justifying prosecution and / or other punitive measures 
and as the chapter will now demonstrate it is the use of such measures within the ‘war 
                                                 
6 ‘New terrorism’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2008) is used to differentiate the state response from 
previous measures to combat terrorism – thus conveying a focus on the ‘war on terror’ response. 
7 Prevention of Violence Act 1939, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 and 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996. 
8 The collective term for the Terrorism Act 2000, Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001 
(ATCSA), Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA) and Terrorism Act 2006. Although the Terrorism 
Act 2000 was introduced before the events of September 11th it has been included under what this 
research conceptualizes as ‘counter terrorism legislation’ because it has become part of the ideological 
construction of the ‘war on terror’ and part of the legislative framework against Islamic terrorism and 
Islamic militants.  
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on terror’ which is why Muslim citizens’ perceptions of the state and the police are 
likely to have changed since the ‘war on terror’. 
 
THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’  
The remainder of this chapter discusses how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted the legal 
and political dimension of citizenship through the introduction of counter terrorism 
legislation. Further, the relationship between the ‘war on terror’ and Islamic identities 
is explored, demonstrating how on the international level and the national level 
Muslims’ Islamic identities have become relevant to the ‘war on terror’ and thus 
significant to policing and polices of integration.  
As stated in the previous chapter the global level is of great relevance to the 
‘war on terror’. It was on the global level that terrorism was linked to Islamic identity. 
After the attacks of September 11th George Bush (2001) defined the enemy as an 
international network of terrorist organizations made up of a number of groups under 
the umbrella of al-Qaeda. Soros (2006) argues that this emphasis on al-Qaeda is 
counter-productive because the ‘war on terror’ categorizes groups which use terrorist 
tactics such as Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Sunni insurrection and the Mahdi 
army in Iraq, as one. The response therefore homogenized and cast over ideological 
and political differences, constructing a vast number of different groups as sharing 
one purpose and as being the same. Through essentializing many groups which are in 
fact different from al-Qaeda, the ‘war on terror’ constructed the global enemy along a 
religious binary. As Turam (2004) states it was on a global context that Islam was 
singled out as being the major threat to Western democracies and civil society, with 
Howell (2006, p.128) referring to the ‘unhealthy construction of Islam as enjoying a 
special affinity with terrorism’. A discourse around ‘new terrorism’ emerged which 
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defined the enemy through casting an expansive definition of the enemy, with Islamic 
affiliation being the dominant factor. The enemy had to be constructed as representing 
a global risk and according to Beck (2006, p.148) the suspicion of terrorism could 
then give ‘the most powerful nation in the world carte blanche to construct ever 
changing representations of the enemy and to defend its ‘internal security’ virtually 
anywhere on foreign territory with military force’.  
Discourses of security and risk where also reflected on the European level. 
According to De Goede (2008), the European Union has led the way in pre-emptive 
measures through introducing pre-emptive policies relating to the criminalization of 
terrorist support, data retention and asset freezing. It was through constructing 
terrorism as a global risk that measures designed to criminalize prior to criminal acts 
being committed were seen as necessary. The Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism was amended by the Council of Europe in 2005, and Klausen (2009) states 
that the convention required nation states to adopt policies aimed at eradicating 
recruitment and training for terrorism. The UK response maintained an emphasis on 
pre-emption and the construction of the enemy, especially the focus on Islamic 
identity which transcended from the international level to the national level. 
Terrorism, the criminalization of terrorism and justice were essentially re-interpreted 
within the wider agenda of global governance. Altheide (2007, p.287) states that  
 
‘politicians joined terrorism with Iraq, the Muslim faith, and a vast number 
of non-western nations to strategically promote fear and use of audience 
beliefs and assumptions about danger, risk and fear in order to achieve 
certain goals, including expanding domestic social control’.  
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Domestic social control was expanded through the introduction of counter terrorism 
legislation and thus it was the interpretation of truth and the legitimacy this conveyed 
which was important (Findlay, 2007). 
The ‘war on terror’ produced a discourse defining the terrorist, as Brah (2009) 
states a suicide bomber is not a given, but socially constructed and produced. Under 
the Terrorism Act 2000, terrorism was defined as the use or threat of ‘violence against 
people and/or property designed to influence the government, to intimidate the public 
or a section of the public, or to advance a political, religious or ideological cause’ 
(Matassa and Newburn, 2003, p.468). Tadros (2007) and Stohl (2008) both argue that 
such a definition had the purpose of placing terrorism activity outside the political 
process. This placement is of significance because by extension the suspect of 
terrorism was then also placed outside the political process and democracy. Without 
the political process there is no legal status and therefore, the suicide bomber is 
dehumanised by accusations of having no respect for the lives of innocent victims 
(Findlay, 2007). It is through constructing terrorism as being outside the political 
process and humanity that principles of liberalism and human rights are legitimized as 
not existing. Thus the definition goes against cosmopolitainism because as Hudson 
(2008) argues, cosmopolitanism’s universalism means that terrorists or terrorist 
suspects cannot be treated in ways that violate their fundamental rights to life, since 
cosmopolitanism is essentially premised on universal human rights.  
The Terrorism Act 2000 is primarily concerned with the prevention of 
terrorism, therefore criminalizing and making illegal a variety of actions to prevent 
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terrorism9. However, this discussion will focus on Section 44 - 47 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000, under which police officers have the power to stop and search people in an 
area seen as being at risk from terrorism, even if they are not suspected of any breach 
of the law. According to Stone (2004, p.75) ‘what is unusual here is that the police 
need have no particular offence in mind; nor need they worry overmuch about the 
level of involvement of the person arrested’, therefore the concept of reasonable 
suspicion is void. The importance of reasonable suspicion is that it adheres to and is 
based on the assumption of innocent until proven guilty, as such placing a burden on 
the police to act according to an objective standard of suspicion. Therefore, when 
interpreted against the existing legislation which governs the relationship between the 
police and the citizen, the Terrorism Act 2000 can be said to be actively encouraging 
the police to use stop and search on the basis of an individual’s personal factors alone.  
The Anti Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) was formally 
introduced into Parliament on November 19th 2001, two months after the September 
11 attacks in America. It received royal assent and went into force on December 13th, 
2001. However, on December 16, 2004 the Law Lords ruled that parts of the Act were 
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, under the Act the state 
could indefinitely detain without charge a foreign terrorist suspect if the individual 
could not be deported for other legal reasons. In March 2005, Part 4 of the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was replaced with a system of control orders 
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA). The PTA is one of the most 
controversial pieces of legislation to emerge. The Act allows for control orders to be 
made against any suspected terrorist, whether a UK national or a non-UK national, or 
                                                 9 The Act criminalized the following - making it a criminal offence not to disclose to the police as soon as reasonably practicable, any information a person knows or believes might be of material assistance in: (i) preventing the commission of an act of terrorism anywhere in the world, and (ii) securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of a person in the UK, for an offence involving the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism.  
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whether the terrorist activity is international or domestic. The control orders are 
therefore of a preventive nature, and as such are designed to restrict the activities of 
suspects who officials fear pose a threat if left unmonitored. Under the rules, the 
Home Secretary approves an order on the advice of the security services and ‘the 
court must only examine whether the decision of the Home Secretary to apply the 
control order based on his suspicion, might reasonably have been arrived at’ (Ansari, 
2005, p.30).  
Article 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 deals most comprehensively with 
issues of legal rights, the article guarantees the right to a fair trial, including the 
following features as being essential to a fair trial, presumption of innocence, the right 
to know what charges exist, the right to prepare a defence and the right for legal 
assistance. These are the procedural rights which have long existed but were re-
affirmed with the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998. However, the right to a 
fair trial does not exist under counter terrorism legislation because a control order 
hearing is a closed hearing. The suspect does not know of the evidence, since control 
orders involve secret evidence, the suspect is unable to challenge the material and 
accusation. It is a basic principle of justice that a person should be able to challenge 
the evidence against them. The reason given for these secret hearings is that to make 
the ‘evidence’ public could jeopardize the security services methods of operation, 
their sources of information, place other people in danger or create a security risk. 
Control orders are therefore based on suspicion and risk, with both legitimizing a loss 
of liberty. 
Under a control order suspects suffer a loss of liberty and vetting 
arrangements mean that those associated with the suspect are also restricted, which 
includes family members (Institute of Race Relations, 2007) (IRR). A control order 
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can last indefinitely and yet it is suspicion alone which can determine the use of a 
control order. As is becoming apparent counter terrorism legislation has made 
legitimate substantive law and procedural law violations which under non counter 
terrorism legislation would constitute injustice. However, this Act also signifies how 
counter terrorism legislation has also redefined the function of punishment, indeed the 
place of punishment in criminal justice and the standard of proof required. Paye 
(2005) argues, this legislation places suspicion over fact, house arrest can be imposed 
not on the basis of what they have done, but according to what they could do. It is for 
this reason the Institute of Race Relations (2007) argue that control orders are forms 
of collective punishment, which violate natural justice and international law. The 
Terrorism Act 2006 received royal assent on the 30th March 2006 and was drafted as a 
response to the July 7th 2005 London bombings. Although the response of the state to 
9/11 was just as authoritarian as the response on both the international and European 
level, the introduction of the Terrorism Act 2006, and period of detention that this Act 
legitimizes, 28 days far exceed the period of detention used by any other European 
state member (Liberty, 2007b). Like the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, this Act 
also legitimizes punishment, in the form of detention rather than control orders and 
therefore, the criticism regarding control orders are equally applicable to this Act.  
It was in a climate where on the one hand the state introduced legislation 
amounting to the most comprehensive ‘charter of rights’ that the state also introduced 
counter terrorism legislation making the term domestic state crime applicable. The 
Human Rights Act 1998 became the most comprehensive system of human rights, 
detailing legal rights in the UK. According to Gearty (2004) the Human Rights Act 
1998 acted to re-affirm the very principles and moral basis of law, the three core ideas 
which are Britain’s legal heritage, respect for civil liberties; the principle of legality; 
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and the principle of respect for human dignity. The counter terrorism legislation will 
now be summarized according to the core principles of legality and therefore legal 
rights. Firstly, the discretion under the counter terrorism legislation means that 
‘citizens no longer acquire that sense of security’ (Beccaria, cited in McLaughlin et 
al, 2004, p.18) as the law is not fixed and it is not known since the Home Secretary 
has the power to define and act on the basis of suspicion. Citizens are thus not given a 
fair opportunity to conform to the law. Secondly, the existence of punishment, house 
arrest and 28 days detention before the conviction of a crime means that the 
presumption of innocence no longer applies. Thirdly, as already stated the law 
incorporates the belief that citizens have individual autonomy and agency, thus 
possessing free will. Citizens are stripped of capacity and responsibility because  
 
‘even if it appears almost certain that the person will commit an offence, 
respect for the individual as a moral agent must acknowledge a categorical 
‘window of moral opportunity’ or chance to remain innocent’ (Smilansky, 
1994, p.52 cited in Zedner, 2007, p.274).  
 
The introduction of counter terrorism legislation has led to the conclusion that we 
now have a system for ordinary decent criminals and one for those suspected of 
terrorist activity (Cheong-Tham and McCulloch 2006 cited in Pantazis and 
Pemberton, 2009). The acceleration of risk and suspicion under this legislation has 
implications for the suspect community, as risk and suspicion alone determine the 
level of rights that exist.  
The ‘war on terror’ marked an increase in the pervasive nature of risk in the 
criminal justice system. Amoore and De Goede (2008, p.8 cited in McCulloch and 
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Pickering, 2009, p.629) state the ‘politics of pre-emption… go beyond the established 
language and techniques of risk’ that existed within the criminal justice system’. Pre-
crime links coercive state actions to suspicion without the need for charge, 
prosecution or conviction and this had a direct impact on policing. Counter terrorism 
policing promotes the idea of the police as being an ‘intelligence agency’. It is 
essentially what the policing task of being proactive justifies in the form of detention 
and control orders which sets it apart from how intelligence and pro-active policing is 
used in non counter terrorism policing. As McCulloch and Pickering (2009) argue the 
preventive counter-terrorism framework is concerned with targeting and managing 
through restricting and incapacitating those individuals and groups considered being a 
risk. This has led to the construction of a ‘suspect population’ a population which is 
vulnerable to policing suspicion on the basis of possessing certain ethnic, religious 
and cultural traits. And it is the presence of such traits which determines as Zedner 
(2007, p.274) puts it ‘those within and without protection’, leading to the 
criminalization of those who are believed to commit ‘imaginary future harms’ 
(McCulloch and Pickering, 2009, p.629). What is of concern is that although as has 
been demonstrated the preventive agenda of counter terrorism policing encourages 
profiling, profiling as a means of preventing terrorism is ineffective (Ansari, 2005; 
McCulloch and Pickering, 2009). It follows that because there is no due process and 
there is a pre-occupation with attributing risk, innocent people will suffer because as 
Mythen and Walklate (2008, p.13) argue, ‘innocent people are rendered risk 
repositories by virtue of sharing some or other of the characteristics of the ‘typical’ 
terrorist’. Further, according to Zedner (2007) it is because the concern of policing 
has shifted from accessing individual offenders to classifying suspect populations that 
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as long as one falls into the category of suspect population, the need to identify 
individual risk need not exist.  
Policing has come under much scrutiny since the introduction of counter 
terrorism legislation. The scrutiny has related to the powers the police have under 
counter terrorism legislation and therefore led to questions regarding how the police 
balance these powers without alienating communities. Within this context the idea of 
the police as serving communities and operating through consent has been 
highlighted. According to Klausen (2009), after the London bombings there was a 
shift in policing practice, with community policing principles being applied to counter 
terrorism enforcement. Although countering terrorism is one aspect of police work, 
for Grabosky (2008) ordinary policing and counter terrorism are the same because 
both require that the police protect communities and that mutual respect and trust 
exist. As stated previously, the police are seen as having dual roles, as being part of 
the apparatus of the state and serving the interests of the state and also as being 
accountable to communities through policing by consent. Within the counter 
terrorism context the idea of serving communities has become fragmented with 
counter terrorism policing being primarily concerned with pre-emption and profiling 
and thus requiring the police to use their discretion to criminalize those who are 
believed to commit future harms.   
Pickering, McCulloch and Wright-Neville (2008) point out the relevance of 
community policing for culturally and religiously diverse societies. Within the 
counter terrorism context this aspect of community policing is important since it 
could ensure that through knowledge of cultural and religious identities the police are 
in a better position to recognize those who constitute a risk and not homogenize 
identities. Innes (2006) relates community policing to neighbourhood policing, 
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arguing that neighbourhood police officers are well positioned to engage with 
communities’ members and thus enhance the existence of trust which will facilitate 
the exchange of information from the community to the police and this is a more 
effective way of countering terrorism. However, although Innes (2006) highlights the 
significance of neighbourhood policing as a way of building trust, Klausen (2009) 
argues that although efforts have been made by the police to build trust with Muslim 
communities, with the emphasis being on collaboration between the police and 
Muslim organisations the sense of trust established through collaborations fails to 
filter down to the general Muslim public.   
In counter terrorism policing trust and legitimacy are of great importance as 
are notions of ‘reasonableness, compromise and respect for the individuals’ rights’ 
(Kennison and Loumansky 2007, p.151). However, beyond the principles highlighted 
as being important, policing within the counter terrorism context has become 
increasingly difficult because of the number of different policing units, each with its 
own agenda and way of policing. To give a brief idea as to heterogeneous nature of 
the police, Walker (2005b, p.387) states there has been a growth in intelligence 
policing which is evident through the creation of the  
 
‘Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) within the Security Service and 
the development of regional offices by the Security Service. Other 
developments include the regionalization of police Special Branches and 
ports policing, and the establishment of a Police International Counter 
Terror Unit (PICTU) based within the Metropolitan Police and the National 
Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) within MI5’.  
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Further, Kennison and Loumansky, (2007, p.152) state a variety of civilians and non-
civilians contribute to policing ‘through a range of agencies and actors’ and similarly, 
Miller (2010) highlights the introduction of the Neighbourhood Policing Programme 
and thus ‘the pluralization of the police makes it difficult in defining who the police 
are’ (Kennison and Loumansky, 2007, p.157). The heterogeneous nature of the police 
makes notions of trust and legitimacy harder to implement. For example, 
neighbourhood police could prioritize a community form of policing but other 
policing units may adopt ‘hard’ policing methods and as Kennison and Loumansky 
(2007) argue, there is the further differentiation of whether the policing unit is 
employed by local state authorities or central state. Although the heterogeneous 
nature of the police has been acknowledged, for the purpose of this research Muslim 
citizens will be asked about their perceptions and experiences of the police, without 
any reference made to any particular form of policing. The main reason for this is 
that, the research is concerned with subjective understanding and therefore it may be 
the case that respondents understand the police as one single institution and asking 
about specific units could lead to confusion.  
The use of counter terrorism legislation by the police is now discussed, 
demonstrating the use of counter terrorism legislation in relation to identity. Data for 
stop and search shows that prior to September 11th the number of PACE searches of 
black people were five times higher than of whites and rates for Asians were almost 4 
times higher than for whites (Home Office 2000). However, after September 11th the 
use of stop and search increased, under the Terrorism Act 2000, in 2002 - 2003 there 
were 31, 1000 searches overall, 21, 9000 up on the previous year and 30,000 more 
than in 1999-2000 (Cowen, 2004, p.1). Further, under the Terrorism Act 2000, 
whereas the number of White people stopped and searched increased by 118 per cent 
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from 2001 - 02 to 2002 - 03, the number of Black people stopped and searched rose 
by 230 per cent, and the number of Asians stopped and searched increased by 302 per 
cent (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2002). And according to Morris (2004a 
cited, in Mythen and Walklate, 2008, p.13) ‘the number of Asian people stopped and 
searched under anti-terrorism laws quadrupled in a single year, from 744 in 2001-02 
to 2,989 in 2003-4’.  
Data therefore reveals that stop and searches under counter terrorism 
legislation are disproportionately used against Asian communities. Spalek (2005 cited 
in Spalek, 2008, p.43) argues that  
 
‘amid raising concerns that young Muslim men are being targeted by stop 
and search under counter-terrorism legislation, calls have been made to 
monitor the faith identities of those who are stopped and searched by the 
police’.  
 
There exists a need for data collection to reflect the emergence of counter terrorism 
legislation which prioritizes religious identity and not ethnic identity. Of the total 
number of arrests made, according to Statewatch (2007) UK, police arrest statistics 
between 11 September 2001 and 31 March 2007, excluding Northern Ireland show 
that 1165 arrest have been made in total. Of this, only 132 suspects have been charged 
with terrorism, 109 with terrorism offences and other criminal activity, with 41 
suspects convicted and 114 awaiting trial. 669 have been released without charge. 
According to Travis (2009) the statistics also show that as of March 2008 there were 
125 people in prison in England and Wales for terrorist-related offences with most of 
the terrorist prisoners, 75 describing themselves as British, and 111 declaring 
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themselves to be Muslim. Therefore, a very high percentage of those in prison are of 
the Islamic faith. Klausen (2009, p.412) points out, ‘a total of 43 people were arrested 
in connection with the 21 July 2005 attack. It is almost impossible to keep track of the 
number of arrests and trials’. Therefore the secrecy surrounding the use of counter 
terrorism legislation and the pre-emptive nature of the legislation makes it difficult to 
know if legislation has been used to eradicate real threats of terrorist activity.  
The need for data collection on the basis of religious identity is further evident 
when the identity of suspects under control orders is considered. Liberty (2007a) have 
argued that all suspects have been Muslims, however courts have ruled that the 
identity of suspects should not enter the public domain as suspects have not been 
charged with any offence. Casciani (2007) argues that by May 2007 some 30 control 
orders had been issued since the start of the regime, and in January, when a British 
man absconded after being served with a control order, the Home Office stated he 
was not believed to represent a direct threat to the public in the UK. If this was the 
case and indeed the man was not a threat then why was he subjected to a control order 
in the first place? The High Court determined on 16th February 2007 that the Home 
Secretary had not given proper consideration to the possibility of a criminal 
prosecution before resorting to a control order, even though the PTA 2005 
specifically requires him to do this (Liberty, 2007a). The use of these powers has 
raised considerable controversy and by November 2009 there were 24 suspects under 
a control order, who are thought to be a grave danger to national security but cannot 
be prosecuted by the courts (Loveys, 2009). Although detention without trial is in 
itself a violation of the principles of legality, the conditions in which suspects have 
been detained are horrific. The conditions in which the suspects have been held at 
Belmarsh high-security prison have been described by lawyers and Home Office 
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medical experts as ‘barbaric’ and as ‘concrete coffins’, with Amnesty International 
describing the conditions of detention as amounting to ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment’ (Ansari 2005, p.61). Policing activity under counter terrorism legislation 
tends to receive much media coverage and this coverage has also detailed police 
abuse. A case which has been cited frequently in the press and by groups representing 
Muslims is that of a Muslim man who was detained by the police in London. The man 
was forced to prostrate with his arms in cuffs, and asked, ‘where is your god now?’ It 
is alleged that the detainee suffered over forty injuries including a black eye and 
severe bruising’ (Liberty, 2004, p.5). Fear amongst the suspect population could 
therefore be related to the punitive nature of this legislation and cases such as this are 
likely to impact the perceptions of British Muslims because there is a strong 
correlation between Islamic identity and the use of counter terrorism legislation, 
which justifies the focus of this research on Islamic identities. 
The ‘war on terror’ has acted to produce a considerable amount of concern 
and this concern is very much the product of what counter terrorism legislation 
legitimizes and the power of the police under this legislation. As Wellar (2001, p.51) 
states,  
 
‘since the system, (criminal justice system) embodies aspects of the power 
of the state, ordinary people who are caught up in it for one reason or 
another can feel especially vulnerable. Such vulnerability can be 
exacerbated by the experience of unfair treatment on the basis of religion’.  
 
Thus, non counter terrorism policing has the capacity to induce vulnerability and the 
increase in police power and perception of religious targeting can both increase 
89 
 
vulnerability and perceptions of legal inequality. Further, adding to this vulnerability 
is the existence of punitive measures based on suspicion.  Research by Spalek, El - 
Awa and McDonald (2009) found suspicion has grave consequences upon an 
individual’s and their family’s life including job losses, family breakdown, mental 
health issues and ostracisation from their wider communities. Therefore, the punitive 
measures do not just deviate from the traditional form and placement of punishment 
within the criminal justice system, but there is also a wider form of punishment 
because the punitive measures have an impact beyond the suspect.  
Bari (2006) argues that information of systematic brutality and a lack of 
meaningful oversight has a long lasting effect on the community and encourages the 
perception that anti-terror is a form of malice against the Islamic religion. According 
to a Guardian poll many Muslims see the ‘war against terrorism’ as a ‘war against 
Islam’ (cited in Ansari 2005). A Guardian/ICM opinion poll in March 2004 revealed 
that two-thirds of Muslims feel that anti-terrorism laws are being used unfairly against 
them, with British Muslims also claiming they are being victimized by police, who 
they say are using their powers of stop and search to harass them (Travis, 2004). 
Research by Spalek, El - Awa and McDonald (2009) has revealed that ‘hard’ policing 
approaches, including increased stop and search, high profile raids, and the perception 
of an increase in aggressive attempts at recruiting informers are helping to create a 
sense of grievance amongst Muslims, with individuals arguing that they feel that they 
are suspect communities. It is therefore hardly surprising that because Muslims 
believe the police view them with suspicion alone, ‘the results of a MORI poll for 
Greater London Authority found that only 11 per cent of those who had experienced 
racist incidents declared to have reported them to the police’ (EUMC, 2005, p.15). 
Further, the IRR have produced similar findings which reveal that even though the 
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‘police quote a 600 per cent rise in attacks, the majority of people don’t report an 
attack to the police because there is the belief that the police, on the whole, are anti-
Muslim’ (IRR, 2007, p.4). It could therefore be argued that where Muslims are 
victimized against, be it at the hands of the police or wider society, they could now 
regard such treatment as normal and therefore continue to suffer in silence. Research 
therefore suggests that the relationship between Muslim communities and the police 
has deteriorated with insecurity now shaping relations.  
The ‘war on terror’ through the introduction of counter terrorism legislation 
has predisposed the discrimination of those possessing an Islamic identity. In what 
Blair called wars of ‘values change’ it was conveyed that ‘Muslim societies need to 
be forced to abandon ‘their values’ (Blair, 2006 cited in Kundnani 2007, p.37) thus 
creating Muslims’ Islamic identities as a problem. The ‘war on terror’, through 
introducing phrases such as ‘the enemy within’, has produced debates regarding 
Muslims’ loyalty as citizens to their British identity and further produced debates 
regarding the compatibility of values, those of British and Islamic. The response of 
the state was one by which Islam was homogenized, as Johnson (2002) argues, the 
diversity of Islam was hidden and further so was the fact that Muslims have very 
different points of view on September 11th. A lack of differentiation amplified the 
belief of Islam as motivating terrorism and this construction of Islam transcended to 
Muslims’ Islamic identities, with the ‘war on terror’ essentializing and the media 
ascribing identities to Muslims that ‘distanced them from the host society and 
connected them to a constructed notion of their faith group’ (Afshar, Aitken and 
Franks, 2005, p.277). It could therefore be argued that the ‘war on terror’ accelerated 
a state constructed discourse in which Muslims’ Islamic identities were increasingly 
being constructed as ‘problematic’ and this has had implications for societal relations. 
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THE IMPACT OF THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ ON SOCIETY AND ISLAMIC 
IDENTITIES 
The state construction of Islamic identities has had implications for societal relations 
because as Hobsbawn (1990, cited in Colley, 1992, p.309) states, ‘there is no more 
effective way of bonding together the disparate sections of restless peoples than to 
unite them against outsiders’ and in the ‘war on terror’ Islamic identities have been 
constructed as being ‘outsider’ identities. Scraton and Chadwick (1991, cited in 
Walklate, 2003, p.30) state, ‘once institutionalized, sexism, heterosexism and racism 
provide legitimacy in interpersonal discrimination’. Similarly Green, (2001, p.489) 
talks about ‘the amplifying effects of elite encouragement’, with Sheridan (2006, 
p.320) stating, ‘negative images of Muslims promoted by the media and by political 
leaders may serve to build or provide evidence for existing Islamophobic prejudices’. 
Garland (1996) links governing crime to the creation of the active citizen. Garland 
(1996, p.452) refers to the ‘responsibilization strategy’ whereby the state devolves 
‘responsibility for crime prevention onto agencies, organizations and individuals 
which are quite outside the state’ leading to the creation of active communities and 
active citizens that take responsibility for crime prevention. The ‘war on terror’ 
response of the state to 9/11 could be considered as ‘elite encouragement’ with the 
demonization of Islamic identities transcending from the state to the societal level 
because ‘it is the state – the legislature, the executive, the judiciary – that sets the tone 
and tenor of race relations in society’ (Bourne, 2001, p.19). Further, central state 
strategies which place responsibility for crime prevention on citizens are likely to 
have influenced societal attitudes in the ‘war on terror’ through campaigns which 
encourage citizens to report what they believe to be suspicious activities and thus 
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prevent terrorism through the attribution of risk onto individuals. Walklate and 
Mythen (2010, p.50) state institutional discourses of risk, ‘encourage the attribution of 
blame by attaching risk to marginalized groups’ and thus since the ‘war on terror’ it is 
possible to contend that Muslims feel the attribution of risk, suspicion and 
demonization from institutions such as the police and in their daily interactions in 
society.  
Interestingly, there are similarities between the way in which the terrorist has 
been defined by the state and Islamophobia because just as the terrorist has been 
constructed as having no humanity and autonomy, Islamophobia incorporates the 
belief that those of Islamic faith (Muslims) are of such faith because they have no 
choice,  
 
‘the simple idea conveyed is that the Muslim lacks individuality and 
autonomous existence, Muslims are thus seen as a group that cannot escape 
the social forces that militate against individual expression and the 
individual freedoms exercised in liberal democratic states’ (Lea, 2005, 
p.40).  
 
The ‘war on terror’ has created Muslims’ Islamic identities as an identity which is 
fixed and associated it with values and beliefs which are a threat to the nation state 
because they have been characterized as being innate. The role of the state’s own 
policies have legitimized Islamophobia because according to Kundnani (2007, p.30)  
 
‘while the state’s official language of race relations prohibits hostility to 
persons defined by their (say, Pakistani) ethnicity, the language of the ‘war 
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on terror’ legitimizes hostility to the same persons defined by their Muslim 
faith, those who were once abused as ‘Pakis’ are now also abused as 
‘Muslims’.  
 
Research suggests that the ‘war on terror’ has impacted commonality in society. In 
April 2005, a Home Affairs Select Committee report concluded that relations between 
British Muslims and the wider community have deteriorated since 9-11 and the 
resultant war on terrorism (cited in Ansari, 200) and the British Psychological Society 
found that after September 11th, ‘43 per cent of non-Muslims admitted that they had 
become noticeably more anti-Islamic’ (Bari, 2006, p.9), with children as young as 13 
displaying signs of Islamophobia and voicing their support for extreme far-right 
groups such as the British National Party (Ansari, 2005). Thus religious identity is 
becoming the primary source of racism with research conducted by Sheridan (2006) 
revealing that religious affiliation may be a more meaningful predictor of prejudice 
than race or ethnicity.  
Research therefore suggests that the identity through which racism is 
experienced has changed. According to Modood (1992) in the 1990s there was a 
renewed emphasis on culture, which led to ‘cultural racism’ and Taguieff (1985, cited 
in Ratcliffe, 2004, p.20) similarly talks about differential racism, where culture 
replaces biology as the basis of ‘race’. Since the ‘war on terror’ Muslims’ Islamic 
identity has become the identity from which racism stems. This does suggest that 
Islamophobia is a more accurate term and according to Wieviorka (2004) this new 
form of racism describes its victims as being incapable of integrating into society and 
sharing the values of the dominant group. The construction of Islamophobia 
incorporates ideas of democracy as being progressive and religion as being 
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backwards. It is through this identity being otherized that Muslims’ Islamic identities 
are likely to have been significantly impacted and in order to understand the 
significance of this identity being demonized it is important to explore the facets of 
Islamic identities.  
An Islamic identity is a very complex identity and this section explores the 
complexity. Firstly, religious devotion varies between Muslims and this suggests that 
the meaning of Islam is highly individualized. Mirza (2007) argues that, Muslims 
have a pick and choose approach to religion, so that they only follow the rules that 
they personally value. Secondly, part of this individualization is interpretation 
because individuals often rely on religious content to construct identities, ‘with 
Muslims increasingly reshaping religion with their own hands (rather than relying on 
‘crusty’ clerics) (Mandaville, 2007, p.102). Thirdly, just like any other identity, 
religion is a reactive identity, it has ‘the capacity to simmer and surface in the lives of 
individuals and groups over time. It can recede but also revive’ (Mitchell, 2006, 
p.1138). Fourthly, it is the complexity of Islam which makes it a means through 
which some Muslims try to ‘make sense of the world and find values by which to 
live’ (Mirza, 2007, p.42). However, Mitchell (2006) argues that even where 
attempts are not made to understand the world through religion, religion can 
unconsciously inform morals and an understanding of the world. Therefore, in the 
‘war on terror’ the most complex and possibly intrusive identity Muslims possess 
has come under attack. However, what is of significance is that because Islam is 
the most sacred point of identification and indeed provides meaning to life, any 
attack on this identity is likely to be of a more personal nature as it is an attack on 
a Muslim’s beliefs, choice and the very meaning through which they interpret life. 
Mitchell (2006) relates religion to spirituality and van Ness (1996 cited Spalek and 
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Imtoual, 2008) states that religion and spirituality react and respond to each other; 
they mutually transform each other. Identity is a complex mix of external factors, 
internal dynamics and there are various forms of identities to which we all belong, 
with varying degrees of attachment. Maalouf (1998, p.34 cited in McPhee, 2005, p.3) 
explains that ‘people often have the tendency to acknowledge themselves through the 
affiliation that is most attacked’. According to McPhee (2005) there are various 
consequences of an attack on an aspect of identity because this identity can firstly, 
take over the entire identity of the person, secondly, lead to feelings of togetherness 
and therefore strengthen community identity and finally, through becoming the 
primary identity, feelings of solidarity claiming and asserting this identity can become 
liberating. It is due to identities being processes that are shaped by external factors 
that this research explores the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on Muslims’ Islamic 
identities.  
Over recent decades Muslims’ Islamic identities have began to take 
prominence over other forms of identification and this can be attributed to external 
factors. State policy and the ‘war on terror’ have contributed to a growth in Muslims 
describing themselves as Muslims, rather than Pakistani, thus giving primacy to their 
Islamic identities. According to Michael (2004, p.5), this is because, ‘actions against 
Muslims on their religion have made Islam more visibly symbolic for Muslims’. 
Muslims’ Islamic identities have become politicized, with the ‘war on terror’ 
radicalizing Muslims into a wide range of political activity - from human rights 
campaigning to radical jihadism – terrorism (Bunting 2004). This has led Geertz 
(2000 cited in Werbner, 2007) to link the political dimensions of Muslim veiling with 
the quest for personal meaning. As Gellner, (1992, cited in Werbner, 2007, p.173) 
states: ‘contrary to what outsiders generally suppose, the typical Muslim woman in a 
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Muslim city doesn’t wear the veil because her grandmother did so, but because her 
grandmother did not’. The politicization of Islamic identities represents how Islamic 
identities have become reactive identities incorporating wider contextual political 
factors and a sense of victimhood. Wieviorka (1999 cited in Wieviorka, 2004, p.290) 
uses the example of young Muslims she met in France who said ‘their choice in Islam 
is personal and deliberate and secondly, they consider Islam enables them to keep 
going when confronted with a racist society and one in which their living conditions 
are particularly difficult’. Further, as Pedziwiatr, (2007, p.268) states ‘research into 
the Muslim communities in Europe has shown citizenship is often central to their self-
understanding and assertions of who they are’. Therefore, Islamic identities have also 
become prominent because of the inner strength this religious identity provides and 
the symbolic imagery associated with demands for equality and justice not just in the 
UK but in foreign policy issues. Another way in which to demonstrate the 
significance of Islamic identity and the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on this identity is 
through considering the umma. 
Michael (2004, p.5) states ‘for some the Umma, provides that which Pakistan 
(as a country strange to them) and Britain (where Islam receives little protection) 
cannot; a sense of belonging’. This is clearly evident as ‘89% of Muslims say that 
they feel included in the global concept of ‘Ummah’ (Clarke et al, 2009, p.89). The 
significance of the umma is it not only provides strength and solidarity but also does 
so though promoting a sense of unity based on Islamic identity. It intersects with 
British identity, and in the ‘war on terror’ this intersectionality has been 
problematized both at the level of ideological construction and in terms of Muslims’ 
perceptions and subjectivity. In the ‘war on terror’ a growing sense of marginalization 
and perceived injustice by Muslims has strengthened the umma identity through re-
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defining what such an identity means. In this way foreign policy and the actions of the 
state are likely to have produced grievances towards the state because through the 
umma, ‘suffering by Muslims in Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Bangladesh or wherever, is 
felt deeply by those elsewhere’ (Clarke et al, 2009, p.89). Through the umma 
connecting the local and the global, the strong psychological dimension of this 
identity can amplify feelings of marginalization and ‘double standards’ both within 
the UK context (politically and legally) and outside the UK context. Brah (2009, 
p.144) details this stating  
 
‘if you are a Muslim, Islamophobia sets you apart, negatively, from non 
Muslims. This may lead to heightened preoccupation… drawing attention to 
global sites of conflict such as Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir and so on increase 
a sense of grievance on behalf of all Muslims’.  
 
This process in turn then further heightens Islamic identities and can increase the 
politicization of this identity with strong negative emotions reinforcing this process.  
The umma has been constructed as a problem in the ‘war on terror’ because it 
is seen as compromising Muslims loyalty to the nation state. However,  
 
‘92.7% of Muslim respondents when asked whether there is a contradiction 
in being loyal to the Umma and being a good citizen said they feel that the 
loyalty towards ‘Ummah’ does not contradict ones role as a citizen of a 
nation’ (1990 Trust, 2006, p.5).  
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However, regarding their place in Britain ‘60% of Muslims in the UK have 
considered leaving the UK since the London bombings’ (Ansari 2005, p.83). 
Therefore, a high percentage of Muslims have concerns regarding their place in 
Britain and this could be attributed to the hostility both at the structural and societal 
level which has been encountered since the ‘war on terror’. The ‘war on terror’ has 
seriously undermined the liberal underpinnings of the social contract and citizenship 
and further, it has possibly contributed to perceptions by Muslims that the social 
contract is not between themselves and the state. For example, ‘93% of respondents 
felt that UK foreign policy was influenced too much by the US Government’ (1990 
Trust, 2006, p.3). The conclusion formed as a result of this survey was that foreign 
policy is causing tension and contributing to radicalization because ‘81% of 
respondents felt that the campaign equated to a warfare waged against Muslims, with 
10% disagreeing’ (1990 Trust, 2006, p.3). In the ‘war on terror’ the actions of the 
state in foreign policy matters have shaped perceptions and produced negative 
feelings towards the state and it could be argued that the umma has become relevant 
because perceptions of injustice exist at this level and at the national level.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has detailed how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted the legal rights of those 
suspected of terrorist activity and how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted integration 
policies towards British Muslims. The relationship between the state and British 
Muslims has been discussed through policies and counter terrorism legislation 
demonstrating how both have focused on Muslims Islamic identities since the ‘war on 
terror’. It is the fact that the relationship between British Muslims and the state has 
become based on a smaller narrower identity (Islamic) at the expense of a more 
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expansive identity such as ethnic minority or Asian that Muslims’ Islamic identities 
are likely to have been impacted since the ‘war on terror’. The research discussed has 
demonstrated how Islam and Islamic identities have become increasingly relevant, not 
just in terms of political constructs but also in terms of subjectivity and this research 
will contribute to this exploration through investigating the impact of the ‘war on 
terror’ on Muslims’ Islamic identities.  
Where the state and police are concerned, the ‘war on terror’ has marked the 
intrusion of global notions of security and risk which have transcended into the UK 
context. Firstly, this has been evident through the emergence of counter terrorism 
legislation, which continues the pre-emptive drive established at the European level 
and the absolute necessity of eradicating terrorism at all costs established through the 
usage of the ‘war on terror’. Secondly, this legislation has been coupled with an 
emphasis on Islamic identity, drawing upon the construction of the de-humanized 
terrorist thus associating a lack of legal rights with Islamic identity and also led to the 
enactment of such discourses and constructs through the police. The police task and 
role has been elucidated as one which has been greatly impacted by the emergence of 
counter terrorism legislation. This research will provide a counter discourse to the 
‘war on terror’, one which is based upon British Muslims’ perceptions. It is the 
differential citizenship which the ‘war on terror’ has legitimized which suggests that 
Muslims’ perceptions of the state and the police are likely to have changed 
considerably since the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘war on terror’ has impacted their 
Islamic identities.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGIES 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses how the research was carried out. In total 32 respondents were 
interviewed retrospectively and prospectively, thus a total of 64 interviews were 
conducted. In designing the sample variables of age, ethnicity and gender were taken 
into account and all respondents were from the Sparkbrook area of Birmingham. In 
terms of ethnicity all respondents were Pakistani and Kashmiri and had been born in 
UK. The chapter elucidates the research process and how attention was paid to 
addressing sensitive issues. Firstly, the research design and use of qualitative methods 
are related to the theoretical perspectives of cosmopolitanism and citizenship. 
Secondly, the use of interviews as the main method through which data was collected 
is explained and because interviews were also conducted retrospectively, the issue of 
memory is discussed. The third section explores interview questions and how these 
were constructed on the basis of the aims of the research, which was to compare 
respondents’ perceptions of the state, the police and their Islamic identities before and 
after the ‘war on terror’. The fourth section details the ethical issues, such as gaining 
consent and confidentiality which arose during the research process. Attention is also 
paid to establishing trust, ensuring the safety of respondents and being aware of 
potential risk, factors which were increasingly relevant due to the research being on a 
sensitive topic. Fifthly, the theme of ‘insider / outsider’ position is discussed. It is 
demonstrated that although I shared the same religious identity as the respondents, I 
still had to articulate the meaning this identity has for me. And further, that although 
being of an insider position can help, differences such as those of power and status 
still intruded on the research process. The sixth section explores my role in the 
research process. It is through exploring my subjectivities that I am reflexive and 
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explain how I shaped the research process. The seventh section expands on the theme 
of reflexivity through discussing emotions. I explore how my emotions were relevant 
throughout the research process and were equally as important in shaping the research 
as the emotions demonstrated by respondents. The final section discusses how the data 
was analyzed and how a reflexive approach to analysis was used which was informed 
by grounded theory. 
 
COSMOPOLITANISM, CITIZENSHIP AND QUALITATIVE METHODS  
This section details the relationship between the theoretical perspectives of 
cosmopolitanism and citizenship and the use of a qualitative research design. 
Although there has been an increase in research on terrorism, that which explores the 
causes of terrorism, impact of counter terrorism strategies and prevention of 
radicalization, there has also been a growing critique into how this research is 
conducted. Firstly, Spalek, El Awa and McDonald (2009) argue that terrorism 
research has often been dominated by state-centric perspectives and Breen Smyth 
(2007, p.260) explores the challenges of researching terrorism, in particular the need 
to ‘avoid replicating hegemonic accounts while still engaging with dominant 
discourses’. Secondly, Jackson (2007) argues that terrorism studies are dominated 
with weak methods and theories and Spalek, El Awa and McDonald (2009) state that 
because terrorism research has relied on secondary sources, the research has failed to 
provide an understanding of counter-terrorism through the perspectives and 
experiences of those experiencing state repression.  
The general aim of this research was to gain in depth empirical data which 
would contribute to understanding the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on British 
Muslims through exploring the ways in which the ‘war on terror’ has impacted 
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respondents’ perceptions of the state, the police and their Islamic identities. To 
achieve this, I did as Breen Smyth (2007) suggests which is to engage with the 
dominant discourse of the ‘war on terror’. However, since my research was concerned 
with understanding the perspectives of those who have been marginalized, the 
research had to be non state centric, which denotes a process whereby the state is de-
privileged. Maintaining a non state centric approach was essential, as this enabled the 
state to be considered in terms of harm and impact, such as the harm that is the result 
of state inequality. The task of engaging with the state centric ‘war on terror’ discourse 
and contributing to an understanding of counter-terrorism through the perspectives and 
experiences of those experiencing state repression was reconciled through drawing on 
the concept of the ‘subaltern counter publics’. The ‘subaltern counter publics’ refers to 
‘subordinate groups inventing and circulating counter discourses’ (Fraser, 1995, p.291 
cited in Pedziwiatr, 2007, p.269). Therefore, in the context of the ‘war on terror’  
 
‘subaltern counter publics’ signal ‘parallel discursive arenas where members 
of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses to 
formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and 
needs’ (Fraser 1992, p.123 cited in Sparks, 1997, p.85).  
 
The aim of understanding the counter discourse of British Muslims required that as 
Miles and Huberman (1994) state, the research strategy be custom built, as far as is 
possible on the basis of what is required of that research and analysis. Thus, it was 
essential that appropriate methods and theories were used, as a theoretical framework 
was required where these counter discourses could be placed and methods where the 
counter discourses could be translated and conveyed.  
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The theoretical frameworks and traditions of cosmopolitanism and citizenship 
facilitated the aim of making visible the impact of the ‘war on terror’. 
Cosmopolitanism and citizenship both emphasize subjectivity and therefore how the 
actions of the state impact citizens’ feelings, perceptions and attitudes. Beck (2006, 
p.43) uses the concept of ‘biographical cosmopolitanization’ which ‘means that the 
contradictions of the world are unequally distributed not just out there but also at the 
centre of one’s own life’, and thus data should reveal how the trans-national and the 
national level impact individuals’ lives. The concept of ‘biographical 
cosmopolitanization’ was important to the research as it facilitated an understanding of 
how due to the ‘war on terror’, inequality and the demonization of Islam were 
perceived by respondents to be at the national and trans-national level. Through a 
cosmopolitan perspective although the state can deliver ‘equal liberty and social 
justice’ it ‘should not be thought of as ontologically privileged’ (Held, 2005, p. 10). 
Cosmpolitanism turns our attention to themes of equal moral worth and responsibility 
and it is through the language of human rights that the state can be opened up, and as 
Beck (2006) suggests, externally examined. Thus, cosmopolitanism provided a 
framework in which the state centric ‘war on terror’ could be critically examined 
therefore allowing counter discourses to emerge whereby the actions of the state were 
related to British Muslims’ feelings of loyalty, attachment and belonging (Beck, 
2006). Citizenship complimented the use of cosmopolitanism because it provided a 
framework within which the state was conceptualized as having a duty to British 
citizens. Thus, important concepts such as legal rights and justice were explored in 
relation to respondents’ sense of belonging and identities (Carens, 2000; McPhee. 
2005). A qualitative methodology can enable  
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‘researchers to create or develop new theories in areas of 
research where there is little existing knowledge’ (Herzog, 1993; 
Rennie, Phillips’ and Quartaro, 1988; cited in Knight et al, 2003, 
p.309).  
 
A qualitative method meant that I could gain in depth empirical data based upon the 
perspectives and experiences of Pakistani / Kashmiri Muslims individuals living in 
Birmingham. It also meant that respondents could relate and connect the state, human 
rights and inequality with belonging, attachment and loyalty. Although these concepts 
were not directly referred to in the interviews, they were concepts which if present in 
the data would be seen as an essential part of British Muslims’ ‘counter discourse’ to 
the ‘war on terror’. Knight et al (2003, p.309) state 
 
‘qualitative methods encourage participants to introduce the 
factors that they perceive to be important and relevant, allowing 
new constructs to emerge that are not constrained by the 
researcher’.  
 
The decision not to include these concepts in the questions asked was therefore 
based on wanting respondents to introduce the concepts they believed were 
relevant and qualitative methods facilitated this. Dupont (2008) emphasizes the 
importance of investigating the suffering and inequality of marginalized populations, 
arguing that  
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‘the absence of narratives of human suffering among the oppressed 
can ‘‘paralyze human action’’ since such accounts at least offer the 
possibility of responding to misery and injustice’ (Kleinman and 
Kleinman, 1996, cited in Dupont, 2008, p.204).  
 
This was very similar to what I believed and how I saw my PhD, as an opportunity 
to give voices to respondents and investigate how the ‘war on terror’ had impacted 
upon them. The research conceptualized language as being centrally implicated in 
the construction of knowledge, for example the ‘war on terror’ discourse because:  
 
‘it signals how dominant, hierarchical relations are conceived, 
legitimised and reproduced through and within the words we speak’, 
(Arrigo, 1997, cited in Bak, 1999, p.20).  
 
Language was used in the research as a process of knowledge transference in which 
it represented the power of the respondents to construct and represent their 
perceptions, experiences and identities. Therefore, just as the ‘war on terror’ has 
created discourses (written, spoken) utilizing language for the purpose of 
legitimacy, I wanted respondents to have power in constructing their own ‘counter 
discourses’. Quantitative methods would not have allowed for this power to be 
transferred to respondents and further would have restricted the emergence of in 
depth empirical data where respondents could reveal the impacts of the ‘war on 
terror’.  
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NARRATIVE INTERVIEWS AND THE PROBLEMS AND BENEFITS OF 
RETROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWS  
Due to the importance of language it was felt that interviews would further facilitate 
the aims of the research. Hollway and Jefferson (2000, p.10) state,  
 
 ‘face-to-face interviewing has become the most common type of 
qualitative research method used in order to find out about people’s 
experiences in context, and the meanings these hold’.  
 
I used interviews to gain empirical data and although the research was of a 
comparative nature, comparing pre and post 9/11, interviews allowed me to not only 
compare and contrast but to do so through data which revealed meaning. Interviews 
compliment a phenomenological approach and ‘the strength of a phenomenological 
approach is that it emphasizes the richness and complexity of an individual’s lived 
experience and privileges agency’ (Cosgrove, 2000, p.247). Interviews allowed 
respondents’ agency to be privileged because respondents could relate the discourse of 
the ‘war on terror’ and the institutions of the state and the police to their lived 
experiences. Thus, through allowing respondents to inter link themes, interviews gave 
respondents the space to articulate their own counter discourse. 
Although repeat interviews10 were conducted respondents often made 
references to earlier periods of their life. This was often done when respondents 
wanted to convey to me the differences between their past perceptions and perceptions 
at the time of the interview. In this way the interviews were similar to the life story 
method which ‘invites the subject to look back in detail across his or her entire life 
                                                 10 Respondents were interviewed twice or in some cases three times, the first interview covered the period 1989 – 2000 and the second interview covered 2001 – present day. 
 
107 
 
course’ (Bryman 2004, p.322). Dupont (2008) states that qualitative studies are an 
improvement over more traditional quantitative research because they allow 
participants to tell their story in their own words and  
 
‘according to Polanyi, the difference between a story and a report (of 
the kind that is often elicited in the traditional research interview) is 
that, in telling a story, the narrator takes responsibility for ‘making 
the relevance of the telling clear’ (Chase, 1995, p.2 cited in Hollway 
and Jefferson, 2000, p.31).  
 
During the interviews respondents were responsible for the stories they told, this as 
just mentioned would involve them bringing in other periods of their life and in 
some cases their beliefs. For example, one respondent took an interest in 
numerology and therefore would talk about perceptions, experiences and identities 
and feel the need to relate them to numerology. I encouraged respondents to use 
narratives and take responsibility because this represented the merging of power and 
language for respondents. It has been argued that narrative interviews reveal truth 
and meaning at a deeper level,  
 
‘the stories themselves are a means to understand our subjects better. 
While stories are obviously not producing a transparent account 
through which we learn truths, story-telling stays closer to actual 
life-events than methods that elicit explanations’ (Hollway and 
Jefferson, 2000, p.32)  
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and this could be because the respondents take control. A narrative structure was 
found to be calming, reducing the unnatural strain that an interview context creates. 
For example, respondents liked the fact that the questions asked were open question 
and therefore allowed them to explain and introduce the issues they wanted to.  
Although a narrative structure facilitated the emergence of rich data through 
empowering respondents I also felt it necessary to empower the prospective narratives 
and thus the prospective data. I felt that collecting retrospective data was one way of 
privileging agency because through providing pre 9/11 narratives, post 9/11 narratives 
could be correctly interpreted. For each of the interviews, the retrospective and 
prospective the same interview guide was used and all respondents received the same 
set of questions in the same order, so flexibility and variation were minimized. 
However, due to the first interview covering the period 1989 – 2000 questions were 
asked in the past tense, whereas for the second interview questions were asked for 
2001 – present day and thus in the present context. Therefore, with the state, the police 
and identities, the retrospective data allowed me to establish what the common 
perceptions and experiences were and how respondents viewed their identities. When 
conducting the prospective interviews where changes in perceptions, experiences and 
identities did exist, I was able to ask what the changes were due to and gain an 
understanding of the extent to which the ‘war on terror’ had led to such changes. 
Further, Muslims’ Islamic identities have largely been absent in the collection of in 
depth qualitative interview data, especially prior to 9/11 and in the context of the state 
and the police, therefore there was a need to understand respondents prior to 9/11 and 
the ‘war on terror’. For example, the data revealed how all respondents identify with 
their Islamic identity and this has become their primary identity since the ‘war on 
terror’. Had I not conducted retrospective interviews I could well have made the 
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assumption that this has always been the case and definitely would not have known 
the extent to which the ‘war on terror’ has impacted Muslims’ Islamic identities. 
However, although using retrospective interviews / data raises the question of 
memory, I decided that the benefits of using retrospective interviews outweighed any 
reasons for not doing so. There are many research methods which involve respondents 
having to be retrospective. The strength of a life history type of approach is in  
 
‘it’s unambiguous emphasis on the point of life in question and a 
clear commitment to the processual aspects of social life, showing 
how events unfold and interrelate in people’s lives’ (Bryman 2004, 
p.322).  
 
It is predominantly used to relate the social context with lived experiences, for 
example Hood and Joyce (1999) used retrospection to investigate respondents’ 
changing perceptions on crime and social change in London and Sin in 2005 asked 
ethnic minority old people to reflect upon their experiences of racism. Research which 
incorporates a retrospective dimension also reveals the impact of events, for example, 
Westergaard et al. (1989, cited in Bryman, 2004) studied the impact of redundancy at 
the Sheffield steel plant on individuals. It is for this reason Thompson (2004, p.81-82) 
argues  
‘nearly all social science, to some extent, involves memory and some 
of it is entirely based on long-term memory’...... ‘Researchers forget 
that it is also important that memories contain a great deal of 
‘reality’.  
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Therefore, although there are problems associated with memory I saw these problems 
as problems which did not invalidate the use of retrospective interviewing. It was 
through conducting retrospective interviews which allowed me to establish human 
agency, perceptions and identities prior to the ‘war on terror’ that I was able to assess 
the impact of the ‘war on terror’ upon respondents.   
Linked to the issue of retrospective interviewing and memory is that of how as 
researchers we interpret the narratives conveyed to us. Hollway and Jefferson (2000, 
p.3) argue ‘one of the good reasons for believing what people tell us, as researchers, is 
a democratic one: who are we to know any better than the participants when it is, after 
all, their lives?’ My aim was to understand the complexities respondents revealed and 
furthermore to respect the transference of information and knowledge. Hollway and 
Jefferson (2000, p.387) have argued everyone ‘including researchers, research subjects 
do not necessarily know themselves fully’. Therefore, when interviewing I took 
respondents’ narratives as being ‘their truth’, their counter discourse. This allowed me 
to consider the diversity of voices which emerged and voices of intra differentiation 
where changes in perception, experiences and identities were the result of changing 
socio-political circumstances.  
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND RETROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWING  
This section explores how the retrospective dimension of the research design was 
incorporated into interviews and how the data that emerged was highly dependent on 
the quality of the interview questions. ‘Researchers must decide how (and how often 
during a series of questions) to specify the reference period they have selected’ 
(Schaeffer and Presser, 2003. p.71). On the more practical level because repeat 
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interviews were conducted I frequently made reference to the time period the 
interview was dealing with. This simply involved me saying before 9/11 and then 
continuing with the question. However respondents frequently interchanged between 
both periods in one interview, when this did occur I did not intervene but let the 
interview flow. It was felt that interrupting the respondent could lead to important 
narratives being omitted. A similar approach to that which was used by Hood and 
Joyce (1999, p.140) was used,  
 
‘we took care to ask respondents to concentrate on the particular 
period of their life we were investigating; to elicit narratives ......to 
situate their accounts in the broader context of social relations, 
activities and structures’.  
 
When conducting the retrospective interviews, the interview started by me asking the 
respondent how old they were during that time, what kind of interests they had, what 
job they did, emphasis was placed on trying to get respondents to remember what they 
were like during this period. Respondents would frequently laugh at how even though 
they may have held a particular belief before 9/11, which they believed was real at that 
time they now see the existence of such a belief with laughter. Therefore, respondents 
when ‘recalling the past’ related it to matters of the self, whether they have ‘changed 
(or stayed the same)’ (Ross & Conway, 1986 cited in Schaeffer and Presser, 2003, 
p.68). This comparison helped me to understand respondents better, the impact of 
experiences and how the ‘war on terror’ had changed aspects of them, especially those 
around Islamic identities.  
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The interview questions used in the research were fundamental to the quality 
of the data that emerged. A pilot study, whereby I conducted interviews with four 
individuals was done to ensure the questions used would maximize the depth and 
quality of data. Due to the research being of an explorative nature, the questions were 
very general, such as ‘During this period what did you think of the government?’ 
Lather (1991, p.105 cited in Sin, 2005, p.104) argues:  
 
‘facts are not given but constructed by the questions we ask of 
events. From this viewpoint, what questions we ask and how we ask 
them will be crucial in determining the picture we end up with’.  
 
Although my interest was primarily with the impact of the ‘war on terror’ and thus the 
power of the state to introduce legislation, impact upon policing, citizenship etc I 
wanted respondents to consider the state in a more expansive way which involved the 
many functions of the state, like the state providing services other than those of law 
enforcement. In this way and as represented in the data, distinct variations emerged 
between the retrospective data, where the state was predominantly perceived in terms 
of providing services and equality and the prospective data, where the state was 
perceived as a legislator, introducing laws and framing police work. The fact that 
respondents had the choice to define the state and include the role / roles of the state 
they wanted was very helpful in establishing the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on 
perceptions of the state.  Further, although the primary focus of this research was with 
respondents’ Islamic identities and how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted upon these 
identities, I did not prioritize one form of identity over another. Respondents were able 
to select the identity / identities which they believed were most relevant to the time in 
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question. This emerged as a significant part of the research because it allowed me to 
understand when respondents’ perceived religious / ethnic similarity and commonality 
and where perceptions of difference existed. For example, in the retrospective 
interviews respondents used their British / Asian identity to refer to their identity. 
However, in the prospective data respondents used Muslim to convey that they 
perceived state inequality and policing through this identity. The choice to use 
qualitative methods which transferred power to respondents and did not restrict 
respondents through the questions asked were as much based on wanting to gain in 
depth data as they were on ethics. The next section considers the ethics of the research 
in more detail.  
 
RESEARCH ETHICS AND ESTABLISHING RISK WHEN CONDUCTING 
SENSITIVE RESEARCH 
Renzetti and Lee (1993, p.5-6 cited in Gunaratham, 2003, p.161) state that there are a 
number of areas in which  
 
‘research is more likely to be threatening, these include (a) where 
research intrudes into the private sphere or delves into some deeply 
personal experience (b) where the study is concerned with deviance 
and social control’.  
 
Research ethics had to be taken into consideration, and the fact that the research was 
based on perceptions and experiences and did include themes of social control, more 
specifically the ‘war on terror’ and counter terrorism meant that consideration had to 
be given to issues such as risk. These themes influenced the research process greatly, 
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most significantly impacting the process of gaining respondents trust, gaining their 
consent and establishing rapport. It was through conducting pilot interviews that I 
realized I would have to build trust with respondents, and indeed start this process 
prior to interviews being conducted. I assumed that once individuals had agreed to be 
interviewed I would obtain rich data. This thought was very much a product of the 
research being on a political topic and something I thought every individual would 
have opinions about. However through conducting pilot interviews I realized that even 
when individuals did agree to be interviewed, a lack of confidence often resulted in 
respondents giving short answers.  
The process of meeting people had many objectives, it was important that I 
gave people confidence, explained the purpose of the research and the role a 
respondent could have. Building and indeed maintaining good relations was even 
more necessary given that repeat interviews would be used and it should be noted that 
I was very fortunate as every respondent returned for the second interview, even 
where the first interview had taken two hours more than what the respondent expected. 
This process is often omitted in the writing up of research and yet for me it was the 
most important part, especially given that my research was on a sensitive topic and 
one in which there is risk and suspicion. I saw it as natural for individuals to want to 
protect areas of their lives, especially when these areas are sensitive topics that have 
the potential to cause pain through disclosure. I therefore used a snowball method 
whereby I made contact through various institutions such as health centres, youth 
groups and institutions which have events for Muslim communities. Due to people 
taking part in the research and then recommending someone this assisted in breaking 
down barriers. Various locations in Sparkbrook were used which included a day care 
centre, television studios, the University of Birmingham and interviewees’ homes. 
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Due to each single interview taking an approximate time of 3 hours emphasis was 
placed on allowing respondents to select the location and time most suitable to their 
needs.  
All but 6 of the interviews took place at the University of Birmingham and this 
was often because the interviews would take place in the evening and most 
respondents felt that if the interviews were conducted at their homes, their children 
would make noise and interrupt the interviews. Where interviews were conducted at 
respondents’ homes I did not feel the need to take extra safety measures since the 
interviews took place during the day. It could be argued that by conducting interviews 
on campus, in some cases until 1am, I was compromising my own safety. However, 
because some interviews did last 3 or 4 hours and people often worked during the day, 
the evenings were the only time to conduct interviews. Further, conducting these 
interviews on campus gave me an added sense of security because it felt like my 
environment, an environment I was familiar with and I lived in close proximity to the 
university, which brought a further sense of security.  
I thought that the very first impression I made on potential respondents was 
important as at this point the respondent could instantly decide they do not wish to 
participate in the research and not even allow me to explain the purpose of the 
research. It was also very important in terms of gaining and establishing trust. Further, 
where a relationship is developed ‘these feelings continue in the relationship’ 
(Hollway and Jefferson, 2000, p.46). Hunt (1989, p.13) states,  
 
‘the researcher’s self is the primary instrument of inquiry. Any 
mechanical device utilized in fieldwork is mediated through the 
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researcher’s own person and the kind of relationship he or she 
develops with subjects’.  
 
It was therefore necessary to go through a series of processes prior to the interviews 
taking place. In many cases this meant spending an hour with an individual and 
although this was time consuming it did allow for trust to be established. People often 
had many questions and spending this time with them allowed individuals concerns to 
be aired prior to the interviews taking place so during the interviews issues and 
concerns did not remain and negatively influence the transfer of knowledge. Therefore 
making the time for individuals was about ethics and also meant that I could identify 
potential problems prior to interviews being conducted.   
Other than safety, a major ethical concern was that of risk. Dickson-Swift et al. 
(2009) suggest that because emotions are prevalent in research on sensitive topics, 
researchers often have to manage their own emotions and those of participants and 
change the way they would normally act. I did have concerns regarding respondents’ 
emotions and if taking part in the research might have a negative impact on them. 
During the course of conducting the research I became more emotionally aware and 
involved in the research. My emotional involvement increased through talking to 
respondents, listening to their counter discourses which acted to ground concepts such 
as justice, meaning they were no longer just abstract entities but an entity respondents 
cared about and believed in. The place and significance of emotions was prevalent 
when I was meeting individuals. For example, I met one woman, due to our age being 
similar and gender being the same; I identified with her more and felt an increased 
sense of responsibility. The woman told me that she could do the prospective 
interview, but would have some difficulty being interviewed for the retrospective 
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period. She explained to me how something bad had happened during that period of 
her life, but didn’t tell me what. I did not ask and simply stated it was her decision. I 
acknowledged the fact that participating might have helped her and empowered her 
but felt it equally could have had a negative impact on her. Dickson-Swift et al. (2009, 
p.62) state  
 
‘sensitive research has the potential to impact on all of the people 
who are involved in it, including researchers. It encourages us to 
examine the potential for harm to the researchers as well as to the 
research participants’.  
 
What this example demonstrates is how the potential harm to the researched can 
transfer to harm to the researcher because I was actually glad when the woman 
decided not to take part in the research. There were many reasons for this; firstly, I did 
not know her well enough to make a judgment regarding potential harm to her and 
further although as researchers we have to protect participants, does this involve 
making decisions on their behalf? Secondly, I did not want to make the decision 
regarding whether she was strong enough to take part. I did not feel comfortable with 
restricting her right to participate but equally due to not knowing her experiences felt 
unable to foresee potential harm. Essentially, there was recognition that her emotions 
would impact my emotions. For example, through her participation my own emotions 
might have been negatively impacted. I would have found the process of seeing 
someone negatively impacted difficult, felt guilt and responsibility and this raised 
questions for me. For example, to what extent does a researcher get involved? Is it 
professional to help through using our own experiences to help others? As I went 
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through the research process I increasingly recognized that maintaining a detached 
stance was not possible and further that being reflexive actually facilitated the care I 
was taking during the research to those I researched.  
    And finally, a consent form was used which listed many of the issues I felt 
respondents would be concerned with. These included the purpose of the research, a 
brief explanation of the types of questions that would be asked, an explanation of what 
the information would be used for, what was expected of the respondents in terms of 
time and commitment, the scheduled time and date of interviews, issues of 
confidentiality, anonymity and privacy. Furthermore, it was made explicit that 
respondents could withdraw from the research at any point and on completion of the 
interviews could refuse to let their data be used. Although this section has detailed the 
ethical issues of the research, ethics is a prominent theme throughout the rest of the 
chapter, being relevant to insider / outsider positions and issues of power and further 
the role of emotions during the interviews. The next section explores ethics in relation 
to the insider / outsider position.  
 
SHARED RELIGIOUS IDENTITY BUT DIFFERENCES OF POWER AND 
STATUS 
The theme of insider / outsider position has become increasingly relevant to the 
research process because it brings to the forefront the identities of the respondents and 
the researcher and further highlights issues such as power which can cut across 
identities and remain as obstacles in the research process even where identities are 
shared.  
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‘Insider research refers to when researchers conduct research with 
populations of which they are also members (Kanuha, 2000) so that 
the researcher shares an identity, language, beliefs and experiential 
base with the study participants (Asselin, 2003 cited in Dwyer, 2008, 
p.58)  
 
and outsider position refers to the researcher as not sharing an aspect of identity. 
However, the placement of the researcher within this context has become significant 
because of the beliefs that transcend from either being an insider or outsider and 
secondly, the implications of this for the research process. According to Ram (1996, 
cited in Ramji, 2008, p.100) the ‘greater the similarities the easier it is for researchers 
to gain access’ and be less exploitative and Mitchell and Irvine (2008) also state, it is 
easier for participants to be open with researchers where an insider position does exist 
thus leading to more in depth data. This has led Papadopoulos and Lees (2002, cited in 
Ramji, 2008) to suggest that there should be a process of ethnic matching between 
researcher and researched.  
I detail how my insider position worked for me and against me throughout the 
research process and therefore how issues such as power cut across the insider / 
outsider position. Furthermore, Bulmer and Solomos (2004, cited in Ramji, 2008) 
have noted that there has been a growth in ethnic minority scholars researching race. 
However, much of the focus on insider position has been through race and ethnicity, 
religion has largely been omitted. I will focus on how although I was of an insider 
position due to my shared religious identity this did not give me a privileged position 
as my religious beliefs still had to be articulated. My identities were very significant 
when I was meeting people and a shared religious identity did not translate to trust and 
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rapport being instantly established. Ramji (2008, p.99) found that ‘the shared cultural 
identity of the researcher and the interviewees emerged as both a point of 
commonality and difference in the research process’. Differences according to gender, 
class and ethnicity (as religion was the same) were seen as being of the same 
importance with no single identity privileged as each was recognized as having the 
potential to impact on communication, power relations and interpretation. As Spalek 
states (2008, p.73)  
 
 ‘it is important to stress that researchers occupy multiple identities, 
so that while some aspects of their identities might help them to 
establish rapport and trust and to gain access to research participants, 
other aspects to their identities may work against them’.  
 
My own experiences regarding my identities have been diverse, challenging the 
reductionist binary of insider / outsider position. My religious identity has been 
subjected to scrutiny by Muslims and non Muslims because I fail to fall into their 
stereotype of ‘what a Muslim is’. This questioning has been due to my dress and 
appearance and yet even though I do not wear traditional clothes I dress Islamically in 
the sense that my body is covered. I did not consider myself as being of an insider or 
outsider position, rather I just emphasized the aim of my research because ‘matching 
one social identity fails to take account of the dynamic interplay of social differences 
and identifications’ (Edwards, 1998, cited in Gunaratnam, 2003, p.85) and the many 
issues that still exist in research. Ramji (2008, p.99) states that more attention needs to 
be paid to ‘the assumptions made by interviewees especially those regarding the 
identities of the researcher’.  
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I was aware that my religious identity and ethnicity would be questioned. 
Ramji (2008), in the course of conducting her research found that she had to verify 
how Indian she was, where her parents were from and had to establish religious 
sameness. I encountered many of these questions and further questions around my 
motivation for conducting this research. As Dupont, (2008, p.199) states ‘one should 
not assume that research participants share a common understanding of the purpose of 
research and the role of the academic and academia’. I made time and space to explain 
my motivation and the meaning the research has for me. I explained how acts of 
othering, disadvantage and verbal abuse which have been directed at my Islamic 
identity have impacted me far more than other identity based abuse. I emphasized how 
many of my moral principles are compatible with Islam. For example, I explained 
beliefs regarding the purpose of life; I believe life is a journey in which personal 
growth is core and the reason we are tested is to facilitate personal growth because we 
are not meant to be static, but we are meant to improve. Sharing these personal beliefs 
made transparent how Islam has influenced me and assisted in establishing trust. 
Strangely enough my conversations with people regarding my Islamic identity were 
very deep and philosophical, perhaps revealing how I shaped interactions more than 
potential respondents.  
However, although shared religious identity helped, issues of power and status 
remained and therefore I had to go beyond my religious identity, and ‘express the 
often hidden values and characteristics of the researcher’ (Edwards & Ribbens, 1998; 
Harding, 1987, cited in Spalek, 2004, p.408). Maykut and Morehouse (1994, p.123 
cited in Dwyer et al, 2009) argue that the qualitative researcher has a paradoxical role 
as they need to understand the perspective of others as well as be aware of their own 
biases. Dupont (2008, p.199) states  
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‘I was never completely comfortable with the inherent power 
imbalance between me, a white, middle class academic, and my 
research participants (low-income African-American women who 
were, for the most, not educated beyond high school)’.  
 
Unlike Dupont, I had not considered power imbalance to a great extent and assumed 
that if any form of power imbalance did exist, I would be the disempowered individual 
due to my age to the extent where I made sure I was dressed smartly so I would look 
older than I was. When I approached potential respondents I was surprised at how 
individuals would reflect on their educational status in determining whether they were 
appropriate to be interviewed and would often recommend someone who they 
believed had more of a right to be heard, simply because they may have had a job, 
may have had a degree or were thought of in high regard in the community. Thus, 
there existed relative evaluations, tied directly to issues of ‘what can I offer you?’ ‘I 
don’t want to give you the wrong answers’. Stenner (2005, cited in Coupland et al, 
2008, p.330) states ‘to be able to articulate a particular emotion is intimately 
connected with the claimed moral right to do so’. I thought everyone I approached had 
the moral right to participate and my interpretation was that individuals were 
restricting their own right to be heard. Dupont (2008) suggests research requires that 
the researcher give over control, share power and regard individuals as co-researchers, 
because the researcher must recognize the limits of their own experiences and 
acknowledge that participants are experts of their own experience. Agozino (2004, 
p.356) states  
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‘western criminologists could learn a thing or two by humbling 
themselves to listen to Other perspectives…western criminologists 
should remain open to chances of learning from the experiences and 
struggles of others as well through an exchange of knowledge’. 
 
 I tried to empower individuals through stating their unique position. I emphasized my 
‘outsider’ status as someone who did not live in Birmingham before 9/11 and for 
many years after. I tried to privilege individuals through stating that I had not 
experienced life in Birmingham and did not want to assume what the impact of the 
‘war on terror’ had been. I told individuals that only they could provide me with this 
information, and therefore how I was in fact just an instrument to which understanding 
had to be transferred. It is very important that individuals know what they can give to 
research and are seen as co-researchers and therefore articulating how there is no 
wrong answer and transferring control was important. This section has demonstrated 
how even where an identity is shared, individuals have assumptions not only regarding 
the purpose of the research but also about the identities of the researcher. Therefore, 
researchers must be open to explaining their identities and further not assuming that 
power relations do not shape research.   
 
EXPLORING REFLEXIVITY THROUGH MY MANY SUBJECTIVITIES 
Nils Christie (1997, p.14–15 cited in Smith, 2006, p.362) argued that ‘social scientists 
were over-socialised and lacked access to their own personal experiences’ which 
resulted in a lack of respect for what we find. The term reflexivity has come to denote 
in its most general sense self-conscious consideration and critique. McNay (2000, p.5 
cited in Riach, 2009, p.358)  
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‘understands reflexivity as ‘the critical awareness that arises from a 
self-conscious relation with the other’, whilst Skeggs (2004, cited in 
Riach 2009, p358) suggests that ‘an ability to stand outside oneself is 
one of the key dimensions of the reflexive self’. 
 
Therefore, in order to reveal the dynamics of the research process and make research 
transparent reflexivity is needed. I use the concept of reflexivity to write myself into 
the research, because as Hunt (1989, p.5) states,  
 
 ‘since the self is the key fieldwork tool, the role of self-
understanding is critical to well executed fieldwork…. a central 
concern of fieldwork methods should be exploring the relationships 
between subject, researcher, and data’.  
 
Gilbert states ‘as qualitative researchers, our goal is to see the world through someone 
else’s eyes… it thus follows that we must experience our research ‘both intellectually 
and emotionally’. As researchers, we should see research not only as an intellectual 
exercise but also ‘as a process of exploration and discovery that is felt deeply’ (2001a, 
p.9 cited in Dickson-Swift, et al, 2009, p.62). This requires reflexivity and that the 
researcher makes clear their own subjectivity or subjectivities. Peshkin (1988, p.17) 
argues that researchers should systematically seek out their subjectivity, I like Peshkin 
(1988) reflect on the journey of discovering my many subjectivities and the 
relationship between them, the decisions I made and their impact on shaping the 
research process. 
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Peshkin (1988) identified six ‘I’s, different parts of subjectivity which 
impacted and shaped the research carried out by Peshkin. The research process and 
through having to articulate my motivation for conducting the research to individuals, 
I found that I also had several ‘I’s. There was the ‘Muslim I’, I wanted to do the 
research because I am a Muslim who understands the importance of Islam and 
therefore wanted to create space so respondents could articulate the meaning Islam has 
for them. This aim made the research meaningful to me and I explained this to 
individuals, as one of the prominent questions individuals wanted to know was my 
motivations for conducting this research. There was also the ‘exploring I’, I was 
interested in identities and how these are impacted by institutions and counter 
terrorism legislation. The impact of unequal power relations, such as those between 
institutions and citizens and the lasting damage and harm they can do is what 
motivated my research. Peshkin (1988, p.19-20) refers to ‘The Justice-Seeking I’ and 
‘the Non research Human I’, it was my ‘justice seeking I’, that wanted to reveal the 
potential harm and negative impact of the ‘war on terror’. In particular it was my 
interest in injustice, wanting to know if respondents’ perceived injustice and how if 
they did, this impacted them and further, the value and importance they placed on 
justice which led to the research.  
Evans (2000) talks about trying to represent two voices, the scientific self and 
the dramatic self, she conceptualizes these ‘voices’ as creating a battle, with the 
‘scientific self’ being concerned with issues of objectivity, validity and 
generalizability and the ‘dramatic self’, being interwoven with the research process, 
unable to escape from the humanness in human interactions. Similarly, Staller (2003) 
when conducting research on the events of September 11th discovered that her 
personal and professional selves were inseparable. I also found that the ‘research I’ 
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was not that different from the ‘non research I’, as although I had an academic interest 
in civil liberties and justice my motivation for the research was as much about my 
personal beliefs in the morality of law. Interestingly, the many ‘Is’ that are now 
represented, reveal how qualitative researchers not only research something which has 
personal and emotional meaning for them but also how the research process impacts 
on the emotions of the researcher, because during the course of my research the 
‘emotional I’ was very present.  
 
THE EMOTIONAL ‘I’, EMOTIONAL MANAGEMENT AND REACTIVE 
EMOTIONS 
As stated before, emotions were not only part of ethics, for example, ensuring that 
respondents were safeguarded and did not endure any negative effects from 
participating in the research, but were also an important aspect of reflexivity and 
subjectivity. Hochschild (1983) developed the concept of  
 
‘emotion work’ to describe and explore ‘the experiences of flight 
attendants and how they managed their emotions on a day-to-day 
basis on the job… she stipulated that jobs requiring emotional labour 
involved face-to-face or voice-to-voice contact with members of the 
public’ (cited in Dickson-Swift, et al, 2009, p.62).  
 
Research by Dickson-Swift, et al, (2009) has discovered that the researcher’s emotions 
are an integral part of the research process and conducting research is ‘emotion work’. 
I relate my emotions to the research in order to continue and indeed add something to 
this debate, showing that where a sensitive topic is the focus of research the emotions 
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of the respondents and researcher should be made central. The ‘Non research Human 
I’, ‘personal self’ and ‘dramatic self’ infiltrate what we research, how we do research 
and the aims of our research, thereby making our emotions entirely relevant. Harris 
and Huntington (2001, p.131) state that 
 
‘if we take emotions and emotional labour seriously… we open a 
space within which we can explore practical strategies to work 
with our emotional responses… we bring to light aspects of our 
experience that may be particularly problematic’ (cited, in 
Dickson-Swift, et al, 2009, p.73).  
 
I felt it necessary to think about my emotions and indeed create space for my 
emotions, because there were various ways in which I felt connected to my PhD, for 
example through my interest in injustice. Further, the ‘Non research Human I’ wanted 
to raise potential respondents’ confidence especially since potential respondents 
expressed concerns which were based on a belief that firstly, an individual’s status 
determines their right to be ‘heard’ and secondly, that I would judge them. Research 
conducted by Dickson-Swift et al. (2009) found that researchers were concerned about 
whether becoming emotional while undertaking research was the ‘right’ thing to do. 
Through considering emotional issues before conducting the interviews, I would 
emotionally prepare myself for interviews. I did this because it is often the shock of 
hearing an upsetting experience which upsets me, however when I know I might hear 
something upsetting I am better placed to deal with it. Lofland and Lofland (1995, 
cited in Dickson-Swift, et al, 2009, p.74) argue,  
 
128 
 
‘knowing that emotional distress may occur for the researcher may 
reduce the impact and encourage researchers to think more about 
themselves when designing research projects’.  
 
I developed many strategies of self care, for example I prepared myself emotionally to 
hear things that might be upsetting and this was my way of making my emotions part 
of the research design. Further, I felt through doing this I was better placed to deal 
with respondents’ emotions, particularly emotions of distress. Although I felt that 
much of the rapport which had to be established was done prior to the interviews 
taking place, establishing good researcher – respondent relations continued when 
conducting the interviews. The need for emotional awareness and sensitivity was seen 
as an ongoing process because as Dupont (2008, p.197) states there should be an 
obligation which is beyond ‘simply doing no harm’, where we consider themes of 
empowerment and potential harm. I was fully aware that respondents might ‘freeze 
up’ in the interview context, so I tried to make the unnatural situation of disclosing 
personal feelings and perceptions to a stranger both natural and normal. 
In one interview a woman became very distressed, she told me she was feeling 
tired, she looked like she was going to start crying and her speech became very 
broken. I had to decide at what point to intervene, if at all and what to say.  
 
‘The world the researcher encounters is chaotic, irrational, and 
unpredictable; as a result, the researcher’s actions are often 
spontaneous and emotionally tinged’ (Alder and Alder, 1987; 
Douglas and Johnson, 1977, cited in Hunt, 1989, p.15).  
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I decided to intervene in a way which would not highlight her distress but hopefully 
empower her instead. I therefore asked the woman if we should take a break. This 
could be seen as being selfish on my part, or as me denying this woman the 
opportunity to show emotions. However, my actions were determined by many 
factors. Firstly, I did not want the woman to think I thought she was weak; this woman 
through being older than me treated me very much like a younger person, she was 
caring, enquiring about how much sleep I was getting, if I’d eaten, etc. I did not want 
the woman to think her portrayal of emotions and distress had negatively impacted me 
in anyway. And secondly, I didn’t want the woman to remember the interview as a bad 
experience, to think of it later and to be in anyway negatively affected. She told me 
that since taking part in the research, her evening family meals were based on her 
discussing what she had revealed to me during the research. This woman’s experience 
was not negative; she thanked me and told me that through voicing her emotions, 
those of distress, happiness, anger etc she had found the interviews to be therapeutic. 
Although Loftland (1971, p.131 cited in Hunt, 1989, p.19), ‘urges researchers to 
protect themselves against compromising emotional involvements’ it was through 
being emotional that harm did not emerge. Therefore, although this woman had 
experienced emotions during the interviews, it could have been the case that because 
we took frequent breaks these emotions were not overpowering. Whereas, had she 
started crying due to the emotions becoming overwhelming because we were not 
taking breaks, this might have led her to believe the interviews were emotionally 
exhausting rather than emotionally empowering.  
                Research by Dickson-Swift, et al (2009, p.69) discovered how a number of 
researchers referred to their ability to stay ‘detached’ from the research as offering 
them some protection from becoming emotional during the research and researchers 
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reported a constant management of self in the research, ‘especially in situations where 
there is a high level of expressed emotion; that is, people crying or feeling angry’. 
Although I practised emotional management I did not try to detach myself. At times I 
became very upset, especially listening to one man’s story. He had been subjected to 
many raids, his children had been detained by the police under counter terrorism 
legislation and what distressed me about his experience was the change in his British 
identity. He felt that this country had given him the opportunity to gain qualifications, 
open a business and conveyed a story of success and gratitude, where he clearly 
acknowledged that it was due to the government that he had gone from being a lorry 
driver to a millionaire owning a successful business. However, when talking about his 
perceptions of the government since the ‘war on terror’ he felt injustice and bitter to 
the extent where he disliked Muslims who were visibly Islamic because he believed 
they were highlighting religious differences, which would lead to further, legal 
inequality. He had experienced loss, a loss of attachment, loyalty and affection to his 
British identity. When he became very angry I felt that I understood his anger; I could 
place how it had emerged and why it was as severe as it was.  
 
‘By demonstrating certain emotionally mediated behaviour, researchers show 
they are persons capable of human feelings rather than automatons enacting a 
prefabricated script’ (Hunt, 1989, p.22).  
 
I did show emotions but felt that I could not show too many negative emotions such as 
anger and had to focus on positive emotions such as empathy, whereby I demonstrated 
a sense of knowing and understanding of the significance of what I was told. This was 
a form of emotional management and where some emotions like anger were 
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concerned, I felt that expressing them could potentially influence what was revealed to 
me.   
            There were particular times during interviewing where I did feel 
uncomfortable and had to manage my emotions to a greater extent. Dickson-Swift, et 
al (2009, p.67) state ‘to say that we have been ‘touched’ … is synonymous with saying 
that we have been emotionally affected’ and many times I was emotionally affected. 
Respondents often talked about emotionally provocative things such as rape, murder, 
genocide etc. One respondent talked about these things with strong emotions present 
and provided graphic descriptions of images she had seen. Through trying to 
understand and connect with this woman I was getting graphic images in my head, I 
had been emotionally affected. Research by Dickson-Swift et al (2009) found that 
researchers reported feelings of exhaustion and tiredness when undertaking research 
interviews, often feeling quite overwhelmed by the nature of the data. I knew that 
preparing myself for interviews was not enough as the average day involved me 
starting interviews at 12pm and finishing at 11pm – 12am. Therefore I was very much 
aware of the fact that after finishing a day of interviewing I was emotionally charged 
and needed to de-stress. I gave myself time and found the best way to relax was to do 
something very much unrelated to my work, such as going into town. This was my 
way of ensuring that I did not suffer from emotional exhaustion and tiredness. Spalek 
(2004, p.413) states,  
 
‘emotional management can take place not only during an interview 
situation but also in the write-up of a study, when decisions 
(conscious and subconscious) are made regarding which feelings the 
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researcher decides to reflect upon and how those feelings are re-
presented’.  
 
It was during the writing up stage that I acknowledged I had changed during the 
research process and indeed questioned how this change impacted the research and the 
decisions I made. For example, I started my PhD when I was 21 and knew that had I 
conducted the interviews at this age many of my decisions would have been different. 
For example, using the earlier example of the woman and her past experiences, at the 
age of 21 I would have encouraged her to participate, because my overwhelming 
belief would have been that even if she suffers negative emotions; they would provide 
her with the impetus to deal with her past experiences. However, I now see the same 
views as simply being too idealistic and recognize that not everything can be 
overcome. I believe it was through making such decisions visible that as Brew (2001, 
p.186, cited in Murray, 2005, p.19) states, ‘research acknowledges its disasters as well 
as its achievements; its rigidities as well as its creativity; its power and its 
powerlessness; its openness and its dogmatic blinkers’.  
One of the most difficult parts of writing up my research emerged when I was 
writing my methods chapter. I had very much the same problem as Hollway did, 
Hollway (2008, p.394) states,  
 
‘I remember being taught as an undergraduate psychologist that 
academic writing should be completely separated from the writer 
(the principle is encapsulated in the rule that we should write 
avoiding ‘‘I’’). Thinking about it psychoanalytically suggests that 
this practice institutionalized a kind of dissociation’.  
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The very task of including ‘I’ was very difficult and something I have never done 
before.  
 
‘Fieldworkers share a culture dominated by the ideology of 
professionalism… According to that ideology, emotions are suspect. 
They contaminate research by impeding objectivity, hence they 
should be removed’ (Hochschild, 1983, cited in Dickson-Swift et al. 
2009, p.63).  
 
The writing process very much reflected this; however I was fully aware that it was 
my emotions and subjectivities which had also shaped the research. I therefore wanted 
to write my emotions in as this would in itself not only problematize the image of the 
researcher as a tool void of emotions but also show how many decisions were 
intrinsically tied to emotions. I no longer saw such emphasis on emotions as being 
over-dramatic, but rather as revealing an honest account and conceptualization of what 
research actually is.  
 
TRANSCRIBING THE DATA AND REFLEXIVE ANALYSIS 
This section details the strategies used when analyzing the data. In total 32 
respondents were interviewed retrospectively and prospectively, thus a total of 64 
interviews were conducted. In designing the sample variables of age, ethnicity and 
gender were taken into account and all respondents were from the Sparkbrook area of 
Birmingham. In terms of ethnicity all respondents were Pakistani and Kashmiri and 
had been born in UK. I wanted to focus on Pakistani Kashmiri respondents because 
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the majority of Muslims from Birmingham are of these ethnicities (ONS, 2004). In 
terms of the research population including a wider diversity of Muslims this would 
have meant having to situate these identities and thus possibly diluting the experiences 
of Pakistani Kashmiri Muslims. I therefore favored depth over generalizibility and felt 
that although the research does focus on Pakistani Kashmiri Muslims respondents it 
can also contribute to our understanding of non Pakistani Kashmiri British Muslims. It 
was also for this reason that I decided not analyze the data according to the variables 
of age, class and gender. Therefore, due to wanting to explore depth I only analyzed 
the data according to the pre 9/11 and post 9/11 comparison. And further, using a 
multitude of comparisons was beyond the scope of a PhD because the word limit 
would have restrained the depth that needed to be conveyed for each comparison. 
Punch (2005) states how a study can be a combination of determined and 
undetermined research11. This research was determined in the sense that research 
questions and a theoretical standpoint - cosmopolitanism and citizenship - were 
applied to the empirical data. However, although the research questions were used to 
guide the research, the data collection questions, those asked in the interview remained 
neutral. The data collection questions were neutral because they did not introduce 
concepts from these theoretical perspectives. For example, respondents were asked 
questions such as ‘What do you think of the police?’ Rather than questions which 
reflected the theoretical perspectives and introduced concepts such as equality, justice 
and human rights through asking specific questions relating to these concepts. When 
analyzing the data concepts such as justice still had to emerge from the data and 
further it was through analyzing the data that I was able to describe what justice meant 
and the meaning of this concept for respondents. Therefore, I used a reflexive 
                                                 11 Determined research is where research questions and a theoretical standpoint are applied to empirical data and undetermined research is where research questions and theory emerge from the empirical data. 
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approach to analysis which was informed by some strands of grounded theory, as is 
now explained. 
Grounded theory is commonly interpreted and understood as an approach 
whereby research questions and concepts emerge from the empirical data, literature is 
examined after interviews have been conducted and theory emerges from the data. 
However, this is only one version of the approach and it is due to grounded theory 
being adaptable that it was not systematically used but rather the analysis of data was 
informed by a reflexive use of grounded theory. Grounded theory was created by 
Glaser and Strauss in the 1960s and ‘according to earlier writings of grounded theory, 
grounded theory is an approach where there is no preconceived hypothesis’ (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967 cited in Allan 2003, p.2). Hunter and Hari et al. (2005, p.57) argue 
that grounded theory has evolved and become less rigid in its use with researchers 
increasingly adapting grounded theory to ‘suit the nature of the research problem’. I 
used a reflexive approach to analysis which was informed by aspects of grounded 
theory and this section explains how the analysis was reflexive.  
Punch (2005) states in traditional research, literature is reviewed as part of 
planning and developing research questions but in grounded theory literature is 
delayed until data has been collected so that the researcher has no preconceived ideas. 
The evolution of grounded theory and emergence of different interpretations means 
that literature is increasingly being used prior to data collection. In 1990 Strauss and 
Corbin ‘advocated reviewing the literature early in the study for several reasons’ 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990 cited in McGhee and Marland, 2007, p.4). The first reason is 
that through a review of literature, researchers know what the focus of research should 
be as literature stimulates questions and the review of literature also provides 
justification for the research. As Hutchinson (1993 cited in McGhee and Marland, 
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2007, p.7) states ‘the purpose of this initial review is to increase awareness of the 
existing knowledge base, and also to identify gaps’. I conducted a literature review 
prior to the interviews being conducted and this assisted in helping me to develop 
research questions through identifying research areas, such as the impact of the ‘war 
on terror’ on Muslims’ Islamic identities that had not been explored. Further, a 
literature review also acted as a justification for the research and I was able to 
formulate research questions which benefitted me through providing me with focus 
and clarity.  
Secondly, Strauss and Corbin (1990 cited in McGhee and Marland, 2007, p.4) 
state a literature review helps researchers ‘to avoid conceptual and methodological 
pitfalls’ and to be ‘open minded’ but not ‘empty headed’. Gunning (2007a, p.363) 
argues that regardless of the increase of interest amongst scholars in terrorism studies, 
there is a ‘continuing dearth of primary research data’. Conducting a literature review 
revealed how over-theorized research into terrorism and the ‘war on terror’ is. The 
lack of research into this area influenced my decision to gain data on the ‘subaltern 
counter publics’ of British Muslims in relation to the ‘war on terror’. I tried to remain 
‘open minded’ but felt that using an approach which could contribute to the state 
centric ‘war on terror’ through not placing respondents’ perceptions of the state in a 
discourse beyond the state would be ‘empty headed’. Gunning (2007a, p.367) states 
‘terrorism studies’ tends to accept uncritically the framing of the ‘terrorism problem’ 
by the state’. According to Gunning (2007a, p.376) a critical approach would move  
 
‘beyond the state as the sole legitimate referent…. to the wider notion 
of human security and an analysis of how ‘terrorism’ and counter-
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terrorism affect the security of all… including such concerns as social 
justice, inequality, ‘structural violence’, culture and discrimination’.  
 
The literature proved to be insightful in identifying a theoretical approach which 
would assist me in using wider discourses whereby respondents’ voices would not be 
marginalized or interpreted according to state discourses. Further, through using 
cosmopolitanism and citizenship my eyes were open to the data in a way which 
considered much more salient forms of harm, belonging and unity. Cosmopolitanism 
and citizenship were used as they both emphasize notions such as justice and the 
responsibility of the state to citizens and therefore do not use the state as the definer 
of harm. However, as previously stated a reflexive approach was used therefore to 
take the concept of justice, it still had to emerge from the data to be included in the 
data analysis. The following quote from a respondent shows how concepts such as 
justice and the responsibility of the state to citizens were present in the data. 
 
I think the police have been trained to be harsh and target the Muslim 
community and I have a story, I have seen it and people say to me, you 
can’t fight the system, keep your head down and do what you have 
been told to do, but I say fight the system where is the justice? The 
police are now encouraged to detain someone just because they might 
be a terrorist. If they haven’t found anything they are not going to but 
what are they putting that family through, the community through, and 
I feel that if they haven’t found anything that is just going to make the 
community angry and frustrated, and more and more against the 
police and I think if they did have something they aren’t going to say 
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anything and the police say come forward we are your friends, tell us, 
but they won’t tell the police. 
 
Other researchers have identified theoretical standpoints/theories prior to analyzing 
the data and used these when analyzing the data. For example, Plummer and Young 
2010, p.317) advocate that ‘assuming a feminist perspective in grounded theory 
research can promote social change’ and Alvarez (2001) analyzed data from his study 
using determined theoretical orientations and perspectives, but the data was still 
grounded because the themes emerged from the data. Hesse (1980, p.247 cited Punch 
2005) argues research should be used to emancipate oppressed groups and it should 
be based on explicit ideologies, through the abandonment of value-neutral social 
science. Therefore, where the aim of the research is to promote social change or 
reveal the lived experiences of minorities or majorities theoretical 
standpoints/theories can be used in conjunction with the data. They are used as a way 
of revealing and as in my case opening the eyes of researcher to try and gain 
narratives that reflect the reality of respondents’ lived experiences.  
This is closely related to the third reason for conducting a literature review, it 
‘stimulates theoretical sensitivity’ (Strauss & Corbin 1990 cited in McGhee and 
Marland, 2007, p.4). Theoretical sensitivity is about developing insight into data, 
being able to give the data meaning, understanding the data and understanding which 
data is significant. Through conducting a literature review and using cosmopolitanism 
and citizenship, which as the literature chapters demonstrate highlight the importance 
of subjectivity, I was able to understand which data was significant. Further, these 
perspectives allowed me to understand how the state and the police could impact on 
citizens’ identities and feelings of belonging and loyalty. Thus, I was much better 
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positioned to identify these themes from the data. For example, to use the quote by a 
respondent below theoretical sensitivity allowed me to understand how due to the 
states foreign policy since the ‘war on terror’ the respondents British identity had 
been impacted.  
 
I think they have shamed our country because I believe I am part of 
this country. I think we had real respect around the world, we had 
high standards people saw this country as a country with morals and 
standards and it didn’t matter who you were when you came to 
England you became equal to everyone else so for me the government 
has lost all that. The best thing in the world was to be able to say I’m 
British, when you went to Pakistani you were proud to say I’m British 
and now I feel really tainted by it and I don’t think the people in the 
government not only don’t represent our views but they don’t 
understand my issues and my community.  
 
I opened up the possibilities of interpretation through deeply questioning the data and 
started labelling the data. For example, the process of labelling is about simplifying 
the data, so I labelled all data which was about a visible Islamic identity with this 
label. For example the following quote since the respondent refers to signifiers of 
Islamic identity. 
 
Anyone with a beard or a hijab is seen as a threat which is just not 
true and it’s about stereotyping. The government has created a divide, 
before we were seen as Asian people but now we are seen as Muslims. 
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I then collated all the data to which this label had been applied. The dominant themes 
/ labels identified were related to the theoretical perspectives of citizenship and 
cosmopolitanism. When writing the data chapters the dominant themes respondents 
talked about became the sub headings in the data chapters and when respondents 
talked about aspects of these themes they were included under the sub headings in the 
data chapter. For example, one dominant theme was the meaning of Islam and how it 
is different from other identities. This theme became a sub heading in the data chapter 
and when respondents explained the reasons for an Islamic identity being different, 
these sub themes were included under the main theme, so reason like an Islamic 
identity being a personal identity, an Islamic identity being a spiritual identity etc. 
Through analyzing in this way the data, the conclusions and findings of the research 
have emerged directly from respondents.      
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated how the research was carried out. Practical issues such 
as the relationship between the theoretical perspectives and the research design have 
been discussed, as well as the use of interviews. However, although this chapter 
explored practical issues, such as interview questions attention was also paid to 
identities, emotions and subjectivity.  
Many of the themes mentioned those of insider / outsider position, reflexivity, 
ethic and subjectivities were discussed and shown to be related to emotions. I 
conducted research on a topic which was sensitive and to not care about the research, 
or those involved would have been hard. Therefore, although a huge part of research 
was the practicalities of how the aims relate to the theoretical perspectives and the 
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research strategies and further, the ethical guidelines that have to be followed in order 
to gain ethical approval, where research involves personal experiences and 
understanding identities it is important that a duty of care include considerations of 
emotions.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ ON 
BRITISH MUSLIMS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE STATE 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the data for respondents’ perceptions of the state before the ‘war 
on terror’, therefore retrospectively from 1989 to 2000, and prospectively, after the 
‘war on terror’. As previously stated, the aim of the research is to consider British 
Muslims’ counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’. The empirical data for both periods 
is compared and cosmopolitanism and citizenship are used as a framework in which 
the empirical data is explored. The significant themes in the data are explored 
throughout the chapter and I conclude the chapter through pulling these themes 
together and presenting respondents’ counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’ through 
discussing their perceptions of the state.  
 
RETROSPECTIVE DATA 
STATE POLICIES PERCEIVED THROUGH ETHNIC / RACIAL 
IDENTITIES  
Citizenship is about state policies which attribute citizens’ rights on the basis of their 
identities. A common theme to emerge from respondents was the idea of New Labour 
providing services and achieving progress through focusing on issues such as 
deprivation and poverty. Policy initiatives of this nature, as Safia suggests were 
perceived as inclusive policies and as a way of strengthening shared citizenship 
through highlighting problems which cut across minority identities. 
 
New Labour came in and I thought it was a change, I think they had started 
to look at closing the gap; they started to look at cycles of deprivation and 
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social exclusion, how if you lived in the worse wards you were more likely 
to get the worse education and get the worse jobs. So it was all about 
solutions and joining up problems. I thought it was really good that they 
thought we have outer ring white estates and core inner ring estates which 
are poor. So they were trying to do their best for those who were at most 
need.  
 
This data therefore suggests that although as McPhee (2005) argues, in order to gain 
loyalty a state must recognize minority groups and loyalty is established through 
minority rights, policies which are developed for the whole are equally as important. 
The data demonstrates how policies can serve the purpose of creating a unified culture 
- which Falkner (2003) argues minority specific policies cannot. Therefore a sense of 
inclusiveness is achieved through policies providing equal citizenship (Johnson, 2009) 
and in this way respondents felt part of the whole. Although social issues and 
inequality were tackled through class identities, Adam said equality also focused on 
minority racial and ethnic identities.  
 
There were services existing on sole basis of serving minorities.  
 
Multiculturalism calls ‘for the recognition and accommodation of cultural minorities, 
including immigrants, and requires states to create policies or laws that allow 
minority groups to root their participation in society within their cultural 
communities’ (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Parekh, 2006; 
Taylor, 1994 cited in Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2003, p.160). The data 
highlights how in order to gain loyalty a state must also recognize minority groups 
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(McPhee, 2005) and equal policies are just as important in ensuring that a citizen feels 
they belong to the national political community (Caren, 2000). As Matloob describes, 
there is a direct link between the state recognition of identities, in this case Asian and 
the psychological dimension of citizenship with loyalty and attachment being 
positively impacted. 
 
The government were very good with Asian community, in the health 
centres, in the hospitals, in the school, everywhere. The government made it 
possible for us to integrate and fit in. I felt like this country was my home 
and people were not scared of differences they respected differences.  
 
Carens (2000) unites emotional attachment and loyalty with identification and in this 
way because state policies essentially categorize citizens, it is possible to understand 
the impact of these categories on citizens’ sense of attachment and loyalty. This data 
shows that where interests in the form of rights exist on the basis of a variety of 
identities, British, racial and ethnic this led to positive perceptions of the state because 
it demonstrated that the state views respondents as part of the national community and 
minority community and this increased loyalty and attachment to the state and national 
identity. 
 
STATE PERCEIVED THROUGH POLICY AND SERVICES 
Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, (2003, p.154) argue that citizenship includes four 
dimensions which are ‘legal status, rights, political and other forms of participation in 
society, and a sense of belonging’. Interestingly, the retrospective data showed how 
the state was perceived mainly in policy and service terms, therefore through the 
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political dimension of citizenship, rather than the legal dimension. For example, New 
Labour was perceived as providing ethnic minorities with services and rights which 
were aimed at eradicating the disadvantages that existed in society due to respondents’ 
ethnic and racial identities. Sophina describes how she perceived the state as providing 
opportunities.  
 
The government was not pushing people to integrate but giving them 
opportunities to form their own support groups and be self productive.  
 
This sense of empowerment was also perceived as trying to be achieved through the 
equal distribution of power at the structural level. Over half of the respondents, like 
Adam expressed the importance of policies which were aimed at helping them achieve 
structural power. 
 
I think by having a far more representative government they were trying to 
root out discrimination and make sure that government was truly 
representative of the people it served. 
 
What is of interest is that during the retrospective interviews respondents used a 
variety of identities, predominantly ethnic and racial and all the identities were based 
on how the state formulated policies. Therefore, as Muslims’ Islamic identity was 
largely excluded under multiculturalism, respondents referred to the identities through 
which the state formulated policies, that of ethnic, racial and Asian. Shafquat uses the 
words ‘our’ and ‘we’ and many respondents used these words to denote their British 
identity.  
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I was enjoying school and college, with New Labour coming in, in the 90’s 
there was a difference, a difference that there was freedom. Things changed 
in the 90’s I really remember the 90’s, economically it was booming, 
internet technology was advancing, we were experiencing a really exciting 
time. It was a free time that’s all I remember, an exciting time as your 
teenage years usually are. You could do what you wanted and that was a 
result of the government we were allowed to do what we wanted as of when 
and I guess you can see that people in other countries did not have that but 
our government provided that for us.  
 
Similarly, Rukhsana also talks about an inclusive British identity. The use of this 
identity also denotes a sense of perceived unity, attachment, commonality, indeed 
revealing that the space between the parts and the whole was not perceived as being 
great.  
 
I can remember it really felt like we were going places as a nation.  
 
It is through the state providing ‘equal citizenship based on justice, human rights and 
social responsibility’ (Johnson, 2009, p.31), a liberal conception of citizenship that 
consensus in society is achieved, as only then can the state rely on its people to create 
an equal and tolerant society. The depth of this consensus and shared identity is 
noticeable in phrases like, ‘as a nation’ and ‘our government’. The liberal conception 
of citizenship is very closely tied to the cosmopolitan ideal, ideas of equality, moral 
worth and human rights. As the data demonstrated the legal dimension of citizenship 
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was not relevant so equal liberty and justice were not thought of in legal terms by 
respondents but rather were thought of in terms of services and policies. Respondents’ 
perceptions mirrored the idea of concentric rings, whereby an individual can be a 
member of various communities (Dower, 2008) and because respondents’ perceived 
their minority identities as being accepted this increased their attachment to the state 
and their British identity.  
 
STATE FOREIGN POLICIES AND THE UMMA  
State foreign policy was the only point in the retrospective data where respondents 
prioritized their Islamic identity and all respondents voiced dissatisfaction and anger 
towards the foreign policy of the state during this period.  
 
I mean Blair, all politicians in Britain are proud, ohh, we went and saved 
the Muslims, and what Muslims did you save in Bosnia? You didn’t, you 
waited and waited and waited until it was too late and there was a handful 
left. There was this charity I went to and they had pictures of Muslims that 
were slaughtered in Bosnia, you saw pictures of little children being put in 
cellars, and then petrol being poured over them and then they would burn 
them. The Red Cross people who took pictures of children and babies 
bodies in cellars, women who’s breasts had been cut off and who bled to 
death, that’s not humane.  
 
Where foreign policy and Islamic identities are linked together, they give rise to the 
umma. It is through the umma that cosmopolitanization is apparent as respondents 
combined the international with the local, demonstrating their connectedness through 
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their perceptions of state foreign policy (Beck, 2002). Therefore through the umma it 
is possible to note the increasing relevance of cosmopolitanism, since 
cosmopolitanism refers to individuals’ capacity to live locally while also being 
connected to global issues (Ruggiero, 2007) and their capacity for cosmopolitan 
empathy – the sympathy for fellow humans regardless of geographical territory / 
distance (Hudson, 2008). This therefore suggests that because the umma is the global 
community of Muslims and the point of unity is Islamic identity – this identity is 
perhaps much more capable of inducing cosmopolitan empathy. The above quote 
demonstrates how through the umma emotions and empathy are transitional and in this 
way the foreign policy of the state can lead to perceptions of state injustice, even 
where state injustice is not experienced at the national level. Although this respondent 
was angry at foreign policy her overall perceptions of the state were positive, as were 
Sikander’s. 
 
The government was trying to integrate communities and the foreign policy 
they had was a bit bad but generally I was getting more involved with the 
political process and felt that things such as ethnic minority issues were 
progressing well.  
 
This data shows the complex interactions between satisfaction at the state domestic 
policy level and dissatisfaction at foreign policy level. Kaldor (2000) remarks on how 
social formations which exclude on the basis of identity are of a transitional nature 
meaning that on the basis of identity one can be an outsider in their own national 
territory in which they are a citizen but also an outsider beyond their national 
territory. It could be argued that although foreign policy led to Islamic identities being 
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prioritized and feelings of anger it is because domestic policy focused on ethnic and 
racial identities and was perceived positively that the state was still perceived 
positively. 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF ASIAN AND ISLAMIC IDENTITIES 
This section explores how respondents thought their identities had been constructed by 
the state. This is of great significance because it further highlights how and why 
biographical cosmopolitanization could not be said to exist. For biographical 
cosmopolitanization to exist Islamic identities would have had to be perceived as 
being constructed negatively at both the international and the national level. Secondly, 
identities and citizenship are closely related, the state determines which identities 
should be the focus of policy and to what extent rights should exist on the basis of 
these identities. Therefore the state construction of identities, through citizenship can 
either lead to inclusion or exclusion (Hussain and Bagguley, 2005). Generally, 
respondents believed discourses were associated with their Asian identity and there 
was an emphasis on cultural stereotypes. All respondents, like Zara, during the 
retrospective interviews conceptualized their Asian identity as an identity which 
encompassed other religious groups such as Sikhs and Hindus and therefore was not 
religiously differentiated.  
 
And every now and then you would have a drama on TV about an Asian 
woman who is going to be forced to marry and it wasn’t going to work out 
and she wanted to marry someone who was white.  
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Firstly, due to Asian identity being based on shared culture, respondents did not 
perceive there to be an amplification of difference. And secondly, biographical 
cosmopolitanization could not be said to exist because Islamic identities were not 
constructed negatively as shall now be discussed.  
It was the Rushdie affair which bought Muslims’ religious identity into the 
public sphere (Kabbani, 2002). Interestingly, all respondents voiced anger at the way 
Muslims had reacted to the Rushdie affair, and therefore did not believe that the state 
excluded their religious identity. Musarat explains how she blamed Muslims for 
causing controversy over the Rushdie affair and reveals how differentiated 
understandings of Islam are.  
 
 I think some good came out of the Salman Rushdie affair, for Muslims I am 
saying this…. All Muslims picked it up as an insult. But the people who were 
showing violent reactions were the Shia’s because of the Ayatollah and if 
throughout the world you look at the ratio of the Shia’s compared to the rest 
of the Muslims it’s a very small minority. Another person said to me at the 
time, don’t you think if he swore and dishonored the prophet don’t you think 
god can look after his own? It was a holy man who said that it was stupid, 
god doesn’t need us to sort out his holy house because he can sort it out 
himself. Yes show your disbelief, because it’s your duty and it says show 
your disbelief, disapprove, yes say I disapprove of what he has done, leave 
the government to do something about it later on, but you don’t show this 
violence and burning and screaming, you know blowing it out of proportion 
and life threats, and god knows what other threats. No, that’s not an Islamic 
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way of doing things. An Islamic way is saying this is very wrong although 
he says he is not a Muslim it doesn’t matter, we do not swear at anybody.  
 
The Rushdie affair highlighted intra Muslim differences and diversity. These 
differences and diversity showed how a variety of different interpretations are formed 
from the Quran and Hadith, and how these interpretations constitute a battle for the 
meaning of Islam. The Rushdie affair was therefore important in terms of signifying 
the differences between radical Shias and moderate Sunni Muslims. It could be argued 
that the event did not lead to negative perceptions of the state because of the wider 
state approach. Therefore, respondents did not perceive their Islamic identity as being 
constructed negatively and believed they were largely constructed according to their 
Asian identity, an identity for which commonality was present. This demonstrates the 
importance of identities within citizenship and potentially how the more identity 
specific state policies are, the greater the damage to the psychological dimension of 
citizenship and citizens’ feelings of belonging, loyalty and attachment if the state 
constructed discourse associated with that identity is perceived as being negative 
(Carens, 2000; McPhee, 2005). 
 
BELIEF IN EQUALITY AS JUSTIFYING NEED FOR RELIGIOUS 
EQUALITY LEGISLATION 
Respondents were asked whether the state should have provided protection for 
Muslims on the basis of their religious identity. Firstly, respondents like Sharfquat 
cited equality as the reason for why legislation to protect them on the basis of their 
Islamic identity should have existed.  
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Within this so-called democracy every person should have the right 
regardless of what religion and beliefs they have to be protected.  
 
The data is highly significant because it reveals that those respondents who believed 
legislation should exist, believed it should exist to protect all religious minorities. The 
emphasis on equality suggests it is essential that the state maintains equality and where 
principles of equality do exist, be it at the service level or legislative level then a 
shared sense of commonality is more likely to exist. Further, it highlights the 
relevance of ethics, cosmopolitanism advocates an ethics of responsibility, the idea of 
not harming other people (Dower, 2008) and how equality creates moral 
responsibilities that have universal scope (Brock and Brighouse, 2005). Therefore, it 
could be argued that respondents citing equality is an example of them displaying their 
ethics of responsibility towards other human beings, their responsibility in ensuring all 
humans are protected.  
Research by Modood and Ahmad (2007) revealed that Muslims are pro-
multiculturalism as long as it includes faith as a positive dimension of difference.  
Many respondents felt that the state included their religious identity where services 
were concerned. Sikander says this led to him to believe that the state respected his 
various identities.  
 
 This government was approving state funded Islamic schools; some 
discrimination legislation actually did seem to suggest that this was a 
country that was not tolerant of racism. So I think in the first four or five 
years there was a shift in positively funding activity around cohesion and 
working with respecting the rights of minority communities.  
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Where ethnic and racial racism was concerned the state was perceived as positively 
trying to maintain equality. Under multiculturalism the state was perceived as 
encouraging society to share a British identity and also appreciate diversity. Nasrin 
describes how multiculturalism led to her having faith in the state.  
 
There was this constant talk of multiculturalism and this concept was not 
only talked about but done so with a sense of proudness in the government, 
the media and everywhere really. It was felt that living in a country full of 
diversity was good, with every group having its rightful place and being 
appreciated for what it bought into the country and the services and 
richness it provided to Britain.  
 
The government was therefore seen as restricting the ‘space’ in which racist ideologies 
could be sustained and gain support. Carens (2000) argues that legal status as citizens 
does not mean that citizens will necessary have an emotional attachment to the state. 
However, because respondents did not feel that differences were amplified negatively, 
rather constructed positively by the state, emotional attachment was strengthened, as is 
evident from what Matloob says. 
 
No I don’t think a need did exist, we were seen as belonging and that’s the 
way it was, I got on well with everyone and liked this country  
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Freedom to practice identity is vital and during this period, Musarat talks about how 
Islam was not perceived as being pushed to the private sphere; instead freedom was 
associated with Islam. 
 
No a law wasn’t needed because we could practice our religion, we could 
do more or less what we wanted we could open up a mosque, we could open 
up a charity there was a lot of easiness towards us and that was nice it was 
like we belonged to this society. Like we were part of this society and 
society accepted us, we didn’t feel like we were segregated and if I wanted 
to open a charity or help someone who is an orphan in a village back home 
you know I didn’t have a problem, I could do that.  
 
Therefore, the state was perceived as eradicating racism and constructing diversity 
positively through providing services on the basis of various identities, including 
Islamic identity. The impact of this was a perceived sense of unity, belonging and 
commonality. Thus, during this period identities as cosmopolitanism advocates, were 
associated with hospitality through the existence of services (Kaldor, 2000) and 
according to respondents these identities had a positive value placed on them (Beck 
and Grande, 2007).  
 
NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THE STATE DUE TO PERCEIVED 
INEQUALITY 
Although all the respondents above perceived the state positively, a very small 
minority were critical of the state and although positive perceptions heavily 
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outweighed the negative ones, it is worth including the negative perceptions. There 
were some criticisms of anti discrimination legislation, as Nazim describes…  
 
The CRE could have executed its power better and provided individuals 
with a lot more support and highlighted the ways in which it can assist 
ethnic minorities.  
 
Secondly, Safia believed that the state could have done more to tackle societal racism 
through encouraging the police to investigate racism and take it more seriously. 
 
I knew that if I reported racism it would never be investigated, so the 
government should have sent a real message out making it clear that we are 
all equal and racism would not be tolerated.  
 
And finally a common dominator in these negative perceptions was that although 
policies to bring equality were introduced; Sikander describes how in practice they 
failed to achieve results, such as that of achieving a more representative government.  
 
Well one of the things that somebody once pointed out to me was about 
showing that somebody has an equal role in society was to have role 
models, now the Asian community in terms of political leadership, in terms 
of active communities and all that I didn’t see, they went forward in terms of 
having more female MP’s and all that but there wasn’t any positive steps 
towards encouraging more Asians, but not just encourage but actually 
allow more Asian to stand in seats that were winnable. 
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Deutsch (2006, p.24) states that relative deprivation is more critical than absolute 
deprivation in stimulating dissatisfaction and ‘the greater the magnitude of relative 
deprivation, the greater the sense of injustice that will be experienced by the 
oppressed’. Where negative perceptions of the state did exist, although the data 
revealed equality as being an important principle, a great deal of inequality was not 
perceived. This is because the state was not perceived to fail Muslim communities in 
particular but all ethnic minorities, as the issues which respondents felt the state could 
have done better were issues that impacted all ethnic minorities. Therefore, it could be 
argued that had inequality been perceived through respondents’ Islamic identities, an 
identity for which inter minority commonality did not exist than a greater sense of 
deprivation would have been perceived. It will therefore be of interest to see how 
respondents’ perceptions of the state have been impacted since the ‘war on terror’ 
given that the ‘war on terror’ has made this identity significant. 
 
PROSPECTIVE DATA 
AMERICAN INFLUENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ‘WAR ON 
TERROR’ AS LEADING TO DISTRUST OF THE STATE 
The events of September 11th were conceptualized as a new form of global terror 
(Mythen and Walklate, 2008), with the binary of the security seeking western 
democracies being set in opposition to the risk and global threat of Islam (Turam, 
2004; Howell, 2006). Beck (2006, p.73) defines cosmopolitanization as ‘a second-
order level of self-destructive civilization that transcends the nation-state and 
infiltrates our innermost thoughts and feelings, experiences and expectations’. It could 
therefore be argued that the ‘war on terror’ has made the concept of 
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cosmopolitanization relevant because the second order level, where the threat of Islam 
and need for security measures was created have been domesticated through the 
creation of counter terrorism legislation. Thus, to consider this further the extent to 
which the term is applicable will be assessed through exploring whether the second 
order has impacted respondents’ ‘innermost thoughts and feelings, experiences and 
expectations’ (Beck, 2006, p.73). 
Firstly, the data shows that the role of America in the ‘war on terror’ has meant 
the concept of cosmopolitanization is applicable as actions at the international level 
have infiltrated thoughts and produced anger. More specifically, Jangir describes how 
American influence in the ‘war on terror has led to negative perceptions of the state. 
 
He took it personally and got it into his head that he’s on a mission to fight 
terrorism and he’s been following it. I think the government have been 
slavish in their following as he has been in the following of America and I 
think the guys an idiot really and needs to stand up to what he says and I 
really don’t have anything positive to say about the government  
 
Interestingly, all respondents expressed anger at what they perceived as American 
influence. Secondly, this anger was not only expressed as a result of the state letting 
America influence state policy but also, like Nasrin says the state following America 
in foreign policy. 
  
After 9/11 my opinion of the government totally changed and it didn’t 
change straight away because for the first month definitely I remember 
Blair actually making an effort to clarify that 9/11 does not justify Muslims 
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being attacked and actually stating that not all Muslims are like that. But 
after a while, the emphasis shifted and when Afghanistan and Iraq came 
into the agenda, he no longer cared about the impact of his words. With 
Bush, it was what I expected because he is quite stupid really and talked 
openly about the new world order and this did suggest that his policy and 
agenda was to go into countries.   
 
In the retrospective data anger at state foreign policy did not lead to overall 
dissatisfaction with the state because domestic policies were generally perceived 
positively. This suggests that where British Muslim citizens are concerned as citizens 
they expect their relationship with the state not to be influenced by external states. In 
this sense the idea of the social contract is relevant because respondents expect a direct 
relationship with the state, where they give up ‘the freedom of the state of nature in 
exchange for the guarantee of certain rights’ (Kaldor, 2000, p.2). Further, citizenship 
is a legal status which attributes rights that the state has a duty to meet (Nash, 2009) 
and as Bilal’s quote highlights, expectations of rights do exist and in the ‘war on 
terror’ America is seen as directly influencing the rights of British citizens.   
 
Mr. Blair is doing his own thing regardless of whether it is right or wrong. 
In fact because of his stupidity and backing of America an entire community 
is suffering because of him. 
 
The combination of rights and citizenship being compromised through the intrusion of 
American influence can be understood through the concept of biographical 
cosmopolitanization, ‘which means that the contradictions of the world are unequally 
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distributed not just out there but also at the centre of one’s own life’ (Beck, 2006, 
p.43). The use of the word ‘suffering’ in the data denotes the significance of emotions. 
Beck (2006) created the phrase the ‘globalization of emotions’ and related it to foreign 
policy in the ‘war on terror’ stating that ‘for the first time a war was treated as an 
event in global domestic politics, with the whole of humanity participating 
simultaneously through the mass media’ (Beck, 2006, p.2) and ‘the protests were 
driven by what one might call the ‘globalization of emotions’ (Beck 2006, p.5). The 
data demonstrates the existence of global emotions because it was the very fact that 
the war in Iraq still went ahead, even though it was responded to through the 
globalization of emotions, which led to marches that all respondents like Jamil felt 
disappointed in the state.  
 
The government has a lot to answer for, but there is no one to make them 
answer and this is sad. They have done so much wrong and are no longer 
answerable to the very people they supposedly represent. Like the Iraq war, 
how many people objected to it? Many went on the march and yet the war 
still happened.  
 
The existence of cosmopolitanization has therefore not just infiltrated respondents’ 
innermost ‘thoughts and feelings, experiences and expectations’ (Beck, 2006, p.73) 
but as Jamil demonstrates there are expectations of the state, that the state is 
accountable to citizens and reflects their interests. The extent of these expectations 
being violated in the ‘war on terror’ is signified through the use of British identity. 
Interestingly, the only time respondents referred to their British identity was when 
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mentioning Iraq. Adam uses his British identity because he perceives the state as 
having failed everyone, including non Muslims. 
 
And it is us, the British public who are now paying for the war, the family of 
those killed are paying and we are all paying through taxes. The 
government acted against what the majority wanted and this is not 
democracy, there should have been a vote on Iraq and we should have had 
the right to decide. How can people now have belief in politics and trust 
after this?   
 
The use of the British identity also signifies an attachment and sense of belonging to 
the whole (McPhee, 2005) and therefore, could be interpreted as respondents 
displaying higher levels of expectations where citizenship is concerned because 
ultimately, it is a form of citizenship based on meeting the rights of all citizens. The 
data demonstrates the globalization of emotions and where British identity is 
concerned, all respondents linked the actions of the state to their sense of attachment 
and belonging to their British identity. For example, Rafia talks about how she no 
longer associates pride with her British identity.  
 
I think they have shamed our country because I believe I am part of this 
country I think we had real respect around the world, we had high 
standards people saw this country as a country with morals and standards 
and it didn’t matter who you were when you came to England you became 
equal to everyone else so for me the government has lost all that. The best 
thing in the world was to be able to say I’m British when you went to 
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Pakistani you were proud to say I’m British and now I feel really tainted by 
it and I don’t think the people in the government not only don’t represent 
our views but they don’t understand my issues and my community.  
 
This therefore suggests that respondents not only have expectations of the state but 
where these are violated their attachment to their British identity is impacted 
negatively. This data has demonstrated the significant change in respondents’ 
perceptions of the state, how the ‘war on terror’ has created perceptions of distrust and 
anger at the state and how this has led to the psychological dimension of citizenship 
being negatively impacted.  
 
‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND RELIGIOUS INTERNATIONAL BINARY  
The global dynamics of the ‘war on terror’ have made the concept of 
cosmopolitanization applicable and this section considers cosmopolitanization and 
Islamic identities. Interestingly, due to the global nature of the ‘war on terror’, the 
prospective data includes themes such as democracy and secularism which were not 
present in the retrospective data, even though the same questions were asked. This 
marks a stark contrast with the retrospective data, and furthermore, the prospective 
highlights how Islamic identities became significant in the ‘war on terror’. 
At the national level respondents expressed anger at the state because the state 
was perceived as being anti-democratic through invading Iraq, regardless of the fact 
that British citizens opposed the invasion. However, at the international level 
democracy was perceived as being a threat by many respondents because respondents, 
like Shafquat, believed that in the ‘war on terror’ the west is forcing democracy upon 
Islamic nations. 
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Judaism is very similar to Islam even Christianity, they don’t agree with 
homosexuality and no religion teaches murder and lying. For democracy to 
be more tolerant on all these different aspects is has to be in direct conflict 
with religion so the more democracy spreads the more religion will be 
phased out as it has done in America and the UK. Like there’s this war 
looming with Iran, they’ve got their base set in Iraq it’s like a stepping 
stone to spread democracy and then go into the middle east and it’s been 
their aim for god knows how long, because its one region in the world 
where Islamic rule still exits. 
 
Democracy emerged as a prominent reason for respondents believing that foreign 
Islamic countries were being invaded and it was expressed as a value orientated 
system that is in opposition with Islam and Islamic values. The other main theme to 
emerge was that of secularism, with some respondents believing that within the ‘war 
on terror’ the west is trying to eradicate Islamic countries. Jangir describes how he 
believes the west needs an enemy and therefore Islam has been purposely constructed 
as being the enemy.  
 
There is this clash of civilizations as it is perceived. Western Europe is 
defining itself by defining what others are and those others are Muslims 
right now, they are making Muslims the enemy within. I think first they had 
the Russians to blame it on and all that but I think now they need to act to 
try and preserve what they are and they are going more right wing and I 
think they are fearing a revolution and want to keep their own culture so 
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that’s why they are trying to distance and separate, and of course that 
makes our society change. And Western Europe is very secular compared to 
other parts of the world, even America is a very religious society and here I 
think where people have lost their own identity they are looking for 
something else.  
 
According to Findlay (2007) terrorism, the criminalization of terrorism and justice 
were essentially re-interpreted within the wider agenda of global governance. This 
data reveals how for respondents themes of democracy and secularism were cited as 
being the motivations for foreign policy and as potentially dividing the world with the 
creation of global terror (Mythen and Walklate, 2008). Thus, as Findlay (2007) states, 
it is the interpretation of truth and the legitimacy this conveys which is important and 
the data reveals that for respondents foreign policy was not perceived as being 
legitimate. The perception of Islamic identity being attacked on the international level 
suggests biographical cosmopolitanization could be perceived through respondents’ 
Islamic identity if they perceive a similar level of attack on this identity at the national 
level. 
 
THE STATE AND THE CREATION OF A NEGATIVE DISCOURSE 
AROUND ISLAMIC IDENTITIES 
This section now considers how respondents believed the British state responded to 
the attacks of September 11th, and constructed their Islamic identities in the ‘war on 
terror’. Altheide (2007) argues that politicians constructed risk and fear in order to 
expand control and create legitimacy through associating terrorism with the Muslim 
faith. The state has a privileged position in dispersing discourses associated with 
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identities with Green (2001, p.489) calling this ‘the amplifying effects of elite 
encouragement’. All respondents made reference to how they believed the state had 
demonized Islam. Interestingly, Sikander highlights the nature of state encouragement 
through making a distinction between the state dispersing discourses and those at the 
societal level. 
 
In my own little world that’s called my mind there is a conspiracy theory 
which says, the people who are portraying the Muslims the ways they are 
being portrayed with the hatred about Islam and the ideological beliefs of 
Islam, doesn’t exactly translate to those who live on the estates of Kings 
Norton, they are just racist through ignorance.  
 
Wetherall (2009, p.11) states, ‘self-conscious community identities may arise through 
an act of categorization or intervention from an external agency’ and Maalouf (1998, 
p.34 cited in McPhee, 2005, p.3) explains that ‘people often have the tendency to 
acknowledge themselves through the affiliation that is most attacked’. The 
prospective data demonstrates how respondents’ Islamic identities have become their 
primary identity and how this has been informed by the international level, where 
Islam was associated with terrorism and the national level, where the state has 
focused on Islam. The ‘war on terror’ has made Islam significant with respondents 
referring to their Islamic identity being attacked on both levels. For example, 
respondents, like Sikander spoke of there being a distinct change in language after 
9/11, with the emergence of language which demonized Islam. 
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The language is ambiguous, on the one hand they are talking about the 
legislation to protect Muslims on the other hand you have the terror raids 
and then you have the Ministers and members of Parliament both from the 
government and opposition who are quite happy to go on national television 
and make statements that would never have been accepted before 9/11. So I 
really don’t see, I’m at a loss to see what it is in terms of racism that they 
are actually fighting, because if that language hadn’t become acceptable, 
then the national front wouldn’t have found a voice, extreme groups always 
find a voice but now they think they have got tolerance from higher powers, 
their voice becomes stronger. And I think some of the language after 9/11 by 
the government and by the conservatives, especially by the conservatives, 
gave rise to another form of extremism which is racism.   
 
In the prospective data, unlike the retrospective data where the state was generally 
perceived as bringing equality and eradicating racism, the state is perceived as making 
Islamophobia legitimate and as giving far right groups’ legitimacy. Respondents, like 
Sophia believe the state has successfully created Muslims as a separate entity through 
not separating Islam from terrorism and associating the two concepts.  
 
After September 11th the government handled the attacks very well I thought 
and there was an effort to try and separate the terrorists from Muslims. 
However, I think this was short lived and the separation did not happen.  
 
All respondents explained how they believed their Islamic identity has been created as 
a separate category, been re-defined according to the ‘war on terror’ with inter 
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commonality eradicated. The creation of difference has impacted perceived 
commonalty and it is for this reason that all respondents used their Islamic identity to 
talk about their perceptions of the state. The response of the state was one by which 
Islam was homogenized, as Johnson (2002) states, the diversity of Islam was hidden 
and further, so was the fact that Muslims have very different points of view on 
September 11th. Younis explains how within the ‘war on terror’, the state has created a 
discourse in which Islam is demonized and all Muslims are seen as potential terrorists.   
 
They are giving the impression that all Muslims are potential terrorist. They 
are not actually trying actively to give people the impression that the 
Islamic community are actually trying to work with anyone, especially since 
September 11th and 7/7 it was just like we are going to arrest people and 
community leaders who aren’t really doing anything. In my opinion they are 
actively telling all people that we are terrorists. 
 
Kaldor (2000) remarks on how social formations which exclude on the basis of 
identity are of a transitional nature meaning that on the basis of identity one can be an 
outsider in their own national territory in which they are a citizen but also an outsider 
beyond their national territory. The prospective data demonstrates how respondents 
perceived their Islamic identities to be attacked within and beyond their own national 
territory. This therefore suggests that due to the ‘war on terror’ there exists 
cosmopolitanization through Islamic identities because respondents Islamic identities 
mark the interconnectedness between the national level and the international level. 
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STATE AS CREATING ISLAMOPHOBIA AND INSTITUTIONALISING 
ISLAMOPHOBIA 
The previous section has explored how respondents believed their Islamic identities 
had been constructed by the state since the ‘war on terror’. The extent to which the 
‘war on terror’ has made biographical cosmopolitanization relevant is dependent upon 
perceptions that Islam and Islamic identities are being attacked at both the 
international and the national level. In order to further explore the national level, 
having just explored how respondents believed the state created Islamophobia, this 
section considers the extent to which respondents believed the state has actually 
institutionalized Islamophobia.   
Beck and Grande (2007, p.71) state differences should not be arranged 
hierarchically and ‘have a positive value placed on them’. Walker (2005a) argues that 
cosmopolitanism advocates the importance of all cultures. Within this perspective the 
principle of equality is essential and the state has a duty to maintain equality through 
ensuring that every group is treated equally. However, all respondents perceived the 
state as not only creating a negative discourse around their Islamic identities but also 
creating an intra Muslim divide. A perceived relationship between religiosity, risk and 
Islamophobia was found to exist with Muslims not just created as a separate entity 
because of their Islamic identity but those thought to be more religious stereotyped as 
being the biggest threat, as Nabeela explain. 
 
I think the government is just crap they don’t know what they are doing they 
are inadequate. It’s a combination of the war and September 11th, foreign 
policy and there are other issues around as well. The government is placing 
all the emphasis on Muslims saying Muslims should be doing this and they 
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should be doing that but it’s about stereotypes as well, and I think that is the 
biggest problem. Anyone with a beard or a hijab is seen as a threat which is 
just not true and it’s about stereotyping. The government has created a 
divide, before we were seen as Asian people but now we are seen as 
Muslims. 
 
It could therefore be argued that not only has Islamic identity been arranged 
hierarchically but within Islamic identity there has been the construction of a hierarchy 
whereby characteristics, such as increased religiosity exacerbate inequality. This 
section considers how respondents believed the state has sustained Islamophobia 
through using Deutsch’s (2006) ideas of achieving civilized oppression. Deutsch 
(2006) refers to interactive power, which involves those who are powerful repeating 
the subordinate status of a group. Following 9/11, the fear attributed to Muslims was 
reinforced and differences were amplified along with notions of risk. This acted to 
oppress Muslims through inventing a ‘war on terror’ construction of their Islamic 
identity. Interestingly, many respondents, like Jangir, believed that where institutional 
racism was concerned, the state was still concerned with eradicating racial / ethnic 
forms of racism. However, where racism against Muslims was concerned, respondents 
believed it was being institutionalized and therefore treated differently by the state. 
 
I think the government when it comes to racism against color they really do 
try and there has been a big change since the 1980s. I would say it was 
more overt racism and now I would say racism against Muslims is more 
institution based so overtly the government come across as being anti racist 
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and stuff but their policy and the way it is, the way they give funding and 
stuff isn’t helping.  
 
Deutsch (2006) refers to civilized oppression emerging when the state enforces rules 
and procedures which regulate the social institutions of the society and produce 
inequality. All respondents believed Islamophobia exists in all institutions, thus 
making the term civilized oppression relevant. Matloob describes how Islamophobia 
has been institutionalized. 
 
 Things were fine before September 11th and then they created this image or 
thing that Muslims are all bad so they have created it, they have created the 
racism and where before services and institutions were very good now they 
are racist and the government is making them racist by making its policies 
and legislation. 
 
As this next quote shows, there are stark differences between perceptions of 
Islamophobia and Paki bashing (Lewis, 1994). Paki bashing was largely interpreted as 
a street level, far right instigated form of racism, however Islamophobia was perceived 
by respondents as not only being state instigated and institutionalized but also as a 
much more damaging form of racism. Jangir explains how it is a more sophisticated 
kind of racism because it exists at the structural level. 
 
Now it has become more overt and the sophistication has been lost when 
you’ve got people like John Reid some kind of thug inside the Home Office, 
and he’s coming out with stupid comments, so it’s definitely increased, and 
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its increased in a bad way because now it’s a more sophisticated kind of 
racism, and that is a lot harder to fight than the street fights.  
 
The retrospective data revealed how respondents perceived an inclusive sense of 
citizenship and the significance of identities in these perceptions. The prospective data 
however demonstrates the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on perceived citizenship. 
Firstly, Benhabib (2002 cited in Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2003, p.156) 
argues that the role of states is not confined to political and legal institutions because 
‘cultural or social meaning’ is shaped and produced by states. The data reveals how 
respondents perceive the state to have shaped the social meaning associated with their 
Islamic identities. Secondly, the data discussed thus far has shown how respondents 
have expectations of the state. However, since the ‘war on terror’ the state is perceived 
to have actually compromised the safety of respondents through institutionalizing 
Islamophobia and creating structural inequality. Falkner (2003) notes how the word 
‘citizen’ incorporates a sense of those who belong from those who do not and Hussain 
and Bagguley (2005) argue that citizenship both creates social divisions and exclusion 
and is seen as the remedy to overcome social divisions and exclusion. It is therefore 
possible to contend that since the ‘war on terror’ the exclusionary nature of citizenship 
is evident in British Muslims’ counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’. 
 
STATE AS CREATING LEGAL INEQUALITY THROUGH INTRODUCING 
COUNTER TERRORISM LEGISLATION 
Where the retrospective data was concerned respondents emphasized the political 
dimension of citizenship and the state was defined according to policies and services. 
The impact of the ‘war on terror’ has made the legal dimension of citizenship relevant. 
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Citizenship is conceptualized as a legal status, since with citizenship comes rights and 
the state has a duty to meet these rights (Nash, 2009), and Bloemraad, Korteweg and 
Yurdakul, (2003, p.154) argue that citizenship includes four dimensions which are 
‘legal status, rights, political and other forms of participation in society, and a sense of 
belonging’. All respondents referred to and defined the state according to the power it 
has to introduce legislation and punish and further, related the institutionalization of 
Islamophobia to their legal rights. Therefore, a stark comparison exists as Younis 
highlights, concerns about identity and discrimination have gone from being based on 
employment to being based on concerns about life, human rights and liberty.  
 
Because of these new laws you can be suspected and taken in, I could be 
kept in for days on end and I haven’t even done anything, if they haven’t 
given me a job fair enough I can go and find another one. But being locked 
up and my family being under surveillance for days and months and being 
in and out of prisons that’s a totally different ball game trust me, you don’t 
know what they could be saying to them they could be beating the crap out 
of them and have the cameras turned off, denied anything and everything 
and psychologically you don’t know what they might be doing to them that’s 
totally, totally different.  
 
The concerns voiced by respondents reflect their legal status and thus citizenship 
rights and although Garland (1996, p.448) states ‘the control of crime and the 
protection of citizens from criminal depredations have come to form a part of the 
promise which the state holds out to its citizen-subjects’, the ‘war on terror’ is 
perceived to have introduced to a form of crime control where protection does not 
172 
 
exist. Many respondents, like Nazar felt the state had not only introduced legislation 
which has produced concerns regarding human rights but also created an Islamophobic 
police force. 
 
Since 9/11 things have changed, the government has changed its policies 
and views of Muslims. Through policy and legislation the government has 
placed restrictions on Muslims and these have been rampant since 2001. 
The government is more aggressive towards Muslims as a group. I would 
say that the most destructive way in which they are being aggressive and 
now targeting all the Muslim community is through the police and this is 
making the force more racist towards Muslims.  
 
For many respondents, like Rafia the perceived non existence of commonality and 
equality is exacerbated when it was considered how the state has dealt with previous 
terrorist acts.  
 
You have people who talk about Islamic extremists, Islamic fundamentalists, 
a fundamentalists is a fundamentalist and a terrorist is a terrorist they 
didn’t call the Irish the Protestant terrorists or the Christian terrorist they 
said it’s the IRA. And you didn’t see their religion as the important thing 
they were fighting for so for me it’s a way of labelling and terrorizing 
people.  
 
Hudson (2009, p.703) states ‘justice is a political concept; it is concerned with dealing 
fairly with all parties…’ ‘Doing justice means giving what is due’. However, the data 
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reveals how respondents believe the state has not only introduced inequality and thus 
injustice, but how this is linked to Islamic identities.  
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATE CREATING LEGAL INEQUALITY 
THROUGH INTRODUCING COUNTER TERRORISM LEGISLATION 
‘State-defined identity categories can have a profound impact on individuals’ 
conception of themselves’ (Skerry, 2000, cited in Pedziwiatr, 2007, p.275) and the law 
and order framework is perhaps the most powerful in impacting and shaping identities, 
since it is through the attribution of risk and suspicion onto peoples that suspect 
populations come to exist. The data found that the vast majority of respondents related 
the loss of legal rights with a damaged faith in British identity. Mazar links this 
damaged faith in British identity to state foreign policy like Iraq. 
 
I think the media’s response and international issues such as Iraq, Kashmir 
and other countries, Guantanamo Bay and the way they took them to 
different countries, all this has become public knowledge which has 
worsened society which I always believed was based on freedom and how 
they have overcome that and restricted and mistreated other people and 
damaged the very fundamental beliefs society was based on.  
 
Within the cosmopolitan perspective the state should maintain equality for the good of 
humanity, as if it is maintained, citizens will feel a sense of responsibility within this 
humanity – an ethics of responsibility. Essentially, it is through the dehumanization of 
the suspect population and the eradication of legal rights that the values which bind 
and create unity on the national and international level are replaced with exclusion, 
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demonization and otherization. Nasrin highlights the link between the state practice of 
inequality and the implications of this in terms of citizens placing themselves within 
humanity. 
 
I think the government no longer cares its primary concerns lies with 
terrorism and in the name of terrorism everything is now justified. They are 
proposing 3 months for people suspected of terrorism without charge. It is 
guilty until proven innocent and this infringes every human right a person 
has. Which community are they targeting, the Muslims community, so we 
have now been singled out and I appreciate that they must fight terrorism 
but by treating all Muslims as suspects, taking all their human rights away 
and continuing with the same foreign policy, there is no way this will do any 
good and it is likely to help in radicalizing Muslims.  
 
It is through themes of domestic state crime in the form of inequality in citizenship 
and cosmopolitanism that potential radicalization can be placed and changes in 
identity. Beck (2006, p.19) states ‘the choice to become or remain an ‘alien’ or a ‘non-
national’ is not as a general rule voluntary, but a response to acute need, political 
repression’. Perceptions of repression lead to changes in identity and a sense of 
detachment because they negatively impact on the psychological dimension of 
citizenship. In this way both cosmopolitanism and citizenship place a duty on the state 
and highlight that where the state, or apparatus of the state fail in these duties then 
citizens’ loyalty, sense of justice and belonging will be impacted. Beck (2006, p.167) 
states ‘Europe sows the seeds of disappointment from which hatred springs’. 
Therefore, a state can breed hatred through the practice of inequality and this was of 
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concern to respondents, since all respondents referred to the state response in the ‘war 
on terror’ as contributing to radicalization.  
 
STATE AS CREATING MUSLIM OTHER IN SOCIETY 
This final section considers the impact of the state at the societal level. The ‘war on 
terror’ has made the concept of biographical cosmopolitanization relevant. The 
intersection of the international and the local has become increasingly relevant to 
respondents’ daily lives. Concepts such as ‘Islamic fundamentalist’ are now inherent 
to how respondents believe the state has constructed their Islamic identities and how 
respondents believe they are perceived at the societal level. Mythen and Walklate 
(2008) make reference to how dominant institutions generate discourses through 
which people come to recognize and understand risk. Asghar talks about how 
international events are now localized in facilitating the construction of the ‘Muslim 
Other’ which exists along the discourse of risk. 
 
It has increased a great deal, the risk is something which is fragile and can 
go up and down and it has nothing to do with the Muslims who live in this 
country, well not the majority of us.  
 
Phrases like ‘enemy within’ and ‘mainstream society’ have acted to not just represent 
the magnitude of the terrorist threat but have also acted to marginalize and encourage 
exclusion on notions of ‘suspected fear’ and ‘suspected risk’ in society. Further, it is 
the state curtailment of the human rights of suspects that have given rise to a powerful 
stereotype, which as Mazar suggests exists at the international level and the local level 
and he compares this to the demonization of Jewish people.  
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I think it is very fundamentalist and doesn’t like to do pleasurable things, 
doesn’t like art and doesn’t like music out to become some sort of fighter or 
some sort of suicide bomber it’s those kind of negative Jihadist as they call 
it and out to do damage to the mainstream society and this is the real 
distinction now and remember this is very different from previous 
discrimination which was based on difference and fear of difference and 
here it’s based on a belief that Muslims are out to destroy mainstream 
society and its far more malicious and far more harmful because people can 
do things to Muslims and not worry about human rights and civil rights and 
all that, if you demonize them enough then it’s acceptable to treat them 
differently and that’s the real thing. So you can justify the curtailment of 
human rights based on ones faith and the way they look and this has 
parallels with the way Nazi Germany treated the Jewish people they 
demonized them enough and made them appear as a problem and then 
massive harm was done to them and I see some parallels with that and the 
Muslim community and this isn’t just locally based its across the board.  
 
The state has therefore created the fear and risk associated with Islam and because the 
fear is evident through the emergence of draconian laws, the very beliefs which 
legitimize the introduction of structural level laws have inevitably filtered down to the 
societal level. It could therefore be concluded that according to respondents the state 
has not only introduced Islamophobia, it has institutionalized Islamophobia and led to 
Islamophobia existing in society.  
 
177 
 
CONCLUSION 
The ‘war on terror’ has been constructed as an international war, one that justifies and 
necessitates the existence of counter terrorism legislation which places suspects 
outside humanity and further, one which makes necessary military action abroad. This 
data reveals that British Muslims’ perceptions of the state since the ‘war on terror’ 
generally do not uphold the state centric constructed discourse of the ‘war on terror’ 
and thus a counter discourse does exist. Interestingly, the counter discourse could be 
conceptualized as one that is based on the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on British 
Muslims whereas for the state, the discourse is about construction and demonstrating 
the legitimacy and necessity of the actions taken. Thus, to consider the main findings 
from this data it was found that firstly, the perceived discourses created by the state 
were found to have a significant impact on respondents’ self ascribed identities and the 
psychological dimension of citizenship, therefore impacting the extent to which 
commonality that of either an Asian identity or British identity were perceived.  
The prospective data showed how any negative impact due to the ‘war on 
terror’ was perceived as being due to the state. A great point of anger amongst 
interviewees was the way in which politicians and those whom comprise the state used 
language to associate Islam with terrorism in the aftermath of September 11th. This 
constructed association was perceived as serving a dual purpose, firstly, the invasion 
of Iraq and Afghanistan, which has produced concerns regarding legitimacy and 
democracy. Due to legitimacy being contested feelings of distrust have prevailed and 
further the arbitrary actions of the state have bought into question the existence of 
democracy. Secondly, it served the purpose of introducing counter terrorism 
legislation which deviates from principles of justice. The data revealed that the greater 
the perception of inequality, especially where the legal dimension of citizenship was 
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concerned, the greater the negative impact on the psychological dimension of 
citizenship and feelings of belonging, loyalty and attachment (Carens, 2000) to both 
the state and British identity.  
Thirdly, a major theme was that of cosmopolitanization as it was found that the 
‘war on terror’ has made the concept of cosmopolitanization much more relevant. 
Therefore, injustice in the form of foreign policy shaped perceptions of the state, 
unlike foreign policy before the ‘war on terror’. The prospective data revealed that 
since the ‘war on terror’ the state has the power to deviate from ‘moral 
cosmopolitanism’ the idea that each human being has equal moral worth and that 
equal moral worth generates certain moral responsibilities that have universal scope’ 
(Brock and Brighouse, 2005, p.4). And finally, the decreasing perceptions of 
commonality at the national and societal level, negatively influenced the extent to 
which respondents wanted to move from the parts to the whole (McPhee 2005).  
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CHAPTER 5: THE IMPACT OF THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ ON 
BRITISH MUSLIMS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare respondents’ perceptions of the police 
before the ‘war on terror’, therefore retrospectively from 1989 to 2000, and 
prospectively, after the ‘war on terror’. Citizenship is conceptualized as a legal status, 
since with citizenship comes rights and the state has a duty to meet these rights (Nash, 
2009) and Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, (2003, p.154) argue that citizenship 
includes four dimensions which are ‘legal status, rights, political and other forms of 
participation in society, and a sense of belonging’. The introduction of counter 
terrorism legislation in the ‘war on terror’ has made the legal dimension of citizenship 
and the social contract relevant. As the last chapter demonstrated respondents expect a 
direct relationship with the state. Further, how the concerns voiced by respondents 
reflect their legal status and thus citizenship rights. More specifically, how although as 
Garland (1996, p.448) states ‘the control of crime and the protection of citizens from 
criminal depredations have come to form a part of the promise which the state holds 
out to its citizen-subjects’, the ‘war on terror’ is perceived to have introduced a form 
of crime control where protection does not exist. This chapter explores these themes 
further through exploring respondents’ perceptions of the police.  
Although police authority and police power is derived from the state, both 
institutions serve a different function and it is through the police that the legal aspects 
of citizenship is no longer abstract but invades the lives of citizens. It is for this 
reason, and as the chapter will demonstrate that when respondents talked about the 
police, their perceptions were based on the practice of legal rights and thus included 
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concepts of injustice and due process. The chapter also relates such concepts to 
cosmopolitanism, as it is through the police that cosmopolitan law is either maintained 
or violated. Nash (2009) contends that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
with its legalistic language outlines the moral principles which should govern state 
activities. Kaldor (2000, p.7) argues the two main components of cosmopolitan law 
are the ‘Laws of War and Human Rights Law’. Cosmopolitan law is therefore about 
the state maintaining universal human rights and Burgenthal et al., (2002: 172 cited in 
Nash, 2009, p.1071) state that ‘the cosmopolitan law of human rights is especially 
well developed in Europe, with the European Court of Human Rights effectively 
acting as a ‘constitutional court for civil and political rights’ for all the member states 
of the Council of Europe’. Through drawing upon cosmopolitanism it will be 
demonstrated how the ‘war on terror’ has led respondents to feel an ethic of 
responsibility, whereby they place themselves within the community of humanity and 
also led to perceptions of injustice. The perceptions of violations of human rights by 
the police has created fear, a sense of marginalization and thus lead to the belief that 
the powers available to the police under counter terrorism legislation are powers 
which violate human rights and as such place respondents outside the community of 
humanity. 
 
RETROSPECTIVE DATA 
PERCEPTIONS FROM PREVIOUS DECADES AS BEING RELEVANT TO 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE 
Data from the retrospective interviews revealed how respondents’ perceptions and 
beliefs where the law, legal status and the police were concerned were based on past 
decades. For example, all respondents, like Adam believed that the period of 1989 to 
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2000 marked an improvement from the policing of the 1970’s and 1980’s, a period for 
which research has demonstrated police discrimination.  
 
During the early 1980s and the 1970s there was a major perception of the 
police as being racist and unfair but late into the 80’s and during the 90’s I 
think this improved.  
 
This is of vital importance to the legal dimension of citizenship because the data 
suggests that just as past experiences and perceptions of the 1970s and 1980 were vital 
in informing experiences and perceptions from 1989 to 2000, it is through experiences 
and perceptions of the 1980s and 1990s that perceptions of contemporary policing will 
be formed. Therefore, perceptions of the introduction of counter terrorism legislation 
which places suspects outside the political process (Tadros, 2007; Stohl, 2008) and 
cosmopolitanism’s universalism (Hudson, 2008) will be based on perceptions of the 
police prior to the introduction of counter terrorism legislation. Although Skitka 
(2002, p.589 cited in Napier and Tyler, 2008) states outcomes and procedures will be 
perceived as illegitimate if they are not consistent with perceivers’ moral mandates, 
this data demonstrates the importance of past experiences in forming perceptions of 
legitimacy and in shaping expectations. The significance of this is that through 
respondents basing their perceptions of legal rights and status in the ‘war on terror’ on 
their perceptions of legal rights and status before the ‘war on terror’ the reduction of 
legal rights will impact respondents negatively.  
The retrospective period was also seen as an improvement from previous forms 
of policing because the police were perceived as wanting to learn about respondents’ 
ethnic identity. Further, like the retrospective data regarding the state, respondents’ 
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perceptions, like Nazim’s of the police were predominantly based on their ethnic, 
racial or Asian identities. 
 
In the 1990s, I think the police seemed to be more pro-active and wanted to 
learn about ethnic groups and this was partly to do with policy and ideas of 
community policing. 
 
The importance of perceived equality is that equal treatment by the police translates 
into ‘equal moral worth’ (Brock and Brighouse, 2005), it informs citizens of their 
value and ‘unforced recognition of their moral status’ (Bertram, 2005, p.78). Where 
identities were concerned the retrospective data revealed perceived commonality, that 
of an Asian and ethnic identity and the use of these identities reflects perceptions of 
equal treatment.  
 
POLICE PERCEIVED WITH CONFIDENCE AND AS APPROACHABLE  
The vast majority of respondents had positive perceptions of the police. During this 
period, 1989 to 2000 Mohammad explains how the police were perceived as being 
approachable.  
 
My impression of the police and how I saw them was very good, I often saw 
them interacting with people and it wasn’t like they were being suspicious 
but more caring if anything else.  
 
Of interest is how those respondents, like Musarat, who had positive perceptions of the 
police found that experiences with the police acted to increase confidence. 
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Once a police officer wanted to talk to me because my husband had been 
driving a bit fast and he said I hope your wife isn’t expecting because the 
way you were driving I thought she was expecting. It was good, the 
comments were good and they would just give you a warning. If you parked 
on a double yellow they would explain why you can’t park there and they 
would just give you a ticket, but it would be done in a good way. So that’s 
the kind of relationship you had with the police if you did come across them.  
 
Deutsch (2006) argues that the victim of oppression may lose his / her sensitivity 
towards injustice and be less committed to the institutions which produce such 
injustice and research by Smith (2009) found that suffering a police wrong can be an 
extremely disturbing experience, damaging self-esteem and self confidence. Data from 
the retrospective interviews demonstrates that respondents’ pre-held beliefs of the 
police determined whether they will interact with the police, and these beliefs heavily 
influence whether the interaction will be viewed positively or negatively. Therefore, 
from a cosmopolitan perspective, perceptions of justice or injustice will not just 
depend on whether the legal and political conventions have been adhered to and 
respect has been shown (Hudson, 2009) but will also be informed by previous 
experiences and perceptions of the police. 
During this period because the police were perceived as interacting with 
communities and upholding the law, perceptions of legitimacy existed. Zulfiquar talks 
about the police as doing a good job. 
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The police did a good job they were good and not heavy handed. I think if 
they were heavy handed against people it was generally because these 
people did something to deserve it and asked for trouble.  
 
Therefore, because respondents felt that they were attributed moral recognition by the 
police, the police were perceived as being legitimate. Thus, the ‘language of the law’ 
(Beccaria, cited in Walker and Boyeskie, 2001, p.111) was not feared because 
confidence existed that the police will act according to due process and maintain 
respondents’ legal rights. Legitimacy is closely tied with fairness and justice (Deutsch, 
2006; Hudson, 2009) and perceptions of legitimacy give rise to perceptions of justice 
(Zelditch & Walker, 1984 cited in Turner, 2007b). The retrospective data for the state 
revealed that because legitimacy was perceived, citizenship was positively impacted as 
were respondents’ attachment to their national identity and therefore because the 
police have a privileged role, they are equally as important in shaping citizens’ social 
status and national identity (Shklar, 1991).  
 
POLICING BASED ON HIERARCHY OF IDENTITIES 
Within the cosmopolitan perspective the state should not be thought of as 
ontologically privileged (Held, 2005) and this is also true of the police because the 
police have an important role in producing and sustaining identities as processes. It is 
through the attribution of risk and suspicion onto peoples that suspect populations are 
formed and it is through the process of differentiating and classifying that not only are 
discourses created (Brah, 2009) but discourses are used to legitimize inequality in 
citizenship and legal rights. Although the data has shown that the police were 
perceived as practicising justice, the type of policing minorities were subjected to was 
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perceived as being dependant on identity. The vast majority of respondents, like Bilal 
believed that the police prioritized their Asian identity and therefore treated them on 
the basis of this identity, as no different from Asian non Muslims. 
 
I don’t think the police could tell the difference between Muslims and Asian 
non Muslims. The police did not have a grudge against Muslims. Also they 
did not have enough knowledge to identify who was who and we were all 
seen as the same, with the exclusion being the afro Caribbean community. 
 
This is very much the same as what the literature on policing on race and ethnicity 
suggests, that ‘Asian criminalities’ were based on culture and not constructed in the 
same way as ‘black criminalities’ (Werbner, 1997; Phillips and Bowling, 2002; and 
Burnett, 2004). This is significant because the greater the extent to which the police 
are perceived as practicing equality the lesser the extent of perceived targeting. The 
data also revealed that a few respondents, like Sophina believed ‘black’ communities 
were subjected to a harsh form of policing.  
 
I think the ethnic community that was singled out the most was the Afro 
Caribbean community and they did face the harshest treatment; in terms of 
being stopped and searched and sentences. There was no real emphasis on 
the Muslim community.  
 
It was the exercise of harsh policing which led to negative perceptions amongst 
‘black’ communities, which led to urban unrest. However, according to Musarat 
oppressive policing was needed to ensure that urban unrest would not take place. 
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They were racist in the sense of the Handsworth riots. I think incidents had 
made them racist. Generally I can’t be that prejudice with them I don’t think 
they were racist because the situations that had arisen had made them 
racist. Again the West Indians before September 11th they were against the 
West Indians more than anything because of the Handsworth riots they 
feared that if these people get out of hand what is going to happen.  
 
Therefore, to some extent, the harsh policing of ‘black ‘communities was perceived as 
being legitimate by a few respondents. Furthermore, because respondents largely 
perceived the police in a positive light and as using their power legitimately this could 
have enhanced their belief that the harsh style of policing ‘black’ communities was 
fair. The majority of respondents like Rafia perceived their own treatment by the 
police to be similar to how the majority of citizens were treated. 
 
 The white kids didn’t really have a difficult relationship with the police nor 
did the Asian kids and many of the Asian kids their fathers would know 
some of the local officers and some of the police could come to people and 
say what’s happening have you heard anything. At that time there was no 
relationship breakdown with the police, the police were seen as a figure of 
authority.  
 
According to Hudson (2008, p.279) ‘the logic of identity/difference imposes a false 
unity on groups defined by difference, and it imposes a false emphasis on a single 
characteristic on individuals’. This data demonstrates that respondents believed the 
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‘logic of identity’ was existent where the policing of ‘black’ communities was 
concerned.  
 
POLICE MISUSE OF POWER LEADING TO NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF 
THE POLICE  
A small number of respondents had negative perceptions of the police and these were 
based on a belief that the police as Sophia suggests, assumed guilt.  
 
Even the way the police spoke to people, they would assume that a non 
white person was guilty and they commit crime because it’s what they do.  
 
And further, the police did not follow procedures, as Azmat explains. 
 
The relationship was not the same for both groups there was much different 
treatment not just with who was stopped, but how incidents were dealt with 
and the way in which the police cooperated.  
 
Some respondents, like Ibrahim referred to how the police used their power to target 
individuals through stop and search.  
 
The police would then want to search the car, search me and check the car 
over. It did leave me with a worse image because if the police were just 
checking things out as a routine thing then you wouldn’t mind but they 
would also be very cocky and rude about things. They would not be polite 
and show the smallest but of respect.  
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Therefore, negative perceptions of the police were found to exist, however, unlike the 
prospective data where injustice is used to describe the actions of the police, during 
the retrospective interviews, the misuse of power by the police was not perceived as 
being injustice. This could be because the law prioritized due process and thus, 
respondents believed the negative actions by the police were due to the police 
misusing their power rather than perceiving the existence of structural injustice. 
Faulkner (2003) states how the criminal trial and punishment are both relevant to ideas 
of citizenship because they exist as a means through which fairness, respect for 
citizens’ dignity and generally the defendant’s legal rights, which form part of 
citizenship, are enacted. Therefore, had rights such as the presumption of innocence 
not existed in legislation then injustice would have been perceived and further, 
respondents would have perceived there to be unequal citizenship. Further, it could 
also be due to respondents’ perceiving a positive relationship with the police through 
their Islamic identity that perceptions of the police misusing their power did not lead 
to feelings of injustice.     
 
MUSLIM COMMUNITY AND POSITIVE POLICE RELATIONS  
Within a cosmopolitan perspective ‘every human being has a right to have her or his 
vital interest met, regardless of nationality or citizenship’ (Jones, 1999, p.15 – 17 cited 
in Sypnowich, 2005, p.56). Therefore, rights, freedom and liberty should exist and the 
police have an important role in determining that these exist. During this period, all 
respondents, like Sikander believed the police gave them rights, freedom and liberty 
based on their Islamic identities.  
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I think in terms of places of worship, I think they were slightly more aware 
of mosques and being more sensitive, in a good way. If you went to Friday 
prayers you would get one thousand cars parked there, the central mosque 
and they should have been booked; the police did overlook this particular 
event on a Friday.  
 
Tolerance such as this on the part of the police signifies not just that the police 
understand that communities have specific needs but also that the police are willing to 
meet these needs and recognize them as being important. The majority of respondents, 
like Zulfiguar felt that the police wanted to gain a better understanding of their various 
identities, including their Islamic identities.   
 
My impression of the police was generally very good and the image I had of 
them was good, I would frequently talk to police officers and found them to 
be very understanding and wanting to know more about our culture and 
religion.  
 
It was due to all respondents believing that the police did not perceive their Islamic 
identities negatively that questions and curiosity regarding their Islamic identities were 
not perceived negatively. Rather, such curiosity was perceived as being part of the 
freedom respondents had to practice their Islamic identities and further as the police 
trying to accommodate this identity.  
 
POLICE AS RACIST? 
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The retrospective data regarding respondents’ perceptions, beliefs and experiences of 
the police has been discussed and now the discussion will focus on whether 
respondents believed the police were institutionally racist during this period. This is 
perhaps the most significant part of the data as although the Macpherson Report 
(1999) was released, which concluded that the police were institutionally racist, 
respondents’ opinions were varied. The most common belief held by respondents for 
perceiving the police as racist was that of the police being a homogenous institution 
and therefore as unrepresentative. Azmat describes how she believed the police were 
unrepresentative of society. 
 
I think one of the main reasons for this was because there weren’t many 
ethnic minority police officers, so the force was very narrow in terms of its 
representation; it only represented one section of society.  
 
Interestingly, when respondents spoke of the issue of representativeness all used their 
ethnic racial identity, an identity for which inter community commonality exists. 
Therefore, respondents did not perceive the issue of representativeness to cause a 
problem where a police – Muslim community specific relationship was concerned, as 
had this been the case then respondents would have used their Islamic identity. And 
finally, a large number of respondents, like Jangir felt that the police were not 
institutionally racist but rather there were a few racist police officers. 
 
It did change my opinion of the police and made me think that there are 
some bad police officers out there, but I didn’t go so far as thinking that all 
officers were like this.  
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This data is significant because it further strengthens the reason why respondents did 
not describe the misuse of police powers as injustice. Had racism been perceived as 
existing in the force, and as being part of the structure then it could have been the case 
that injustice was perceived. But since the police misuse of power was perceived as 
being due to the individual police officer and not legitimized by law, such experiences 
were not perceived as constituting injustice and therefore as deviating from 
cosmopolitan law. It could therefore be argued that during this period ‘black’ 
communities were perceived as constituting marginal citizens (Nash, 2009) because 
the police did not afford them with adequate protection. 
 
PROSPECTIVE DATA 
EMPATHY FOR THE POLICE ROLE IN COUNTER TERRORISM 
POLICING  
One interesting theme to emerge from the prospective interviews was that of empathy, 
whereby respondents understood that the police have to serve a different role under 
counter terrorism legislation and one which has to involve religious profiling, as the 
next quote by Ibrahim demonstrates.  
 
I think the police are trying to do a good job, generally I mean they are 
pretty good but they could get better and need to constantly build their 
relationship with the Muslim community because at the end of the day we do 
share the same purpose and that is to wipe out extremist Islam and 
terrorism. So if the police worked harder than they could get more 
informers, but this is also the job of the Muslim community we need to be 
192 
 
more accepting of the police, not protect people and realize that these 
groups that go out killing people are wrong and not justified in any way.  
 
However, Ibrahim also emphasizes commonality and through this places a sense of 
moral responsibility onto Muslims by suggesting that Muslims need to accept the 
police task within countering terrorism and help the police in their shared goal of 
preventing terrorism. Within cosmopolitanism there is the concept of the ‘world 
citizen’ and according to Kaldor (2000) this global identity is based on common 
human rights. Cosmopolitanism emphasizes the duty of individuals not to harm others 
(Dower, 2008) through the ethics of responsibility (Brock and Brighouse, 2005). What 
is of interest from this data is that it reflects how perceptions are shaped when 
respondents place themselves within the global realm of humanity and how this 
generates responsibility. For example, part of understanding the need for religious 
profiling was due to understanding moral responsibility and therefore that at times 
inequality will exist but where it does there is a utilitarian justification, it is for the 
good of humanity to which we all have a responsibility. Further, through respondents 
considering their role in protecting humans and indeed highlighting their own moral 
responsibility, this led to perceptions of the police which were based on empathy. 
Thus, there was no belief of a ‘friend–foe’ divide’ (Hudson, 2008, p.284) but rather as 
Jamil says, the police were understood as having conflicting roles which makes their 
job difficult.  
 
The police do have a harder role and job to do. On the one hand they seem 
to be very good to the Muslim community especially when it comes to things 
like honor killings, but then when it comes to terrorism there is a shift and it 
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is the unpleasant experiences which people remember when they think of the 
police. 
 
Counter terrorism legislation has given way to a preventive (McCulloch and 
Pickering, 2009), pre-crime logic of security (Zedner, 2007) form of policing ‘where 
innocent people are rendered risk repositories by virtue of sharing some or other of the 
characteristics of the ‘typical’ terrorist’ (Mythen & Walklate, 2008, p.13). A few 
respondents, like Zara understood the need for prevention. 
 
It is very difficult because terrorism is such a big threat and one attack can 
cause so much devastation as we have seen. I think they try to do their best 
and do have targets they need to make; this is something that most people 
forget when criticizing the police.  
 
And a few respondents, like Jangir understood the need for religious profiling.  
 
After September 11th if you’re going to look for a terrorist you’re not going 
to look for a white person who is living somewhere in East Anglia and has a 
farm, so there is religious profiling people say it’s bad but I can totally 
understand why they do it, you look for the people you suspect.  
 
Walker (2005b) states there has been a growth in intelligence policing and Kennison 
and Loumansky (2007) and Miller (2010) highlight the increasing plurality of the 
police. This data reflects that part of the understanding and indeed empathy regarding 
the police was informed by an understanding of the conflicting and heterogeneous 
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nature of the police. Finally, within citizenship according to Rawls (1996 cited in 
Turner, 2007a, p.126) the solution to ethnic diversity is ‘rule of law, norms of 
compromise, reasonableness, and the protection of individual rights’. And the 
psychological dimension of citizenship is important as it conveys ‘one’s sense of 
emotional attachment, identification, and loyalty’ (Carens, 2000, p.166). This data 
demonstrates that because respondents were placing themselves within the realm of 
humanity, loyalty and attachment to the state were not compromised. Thus, the belief 
in commonality and responsibility meant that respondents believed religious profiling 
was reasonable and necessary to protect citizens and through this point of view the 
psychological dimension of citizenship was not impacted negatively. 
 
DIMINISHING EMPATHY - POWER OF THE POLICE IN COUNTER 
TERRORISM LEGISLATION AS PRODUCING NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS  
However, although empathy and emphasis on a shared humanity did exist, when 
respondents considered the power of the police these perceptions of empathy faded. 
This was the case for respondents that initially felt empathy and those that did not. 
When respondents considered the power of the police, perceptions of empathy 
converted to fear. Respondents like Zulfiguar spoke about how they believe the police 
are more authoritarian under counter terrorism legislation. 
 
They have become like an authoritarian force where we are concerned and 
since 9/11 I have been stopped three times buy the police. I think this is 
because of the way that I dress, when I am in western clothes I get far less 
attention from people and looks. 
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Wellar (2001, p.51) states, ‘since the system, (criminal justice system) embodies 
aspects of the power of the state, ordinary people who are caught up in it for one 
reason or another can feel especially vulnerable’. Within the counter terrorism context 
due to an increase in police power, respondents’ perceived a greater sense of 
vulnerability. The source of policing legitimacy has always been contested. According 
to Faulkner (2003, p.298), the authority and legitimacy of the British police is not 
derived from the state but rather ‘from the consent and confidence of the citizens 
whom they serve’. Unlike Reiner (2000), who states that the government invest the 
authority and power they have under the social contract in the police as agents of the 
law. Within the prospective interviews respondents like Shafquat explained how 
counter terrorism policing is not a form of policing in which trust and confidence is 
prioritized and further, Shafquat explains how he believes the gap between the 
intelligence service and the police is narrowing. 
 
From what I have seen of the police I think they are trying to be fair but 
again I have to say I have my suspicions. The thing is that the police force is 
becoming more like an intelligence force and the gap between MI5 and MI6 
is getting narrow, this is worrying because to me M15 and M16, are the 
ones that do not care about the community, the do not care about trust and 
confidence.  
 
Counter terrorism policing can therefore be conceptualized as a form of policing that 
respondents believe prioritizes the objectives of the state over the confidence of the 
public. Grabosky (2008) states ordinary policing and counter terrorism are the same 
because both require that the police protect communities and that mutual respect and 
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trust exist. Klausen (2009) argues that although efforts have been made by the police 
to build trust with Muslim communities, with the emphasis being on collaboration 
between the police and Muslim organizations, the sense of trust established through 
collaborations fails to filter down to the general Muslim public. This data reflects 
Klausen’s argument because many respondents, like Ashra talked about having a deep 
sense of insecurity where the police are concerned and about being suspicious of the 
police.  
 
I think there is a huge difference now, when the police patrol the streets in 
this area, you longer know whether they are doing it because they want us 
to feel safe or they are doing it as spies.  
 
For all respondents the existence of these powers were not perceived as isolated or 
indeed as leading to a minimal number of false arrests, detainment or control orders 
but as representing powers that all Muslims could be subjected to. The image of the 
police has changed and led to a significant change in perceptions, as Musarat 
highlights.  
 
When I was younger and I would walk down the street and see a policeman, 
you would say hello Mr. Policemen and he would say hello, and where are 
you going? Going to school are you? And he would walk with you and I was 
only 9 years old, and you had the lovely image of the bobby and that’s all 
gone now, now you see the police man and you say ‘cor, blimey lets run 
before he decides to stop and search you, arrest you and decides to research 
your background, to see if you’re a terrorist’. My beliefs have changed from 
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what I used to believe as a nine year old of a policeman who I could trust 
and walk to school with and if I was bullied I could always run to a 
policeman, so it was a very nice time and I remember it very well, but now 
when I compare it to what it is now I don’t want to go near them.  
 
This data firstly demonstrates how when respondents considered the power of the 
police under counter terrorism legislation, empathy faded. Secondly, how counter 
terrorism policing is thought to be a form of policing where differences, those of 
identities matter and therefore equality does not exist and finally, how respondents 
perceive counter terrorism legislation through the perspective of the potential harm.  
 
COUNTER TERRORISM POLICING AND MUSLIMS AS SUSPECTS  
Since the ‘war on terror’ Muslims’ Islamic identities have been subject to 
demonization (Mueller, 2004; Lyon, 2007; Thomas, 2009) and over policing (Zedner 
2007; McCulloch and Pickering, 2009). What makes this categorization and the 
placement of terrorism a concern is the association of terrorism with Islamic identities 
and risk. Most respondents referred to how their Islamic identities have been 
constructed with fear and as representing a danger in the ‘war on terror’. Due to this 
construction and the level of fear thought be associated with their Islamic identities, 
most respondents, like Mazar, differentiated the fear from the fear associated with 
‘black’ communities. Interestingly, there was an association with the constructed level 
of fear respondents thought the police think they represent and the level of fear 
respondents then felt from the police. As Mazar highlights the greater the perceived 
construction of fear with his Islamic identity, the greater the fear of the police.  
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There’s another stream of discrimination developing around Muslims 
because this form of racism that impacts Muslims is very different, there 
was no real threat from the black community or the Indian community to 
mainstream society but Muslims are seen as a threat as a danger within and 
their responses are far more harsher and unhelpful and I think this makes it 
a bit different and I’m not sure everybody understands that.  
 
According to Beck (2006, p.148) the suspicion of terrorism gave ‘the most powerful 
nation in the world carte blanche to construct ever changing representations of the 
enemy and to defend its ‘internal security’. In the UK, counter terrorism legislation 
was introduced which as Amoore and De Goede (2008, p.8 cited in McCulloch and 
Pickering, 2009, p.629) argue went beyond ‘the established language and techniques 
of risk that existed within the criminal justice system’. The acceleration of risk and 
suspicion under this legislation has implications for the suspect community, as risk 
and suspicion alone determine the level of rights that exist. As McCulloch and 
Pickering (2009) argue the ‘preventive’ counter-terrorism framework is concerned 
with targeting and managing, through restricting and incapacitating those individuals 
and groups considered as being a risk. The concepts of pre-emption and identifying 
risk were present in the data. The next quote by Mazar demonstrates that the police 
are perceived with fear because the police are thought to target those with Islamic 
identities, and secondly because human rights can be violated, this has also 
contributed to perceptions of fear. 
 
There is a difference, no other groups of people are treated as Muslims are 
and the way Muslims are being treated involves a violation of human rights 
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and procedures that in the past would have never been accepted and 
tolerated. I think if the police tried to treat any other community like this, 
then it would not be accepted. But people have been made to believe that 
such treatment is necessary and acceptable where the Muslim community is 
concerned.  
 
Nash (2009, p.1068) argues ‘human rights and citizenship have long been closely 
entwined; indeed historically they share similar roots in liberal individualism’ and the 
existence of institutions such as the United Nations has led Benhabib (2007. p.32 cited 
in Nash, 2009) to comment on the existence of a relationship between the international 
level and citizens via human rights. Since the ‘war on terror’ the research found that 
respondents no longer perceive to have the same human rights as non Muslim citizens 
and therefore believe they have a reduced legal status. In this sense they could be 
considered as constituting ‘marginal citizens’,  ‘who have full citizenship rights but 
who nevertheless do not enjoy full citizenship status: economically, by relative 
poverty; and socially, by racism’ (Nash, 2009, p.1073). The existence of racism and 
targeting is demonstrated in the data, for example Musarat talks about the police 
targeting Muslims because of their Islamic identity. 
 
After 9/11 my son was driving very slowly in the traffic, it was 5 o clock 
traffic and he had my daughter sitting there and my daughter covers her 
face, my younger daughter he had picked her up from work and was 
bringing her home. The police followed him and he said to my daughter 
look the police are following me, the police came to our house and my 
daughter ran out the car because she didn’t want the police near her you 
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know how these religious girls are like. They made him open his boot, they 
searched his boot before 9/11 they wouldn’t have done that, they then 
searched him they body searched him, and I got a bit angry and I said he 
wasn’t speeding and he said Mum it doesn’t matter. And I said no, he 
wouldn’t do that to a white man, he wouldn’t body search him. 
 
This data reveals that Runciman’s (1966, cited in Deutsch, 2006) two types of relative 
deprivation: egoistic and fraternal deprivation are relevant. Fraternal deprivation 
occurs when a person feels his / her group is disadvantaged in relation to another 
group, data has just shown that Muslims feel deprived of legal rights, with an inter 
group comparison forming such a perception. Egoistical deprivation occurs when an 
individual feels disadvantaged relative to other individuals. Egoistical deprivation 
could also be said to exist because religiosity was revealed as exacerbating the 
disadvantage and vulnerability associated with an Islamic identity. All respondents felt 
that being visibly Islamic increased vulnerability, as the police would be more likely 
to stop them, as Aneesa explains. 
 
There was an incident with a girl. I was driving up the central road from 
central mosque and she was just driving behind us, she took over and the 
police were at the roundabout and they came over and stopped her and they 
tried to body searched her and she had a niqab on and she was refusing she 
said it’s against my religion and they said no, so they arrested her because 
she wouldn’t let them body search her, and she hadn’t done anything 
wrong, she over took us, but did it slowly. After 9/11 they would look for 
single Asian girls who had a scarf on or who dressed Islamically and they 
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would purposely stop them, take them down to the station and ask them 
questions or say look let us search your car, search you, look in your 
handbag and obviously being a women you could carry your sanitary pads 
in your bag. Some women are very fussy about them and wouldn’t let them 
look and then they would say would you like to go the station then, what are 
you hiding in there. It went really mad in those days, just after 9/11 it was 
like everybody was walking with a bomb underneath them or something, but 
I think it’s gone a bit less now because there were a lot of complaints 
against the police. I mean if you heard of a white woman speeding you 
wouldn’t expect the police to stop her and body search her.  
 
Deutsch (2006) uses the concept of doubly deprived to denote two levels of 
disadvantage, that of group disadvantage and that of individual disadvantage. This 
research reveals that where an Islamic identity exists with an individual identity, for 
example of Islamic religiosity, respondents perceived not only a greater sense of 
disadvantage but also fear. Cosmopolitanism clearly advocates respecting others in 
their difference, as members of the same humanity and not of some other, second class 
humanity (Beck, 2006) and further, a cosmopolitan identity is an ‘inclusive self-
image’ (Hudson, 2008, p.284). Cosmopolitanism is against ‘the logic of 
identity/difference’ since this ‘imposes a false unity on groups defined by difference’, 
(Hudson, 2008, p.279). Therefore when defining the cosmopolitan - choice of 
identities, multiple affiliations and multiple attachments are stressed as being a reality. 
Whereas in the retrospective interviews the police were thought of as positively 
affording respondents with moral status through their Islamic identities, according to 
the findings from the prospective interviews, counter terrorism legislation has led to 
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respondents being treated as a ‘second class humanity’ (Beck, 2006, p.53) because of 
their Islamic identities. It could be said that they suffer the logic of identity as 
assumptions are made about their identity which lead to unequal citizenship. 
Therefore, although cosmopolitanism states that differences should not lead to human 
rights being violated, this data revealed that respondents believe differences, that of 
possessing Islamic identities can lead to rights being violated and within this category 
of difference, those with a visible Islamic identity are at most risk of having such 
rights violated. 
 
NEGATIVE EXPERIENCES AS TRANSCENDING TO WIDER 
COMMUNITY AND LONG LASTING IMPACTING 
Bari (2006) argues that information of systematic brutality and a lack of meaningful 
oversight has a long lasting effect on the community, and encourages the perception 
that anti-terror is a form of malice against the Islamic religion. According to a 
Guardian poll many Muslims see the ‘war against terrorism’ as a ‘war against Islam’ 
(cited in Ansari, 2005). Counter terrorism legislation has produced a variety of hard 
policing tactics which are of a preventive nature. Research by Spalek, El - Awa and 
McDonald (2009) found police suspicion has grave consequences upon an individual 
and leads to individuals being ostracised from their wider communities. Those 
respondents who had experiences involving the police, as Matloob explains, not only 
felt repressed but also of great concern was the impact of preventive policing on their 
relationship with their wider communities. 
 
The 17th of June last year in the early morning the police raided my office, 
this one where I am standing. Now all of my office furniture they took it, 
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they took my computers, my files, they looked in my house and they found 
nothing. And I said you are committing day light robbery and the lady was 
sitting here, police standing here and I said please do everything step by 
step and my son said you can’t do this. The lady was just speaking to us like 
we are just third world people or something, we are slaves for these people, 
and they said we can take anything whatever we want, then I said you don’t 
touch my son, don’t talk to him, if you want to take anything, just take it, you 
take everything, till now they didn’t bring my computers back they even took 
the monitors, the TVs and even the printing machines, till now I haven’t 
received any of it back. When I had my interviews, I was talking just like I’m 
talking to you and he said Mr ........ you are talking nonsense and I said my 
friend when you attack and raid my office, that looks to me like bloody 
nonsense because what you are doing is not right and you know what you 
are doing is not right. When I return from here what are you going to do? 
You can’t return my name in the community because lots of people saw you, 
my son was here and you scared him as well, and you take everything.  
 
It is the fact that counter terrorism legislation has increased association offences, 
whereby those in contact with suspects also become suspects that the application of 
risk and suspicion onto individuals by the police can lead to exclusion at the societal 
level. Therefore, as the above quote demonstrates, this experience will have a lasting 
impact through associating the individual with risk. The prospective data also revealed 
that even where respondents had not experienced counter terrorism legislation, the 
experiences of other people who had experienced counter terrorism legislation 
produced fear. Maria describes how the preventive nature of counter terrorism 
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legislation can negatively impact the choice and ability to practice an Islamic identity 
and fulfil Islamic duties. 
 
A couple of doors down we did actually have one of the guys who was 
arrested for terrorism and we didn’t think that could happen and they 
actually ripped the furniture and cut it up and everything and they took the 
old ladies passport and she’s so old and even if he was doing it she 
wouldn’t know that he was doing it and she wanted to go hajj and she 
couldn’t go because they wouldn’t release her passport and years have 
gone by and I don’t know if they have released it. You know how they treat 
the rest of the family is outrageous it doesn’t’ matter what people say that 
you should know, but sometimes you don’t know what the children do. He 
was a grown man he was married, he had a wife and children and then they 
raided that house and the poor mum who’s planning to go to hajj can’t go.  
 
Although the police took the lady’s passport as a preventive measure, for Muslims this 
preventive action is perceived very differently. For Muslims a pilgrimage to Hajj is 
one of the five pillars of Islam, it is an obligation that practicing Muslims have to carry 
out at least once in their life time. Through the police taking the old lady’s passport 
they have restricted her from fulfilling what she believes is her Islamic duty and for 
practicing Muslims this is seen as a duty which is important in terms of life after 
death. Measures such as this, which constitute prevention have a devastating impact 
and further create fear amongst Muslim communities. Witnessing raids was found to 
lead to perceptions of monitoring and heightened fear of the police, as Safia explains. 
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After September 11th, things have changed I have seen places being raided 
and people are now scared, the thing is that they, we believe that even 
though we have done nothing wrong the police will raid our shops at any 
time and they, they monitor us, trying to find any small thing they can to get 
us. Seeing people being locked up, places raided and Sparkbrook you know 
has received a fair bit of attention from the police and it has all been to do 
with terrorism.  
 
‘Justice as fairness’ (Rawls, 1971 cited in Carens, 2000) conveys the idea that the state 
should provide citizens with choice and freedom therefore ensuring equality. The 
discourse of law constructs the boundaries of citizenship through defining the legal 
status of citizens, ‘the formal rights and duties that one possesses as a member of a 
political community’ (Carens, 2000, p.162) and Gearty (2004, p.63) states that, 
‘equality before the law is regarded as an aspect of equal citizenship’. However, the 
above quotes highlight that not only do respondents perceive there to be inequality in 
the law, but how such inequality has long term consequences. Ideas of justice, equality 
and freedom are important in citizenship as when they are maintained belonging and 
loyalty are established. Falkner (2003) highlights that at the very least the state should 
provide the opportunity for voices to be heard so that minorities can make decisions 
based on their communities. Therefore, in order for the police to understand the 
consequences of their actions they need to listen to the voices and concerns of 
Muslims. As the real danger here is that although the police may act on the basis of 
prevention, such actions could have a different meaning, as the above data 
demonstrates and therefore, not only are the police perceived as enacting injustice but 
also preventing someone from living according to their system of beliefs.  
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EXPANSIVE POWERS OF THE POLICE AS EXPANDING SOCIAL 
CONTROL AND CRIMINALIZING 
Since the ‘war on terror’ there are regulations in place which previously did not exist 
and these have acted to restrict freedom. The prospective data revealed that where 
respondents, like Mazar had not had direct experiences of counter terrorism they were 
likely to have experienced some of the regulations which are part of this legislation 
and act to restrict freedom, such as sending money abroad.  
 
We were part of this society and society accepted us, we didn’t feel like we 
were segregated and if I wanted to open a charity or help someone who is 
an orphan in a village back home you know I didn’t have a problem, I could 
do that. But you know since September 11th you can’t even do that, without 
some MI6 officer knocking at your door. Let’s put it this way, a friend of 
mine tried to send £1000 to his mother, he did that the second time he tried 
they said you have to wait a certain time period before you can send some 
money again. So your mother has to live with the bare essentials, because 
the government in this country decides how much money you send your 
mother back home, these are things that we have to face now and we didn’t 
have to before.  
 
It is due to the pre-crime logic of security over-taking the post-crime orientation of 
criminal justice (Zedner, 2007) that those apprehended as suspects could well be 
innocent. It is the power of the police under this legislation, and the preventive nature 
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of this legislation which has led to experiences such as the following described by 
Musarat, which previously would not have existed. 
 
The police are reacting too much, I know because one of my close relatives, 
he is a security guard and he helped the police to arrest a few people who 
were being very rowdy outside his club, and when the police took them, he 
went with the police to give a statement. He was standing as a doorman and 
saw that the police needed help so he helped them and they saw his uniform 
and thanked him for doing them a favour and they said would you like to 
come in and give us a statement. And they kept him overnight because they 
had to do a check with Interpol to make sure he wasn’t on the wanted list. 
They took him in, in the morning, 1 or 2am and we didn’t see him until 7 pm 
the next evening, we couldn’t communicate with him, we couldn’t talk to 
him, we couldn’t do anything.  
 
What this research has revealed is that respondents do understand the need for 
prevention; however, it is the existence of no evidence and hard policing methods, 
raids, detention etc which together produce anger. Many respondents, like Mazar, felt 
they are living in a police state and have a sense of powerlessness because counter 
terrorism includes procedures like those in airports, as the next experience 
demonstrates. 
 
I travelled to Pakistan a number of times because I had a young son here 
who was quite ill and a dad who was quite ill so I was travelling back and 
for quite a bit and I think it was 2001, after 9/11 there was a group of us 
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travelling from a local airport and I was dressed in my western clothes and 
a few of my colleagues were dressed in Islamic clothes and one had a beard 
and I was waved in and it wasn’t an issue but the colleagues were taken into 
a room and they were searched and stripped, they had the full treatment and 
I think the difference was that they looked more Muslim. Again after 9/11 I 
was travelling through Birmingham airport and I had a fair bit of money on 
me because I said I would take the money with me and spend what I need to 
and bring back what I don’t spend. I had 9 or 10 thousand in my brief case 
and pushed through the exit and obviously it showed up as money and I was 
hauled into a little room and I was worried because my plane was due to 
depart and they were still asking me questions so I said look this is how I 
got it and if you don’t believe me than contact my employees and they will 
say its redundancy money and I said its all traceable and I’m not here to do 
money laundering or anything and there’s a whole history of me travelling 
to and fro so I was kept there for two hours and they went into my 
background and the rest of it and once they were satisfied they let me go.  
 
These experiences highlight how counter terrorism policing can induce a higher level 
of vulnerability. According to Deutsch (2006, p.24), a victim of injustice may be 
outraged by his / her experience and challenge the victimizer, however, if the 
‘victimizer is more powerful and has the support of the legal and other institutions of 
the society, the victim will realize that it would be dangerous to act on his outrage or 
even to express it’. Due to the power of the police under this legislation, suspects have 
to co-operate and let the enactment of suspicion be actualized because if they do not 
the punishment is arrest. In the case of airports for example, Muslims must accept the 
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fact that they are likely to be checked and body searched and allow such procedures to 
take place so that suspicion can be eradicated. Due to the expansion of control and 
emphasis on prevention, Muslims are likely to be placed in situations where they will 
come into contact with counter terrorism policing measures. 
 However, although the prospective data has demonstrated respondents’ 
perceptions of the police since the ‘war on terror’ and how these have changed, the 
perceptions have highlighted the place of human rights. Thus, although the police have 
been given a greater amount of power this does not mean that, as the data suggests 
Muslims are always going to co-operate. The data has revealed anger and this anger 
can be placed through a consideration of what human rights actually are. According to 
Dower (2008) the introduction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
aimed at ensuring that responsibility for protecting individuals’ human rights resided 
with the state. Faulkner (2003) summarizes the evolution of rights stating that in the 
contemporary era citizens’ rights are those rights which are guaranteed by 
constitutions and statutes such as the Human Rights Act 1998, and Nash (2009) 
highlights how the emergence of individual autonomy, equality and innocent until 
proven guilty are what we now interpret as human rights. Therefore, to consider that 
understandings of human rights are informed by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and protected in statutes, it is then possible to comprehend how these are not 
simply changeable laws but laws which reflect rights which were perhaps regarded as 
being rights which would never be deviated from. Therefore, the fact that these rights 
have now been deviated from is what has produced anger, fear and vulnerability.  
 
PERCEPTIONS OF INJUSTICE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THE 
LEVEL OF THE UMM A 
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In the retrospective data injustice was not perceived as existing even though negative 
perceptions of the police were present, however in the prospective interviews injustice 
emerged as a major theme. Deutsch (2006, p.24) argues ‘the greater the extent of 
relative deprivation the greater the sense of injustice that will be experienced by the 
oppressed’. Respondents, like Nabeela perceived a great sense of deprivation where 
policing was concerned because they perceived a deprivation of legal rights, due 
process and human rights. This research reveals how concepts of power, inequality, 
demonization, and prevention which transcend from the state, to legislation, to 
policing are all united in creating a perceived deep sense of injustice, as Nabeela 
explains. 
 
I think the police have been trained to be harsh and target the Muslim 
community and I have a story, I have seen it and people say to me, you can’t 
fight the system, keep your head down and do what you have been told to 
do, but I say fight the system where is the justice? The police are now 
encouraged to detain someone just because they might be a terrorist. If they 
haven’t found anything they are not going to but what are they putting that 
family through, the community through, and I feel that if they haven’t found 
anything that is just going to make the community angry and frustrated, and 
more and more against the police and I think if they did have something 
they aren’t going to say anything and the police say come forward we are 
your friends, tell us, but they won’t tell the police. 
 
Within the perspective of cosmopolitanism, justice is a major theme and according to 
Hudson (Hudson, 2006, 2007, 2008 cited in Hudson, 2008, p.276) cosmopolitanism 
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developed ‘as an ideal to underpin models of justice’. ‘It requires keeping the rules of 
international law, respecting legal and political conventions nationally and 
internationally, but it also demands respect for the other just because she is a human’ 
(Hudson, 2009, p.715). The very fact that human rights and due process are not 
perceived and inequality is perceived means that respondents perceive the police as 
violating international law and as not respecting their rights as human beings. Bertram 
(2005, p.78) argues that for perceptions of justice and a sense of self respect to exist, 
firstly, there must be a sense of individual autonomy, that an individual’s actions 
determine their fate and secondly, ‘they must be granted by others an unforced 
recognition of their moral status’. Thus, it is essential for justice to be perceived and 
for cosmopolitan law to be maintained. However, in addition to the prominent theme 
of fear which has featured throughout the prospective data, the existence of fear can be 
pin pointed to the individual autonomy of law. As Matloob explains, the individual 
autonomy of the law is perceived as being absent. This suggests that part of how the 
police are perceived is due to the framework within which the police operate and 
because counter terrorism legislation deviates from many universal human rights, such 
as innocent until proven guilty, by virtue of this injustice is perceived.  
 
My opinion of the police have completed changed before I trusted them now 
I do not. I have had so many experiences with them since September 11th 
and it is guilty until proven innocent now. The police are corrupt they will 
try to make up things. They used to be okay and treat us with respect but 
now I always fear for my sons and I am scared after what has happened to 
me. They have targeted me so many times that I just don’t know what to do 
and it is not just the police it’s every institutions. 
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Therefore, respondents fear is exacerbated on the basis that they do not feel that their 
actions will determine their fate. Thus, in the era of the ‘war on terror’ and as the data 
has demonstrated there exists fear through a lack of security, whereby respondents feel 
what constitutes the law, or criminal behaviour is unclear.  
Keltner, Horberg and Oveis (2006) argue that concerns over what is just and fair 
are the glue of social living, with Schwartz and Sagiv (1995 cited in Karstedt, 2002) 
stating moral values of justice and fairness concern all cultures. Perceptions of justice 
are important for individuals, society and humanity, as they form the very norms 
which unite humanity. This data has revealed that respondents perceive a loss in 
human rights, and the fact that no avenue of complaining and re-dressing harms exists, 
as Nabeela explains has exacerbated feelings of injustice. 
 
If we were to complain and say this is what they did who is going to take 
our word against the police? They are going to protect the police first and 
then us, unless, it’s in extreme circumstances and who has got the time, the 
energy and the resources to fight the force, nobody.  
 
Butler (1997, p.139, cited in Frost and Hoggett, 2008, p.449) states, that ‘loss cannot 
be worked through when there is no public recognition or discourse through which it 
might be named and mourned’. There exists no recognition of the loss of legal rights 
perceived by respondents, which has compounded feelings of vulnerability and 
powerlessness into helplessness. It is because procedures which would constitute 
injustice where non terrorism legislation is concerned are legitimized in counter 
terrorism legislation that there is no recognition. Zelditch and Walker, (1984 cited in 
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Turner, 2007b, p.301) state a key factor which contributes to judgments about justice 
is legitimacy ‘which can make it seem right and proper that some should receive more 
than others’. However, the data demonstrates that the existence of injustice is 
perceived as being illegitimate, which is why the theme of empathy only featured 
minimally in the data. Further, the data revealed that respondents believe procedures 
such as innocent until proven guilty should never be violated because respondents’ 
interpretation of legal rights is based on universal human rights. It is the existence of 
justice that creates responsibility and unites humanity and according to respondents 
counter terrorism legislation has undermined this.  
Beck (2006, p.19) states ‘the choice to become or remain an ‘alien’ or a ‘non-
national- is not as a general rule voluntary, but a response to acute need, political 
repression’, and hatred develops by those who are excluded. This is where the dangers 
of unequal legal citizenship become apparent because just as many respondents said, 
exclusion, demonization and being placed outside humanity can lead to people placing 
themselves outside humanity. Many respondents, like Mazar expressed their concern 
regarding the impact counter terrorism policing was having on young people. 
 
I will give you an example recently I was driving past after the terrorism 
raids and there was a whole group of Muslims on Stratford road who 
looked like they were from the Pakistani Muslim background and they were 
young all 11 or 12 and they were all spread against the wall and some 
police officer was walking through and I said what kind of relationship are 
you going to have with these people when they are older, grow up and get 
jobs and the rest of it. You are demonizing them the way you did with black 
youths back in the 70s and 80s and all the hell they had to go through for 
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that and you’re doing exactly the same thing to these young people so 
they’re not going to go and join the police. When they grow up they are not 
going to say that I am part of the mainstream society and I will not do 
stupid things which will harm my own country and my own people, your 
immediately disconnecting them so isn’t your responses self fulfilling and of 
course the police will deny all that and when I tried to raise it with a senior 
officers they would have it.  
 
Injustice was not just perceived as existing on the national level but also on the 
international level, in the form of foreign policy as Musarat highlights. 
 
After September 11th my reaction got worse because they had to back the 
government and I can see the government’s policies were so broadly 
oppressed by the Americans and the Americans were only in it for the 
money and the power so it’s really bad, so what the police are doing is 
connected to the government. And this is why my own trust in the police has 
really gone, if something happens I mean I will always be happy to help the 
police, but I don’t trust them.  
 
The ‘war on terror’ transcends localization and globalization leading to what 
Ehteshami (1997, 180 cited in Khatib, 2003, p.392) calls ‘the emotional, spiritual and 
political response of Muslims to an acute and continuing social, economic and 
political crisis’. In this way the ‘war on terror’ has led to a stronger sense of shared 
identity and also impacted emotions and feelings, thereby meaning that events across 
the globe can feel as personal as events that are local. The previous chapter showed 
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how respondents viewed foreign policy as an attack on Islam and the emphasis on 
Islamic identity has been notable in this research through respondents using their 
Muslim identity to describe their perceptions. Therefore, the prospective data reveals 
the existence of biographical cosmopolitanization because injustice is perceived as 
existing on both levels and it could be said that biographical cosmopolitanization 
heightens feelings of injustice, because oppression at the level of the umma, which 
transcends national boundaries and incorporates issues such as the Palestinian and 
Israeli conflict becomes part of the oppression perceived at the local level. However, 
the danger of the existence of biographical cosmopolitanization is that it can lead to 
citizens no longer feeling part of humanity and therefore perceiving no sense of 
responsibility to humanity. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The first major theme to emerge from the data was that of injustice. The legitimization 
of inequality has acted to repress respondents’ feelings of injustice as although the 
treatment may be perceived as unjust it remains legitimized by the law. This research 
has revealed how respondents feel disadvantaged with an inter group comparison 
forming such a perception. Therefore, although Beck (2006, p.53) states that 
respecting others means treating them as ‘members of the same humanity’ respondents 
believe since the ‘war on terror’ their legal rights have diminished and they have been 
constructed as being outside humanity.  
The second major theme was that of cosmopolitanism as bringing unity and 
responsibility, the idea that we owe justice to all persons because we share a common 
humanity. This data demonstrates how the state was perceived as being responsible for 
the introduction of the counter terrorism legislation and injustice and therefore the vast 
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majority of respondents had empathy for the police role under counter terrorism 
legislation. Respondents, when talking about empathy, very much placed themselves 
within the realm of humanity, above all categories of difference. Part of understanding 
the need for religious profiling was about understanding moral responsibility and 
therefore that at times inequality will exist but where it does there is a utilitarian 
justification. However, although empathy did exist when respondents considered the 
power of the police and existence of injustice, perceptions of empathy and emphasis 
on a shared humanity faded. This was the case for respondents who initially felt 
empathy and those who did not. This suggests that even though respondents want to 
perceive counter terrorism policing through commonality the fact that this form of 
policing is perceived as leading to inequality on the basis of possessing an Islamic 
identity makes this difficult.  
This relates to the final theme to emerge, that of identities. The police have an 
enormous amount of power to condition respondents’ perceptions of human rights and 
legal rights. A violation of these rights or even the perception by respondents that such 
rights will not be maintained since the ‘war on terror’ has led to respondents placing 
themselves outside the nation and humanity. In this way the police have a unique role 
to play in how the three dimensions of citizenship interact and it is through the police 
that not only can the psychological dimension of citizenship be damaged, but so can a 
humanitarian sense of belonging 
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CHAPTER 6: THE IMPACT OF THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ ON 
SOCIETY AND BRITISH MUSLIMS’ ISLAMIC IDENTITIES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The two previous chapters have demonstrated how the ‘war on terror’ has significantly 
changed respondents’ perceptions of the state and the police. Whereas the two 
previous chapters have predominantly considered how respondents believe their 
Islamic identities have been constructed in the ‘war on terror’, this chapter explores 
the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on society and respondents’ Islamic identities.  
There are two core themes which emerged from the prospective data on 
respondents’ perceptions of the state and the police which are significant to 
understanding how the role of the state and the police in the ‘war on terror’ can impact 
society and Islamic identities. The first theme was that of inequality and injustice. The 
prospective data demonstrated how since the ‘war on terror’ respondents believe the 
state and the police perceive Muslims through their Islamic identities, how Muslims’ 
Islamic identities have been demonized by the state to legitimize the introduction of 
counter terrorism legislation and how based on this, respondents perceive their 
relationship with the police to be based on fear. Therefore, it is through respondents’ 
Islamic identities that they perceive inequality and injustice and more generally, a lack 
of human rights and citizenship. This chapter explores the impact of the ‘war on 
terror’ and more specifically the impact of respondents’ perceptions of inequality and 
injustice on their Islamic identities in greater detail.  The chapter also explores how 
respondents believe the ‘war on terror’ has impacted societal relations. The 
construction of Islamic identities in the ‘war on terror’ could be interpreted as ‘elite 
encouragement’ (Green, 2001) because as Sheridan (2006, p.320) states, ‘negative 
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images of Muslims promoted by the media and by political leaders may serve to build 
or provide evidence for existing Islamophobic prejudices’. This chapter considers how 
respondents believe societal relations have changed, paying particular attention to 
racism because although the state and the police have an enormous power to shape 
identities through citizenship, interactions between citizens also impact citizens ‘sense 
of attachment’ (Carens, 2000, p.168) to their identities, as this chapter demonstrates. 
 The second theme to emerge from the prospective data on respondents’ 
perceptions of the state and the police was that of biographical cosmopolitanization. 
The ‘war on terror’ has made the concept of biographical cosmopolitanization relevant 
as respondents’ perceptions of injustice and Islam being demonized, were present at 
the international level and the national level. The intersection of the international and 
the local has become increasingly relevant to respondents’ daily lives and this chapter 
will explore this further through considering how perceptions of injustice and 
inequality at the international level and the national level have negatively impacted 
respondents’ attachment to their British identity. Finally, this chapter also reveals the 
diversity amongst respondents, in terms of how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted their 
Islamic identities. It will be discussed how the ‘war on terror’ has had a positive 
impact on some respondents’ Islamic identities and a negative impact on some 
respondents’ Islamic identities.  
 
RETROSPECTIVE DATA 
RACISM  
Policies at the level of the state essentialize identities as they ‘imply an internal 
sameness, an external difference or otherness’ (Werbner, 1997, p.228) and can lead to 
social divisions and exclusion (Hussain and Bagguley, 2005). The legal and political 
219 
 
dimensions of citizenship are therefore instrumental in conditioning the boundaries 
between communities and influencing the psychological dimension of citizenship 
(Carens, 2000; Falkner, 2003; Lister, 2005). However, these policies are also 
significant because the state has a privileged position in maintaining consensus and 
unity in society and it is through equality that society works because this ensures that 
‘certain norms, attitudes, and dispositions’ are ‘widely shared among the population’ 
(Carens, 2000, p.9). Therefore, at the societal level a feeling of belonging is important, 
because as Seglow (2003, p.92, cited in McPhee, 2005, p.4) explains, ‘only through 
the secure receipt of recognition by others are human agents able to achieve an 
adequate relation to self’. The prospective data on the state revealed that the identity 
through which respondents experienced the state was important because where 
policies were perceived as being based on a British identity this led to a greater sense 
of perceived citizenship and inclusion. In terms of societal relations the data 
demonstrates that perceived commonality is just as important to respondents’ sense of 
belonging (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2003) and therefore it is the identity 
to which otherness has been applied which is also of significance. All respondents, 
like Rafia expressed how during the period of 1989 to 2000 their ethnic identity was 
the identity from which difference was established and racism existed. 
 
I think during this skinhead faze you did hear of racism every now and then, 
the word Paki, that was there so in a sense that racism was there but 
nothing more than occasionally being called a Paki.  
 
The majority of respondents believed that their experiences of social exclusion and 
racism were based on resources and it was the presence of a Pakistani identity which 
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led to ‘Paki-bashing’ (Lewis, 1994). As Sofia suggests, it was respondents’ ethnicity 
which was perceived as being problematic. 
 
The men however who were older I guess they felt that we were a threat to 
their security and way of life, also that we had taken all the jobs they had. I 
think this is why when they were being racist they would often say go back 
to your own country because there was a reluctance to accept that we were 
in our own country now and Pakistanis also belonged to this country. Like 
the people are part of the BNP you could show them array of facts like the 
economic contributions that Pakistanis made and they will still argue that 
Pakistanis bleed the country dry.  
 
All respondents, like Shafquat spoke about how because racism was based on their 
ethnic and racial identities and motivated by a concern over jobs and resources and 
therefore racism was not perceived as being personal.  
 
No. I didn’t think that deep when I was called names I would just deal with 
it and move on. For some reason I never took it personally it wasn’t like 
someone was saying or insulting part of my character they were insulting 
something based on what they thought I was or what they believed.  
 
Thus, although interactions between the socially dominant and the oppressed maintain 
the system of oppression (Deusch, 2006), respondents did not perceive a great sense of 
exclusion and all respondents, like Sikander spoke about how an ethnic based form of 
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racism was easier to accept because it was based on resources and jobs as opposed to 
personal characteristics. 
 
I worked, well I was the only black face in the whole of the department, so 
the only kinda racist remarks I came across were when you know someone 
has been cut up by someone and they say ‘fucking Paki’ but not in terms of 
serious racism so I really thought that I was part and parcel of this country.  
 
This suggests that the identity which is subject to the establishment of difference and 
the perceived motivation for racism are important in shaping respondents’ perceptions 
of racism and in determining the impact of racism.  
 
SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS OF ISLAMIC IDENTITY 
Benhabib (2002 cited in Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2003, p.156) argues that 
the role of states is not confined to political and legal institutions because ‘cultural or 
social meaning’ is shaped by and produced by states. During this period respondents, 
like Younis felt that society did not know how to differentiate between Asian 
identities. 
 
I don’t think people really understood Islam at all they didn’t really have an 
opinion on it one way or another I think they just saw people as Indians, 
they would shout out the word Paki but I don’t think they understood the 
difference between Indian and Pakistani. I mean the fact that most people 
would have said ‘do you speak Pakistani or do you speak Indian?’ is a 
direct illustration about how little people knew about the culture so unless 
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they studied something at school they didn’t really know the difference 
between a Hindu or a Muslim or knew anything about it, up to this point. 
 
This reflects the retrospective data where the state was concerned and demonstrates 
how respondents didn’t perceive there to be a discourse associated with their Islamic 
identities at the level of the state and in society. Further, where the retrospective data 
for the police revealed that respondents believed there was a lack of knowledge 
surrounding their Islamic identities, many respondents, like Sikander also cited a lack 
of understanding surrounding their Islamic identities at the societal level. 
 
I’ll tell you one of my own experiences when I first went to work and I 
started fasting. The first week or so my colleagues actually thought it was 
quite funny and would actually make me a cup of tea and put it in front of 
me just to test me, I don’t think they were being anti Muslim, it was just to 
see if I had the will power. They would eat chocolates in front of me and by 
the end of that month, those same colleagues started realizing what time I 
was opening the fast and they would buy chocolates for me and make a cup 
of tea for me at the right time and even if I was working, my head was down 
they would come up to me and say look, its time. Something I heard which 
made me laugh, I was at a meeting, a conference and there was a French 
person who said I don’t particularly understand Muslims what is wrong 
with you kids, you go to the nightclubs and you go to the bars but on a 
Friday afternoon why do you always go to this mosque thing?  
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Although a lack of understanding was perceived to exist around respondents’ Islamic 
identity, the values associated with this identity were perceived as being positive 
values. Mazar explains what these values are.  
 
There were obviously issues to do with book burning and things like that but 
largely things were okay, these are committed people who value their faith 
and have a strong family system, so there were a lot of positive things and 
things to be aspired to and how we are perceived to look after our elders 
and we were hard working making business. So there were some issues yes 
these people are different to us but there are some aspects of their life that 
we should emulate.  
 
Therefore, where the construction of Islamic identities was concerned this data 
demonstrates a strong correlation between perceptions of the state, the police and 
society. This demonstrates that as Benhabib (2002 cited in Bloemraad, Korteweg and 
Yurdakul, 2003) suggests, the state influences societal beliefs through having the 
power to shape the meanings associated with identities. It could therefore be argued 
that in terms of the discourses associated with identities, discourses are of a 
transitional nature, whereby the state has the power to create marginalization through 
the construction of negative discourses, the police can sustain these discourses and 
they will invariably filter down to society and influence societal relations. Further, in 
terms of the construction of Islamic identities, Jangir explains how international events 
were not perceived as influencing societal perceptions of Islam and Islamic identities. 
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There were tensions before the war in Chechnya and the Bosnian war was 
in that decade so obviously there was tension and internationally Muslims 
were highlighted as being extremists or fundamentalists and this didn’t 
impact us at home, you know living where I did we didn’t have much of a 
problem with racism.  
 
This data validates the retrospective data on the state, which also showed that 
biographical cosmopolitanization did not exist before the ‘war on terror’. Therefore, 
negative constructions of Islam and Islamic identities on the international level were 
not perceived as leading to negative discourses of Islam and Islamic identities at the 
national / local level. 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ISLAMIC IDENTITY – HOW IT DIFFERS FROM 
OTHER IDENTITIES  
One of the main aims of this research was to consider the meaning of Islamic identities 
for respondents. It is through understanding the meaning this identity has for 
respondents that inequality and demonization on the basis of this identity can be 
understood. Furthermore, gaining this understanding was important because firstly, the 
constructed ‘war on terror’ has been responded to through what Fraser (1995, p.291, 
cited in Pedziwiatr, 2007, p.269) calls, the ‘subaltern counter publics’. Core to 
understanding the counter publics involves an understanding of Islamic identities, 
since these identities have been the focus of the ‘war on terror’. Secondly, Carens 
(2000, p.162) argues that people have ‘multiple memberships within each of the 
dimensions’ the legal, political and psychological, which ‘interact with each other in 
complex ways’. Religious affiliation is one such membership, and it is through 
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appreciating the dynamics of Islamic identities that it can be can understood how it 
interacts with the three dimensions of citizenship and other identities. 
Mitchell (2006) argues that even those who are not religiously devout, who seem 
to have secular identities, still have a religious content which informs their identity 
and this research strongly suggests that those with secular identities still have an 
affinity with their Islamic identity. All respondents, including those who 
conceptualized their Islamic identity as secular because they are not practicing 
Muslims like Bilal, spoke of how their Islamic identity is important and is much more 
significant than either their ethnic and / or cultural identity.  
 
Religion because it is your faith it is something you honour and are devoted 
to and when someone is trying to take that liberty away its heart breaking. 
In comparison colour and culture, culture is manmade and colour is given 
to you by god and religion is for the god.  
 
Therefore, although Carens (2000, p.142) states that ‘for some Islam may be primarily 
a cultural marker, that has little bearing on the norms that guide their actions in public 
and private life’, even where this was the case and Islam did not inform respondents’ 
actions, the identity still remained important for these respondents. According to 
Mirza (2007), an Islamic identity is personal; it is personal because it reflects 
negotiation, choice and meaning which is derived at by the self, for the self. 
Woodhead (2008, p.55) argues generally a ‘religion is a name we give to a complex 
set of social practices which structure individual agency, and are in turn recursively 
structured by it’. The data revealed how an Islamic identity was perceived as being a 
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personal identity, which interacts with individual agency and as Mohammed explains 
this distinguished Islamic identity from other forms of identity. 
 
Religion hurts more. Because religion is something that is personal to 
someone even though many people read the Quran their understanding is 
personal and everyone has certain values that they pick up from the religion 
and are personal to them so it becomes a personal attack on the individual, 
its more than culture because culture only affects the society you are in or 
something you do in an certain way.  
 
The meaning Islam has for a Muslim can change over a Muslim’s lifetime. At certain 
times a Muslim may invest in only certain beliefs that provide them with guidance and 
at other times they will follow Islam as a complete guide to life. As Mitchell (2006, 
p.1138) states, ‘this is because religion has the capacity to simmer and surface in the 
lives of individuals and groups over time. It can recede but also revive’. The next 
experience by Aneesa shows the capacity of this identity to surface and how it 
surfaced into her life because of external events.  
 
I never used to read my namaz in those days and now I have started paying 
more attention to Islam and it’s only after September 11th that I’ve read the 
translation for the Quran before I only wanted to learn about the Quran 
through word of mouth, I am a stronger Muslim now and I think its right 
that for a person to understand Islam they should read about it themselves. I 
did start to read my namaz and changed the way I dress, even though I 
wasn’t a bad dresser before I just cover my head now because I never used 
227 
 
to wear a scarf before. It was a big reason for me to wear the scarf because 
I was frightened as to how people would look at me, but I just took the 
decision and did it but I did get some looks. The main reason I started 
wearing the scarf was because of the trouble my son was going through 
with the police I needed something to help me get through the pain my son 
was causing and I was putting that down to the fact that because we weren’t 
practicing Muslims. I thought it was a kind of punishment and I had to do 
something, change my lifestyle and ways, because maybe I was getting a bit 
too westernized and had to go back to my roots. And since 1998 I’ve been to 
Pakistan twice and I never did go before that and I’ve had three spiritual 
experiences while I have been in Pakistan and I remember one thing that 
sticks in my mind that my father said to me was that the only place you will 
know whether there is god is if you go to Pakistan, see the life people have 
other there then you know there is a god. If you’re in England you can’t see 
it, the spiritual experiences have just helped me to get into Islam and 
understand it a bit more and I’m glad I went and want to keep that.  
 
It also demonstrates how an Islamic identity can provide strength. It is because as 
Woodhead (2008, p.55) suggests that ‘religious belonging may make life not only 
intellectually meaningful and morally satisfying for its members, but emotionally 
resonant and practically live-able’ that external events can influence the nature of this 
identity and the extent to which it penetrates a Muslims life.  
This section has demonstrated how an Islamic identity was conceptualized as 
having greater importance for respondents than an ethnic or cultural identity. The 
reactive nature of Islamic identity has also been shown, demonstrating how external 
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events can change Islamic identities. This suggests that the international and national 
demonization of this identity in the ‘war on terror’ will not only have impacted 
respondents’ Islamic identity through producing a reactive identity but will also have 
implications for respondents’ sense of attachment and loyalty to their Islamic and 
British identities.  
 
PROSPECTIVE DATA 
SOCIETAL PERCEPTIONS OF ISLAMIC IDENTITY & THE NEW 
DISCOURSE OF PAKISTANI IDENTITY 
Since the ‘war on terror’ Islamic identities have been constructed as a global threat 
(Turam, 2004) and within the nation state in what Blair called wars of ‘values change’ 
it was conveyed that ‘Muslim societies need to be forced to abandon ‘their values’ 
(Blair, 2006 cited in Kundnani 2007, p.37). Mythen and Walklate (2008) make 
reference to how dominant institutions generate discourses through which people 
come to recognize and understand risk. The structural level is powerful in influencing 
societal relations and creating social divisions through creating some identities as risky 
identities. This section considers how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted respondents’ 
perceptions of how their Islamic identities are perceived in society.  
From a cosmopolitan perspective, Walker (2005a) presses the importance of 
universalism based on humanity whereby commonality exists but not at the expense of 
differences and Beck and Grande (2007) argue that differences should not be placed 
hierarchically but rather be seen positively. In this way difference is embraced and 
conceptualized as providing fluidity and as adding depth, creation and choice – 
therefore it could be argued that subjectivity and personal freedom are prioritized. 
However, this research revealed that respondents perceived their Islamic identity as 
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being perceived negatively because all respondents said the ‘war on terror’ and the 
state had produced negative stereotypes of their Islamic identities which associated 
their Islamic identities with terrorism. Respondents, like Safia perceived this discourse 
as also existing in society, with societal beliefs regarding the incompatibility of an 
Islamic identity and a British identity. 
 
After September 11th there isn’t a mixed opinion I don’t think, as I said 
before stereotypes are used where Muslims are concerned more than ever 
before and for the first time perhaps we have certain beliefs existing like 
Muslims are killers, believe in a bad violent religion and cannot fit into 
Britain and live in this country.  
 
Therefore, it could be argued that ‘the logic of identity/difference’ is perceived to exist 
with the ‘single characteristic’ of Islamic identity being essentailized and association 
with terrorism (Hudson, 2008, p.279). Within this construction it is the fact that 
terrorism denotes risk which has made the existence of a British and Islamic identity 
problematic. Interestingly, all respondents spoke about how their Islamic identity is 
now associated with risk and Azmat explains the nature of this risk.  
 
We are and it’s not just a small risk but a huge risk, a risk that blows up 
building and wants to kill all non Muslims, if you go to internet chat rooms 
what they write about Muslims is shocking and there are few people who 
are non Muslims that actually defend Muslims.  
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According to Beck (2006), the ‘war on terror’ associated risk with Islamic identities so 
that state suspicion and the risk of terrorism could legitimize internal security 
measures. The prospective data regarding perceptions of the police found that the 
greater the risk respondents thought the police think they represent the greater at risk 
respondents felt from the police. This data was very similar, because as Sophia 
suggests the greater the perceived fear of Muslims in society the greater the extent of 
marginalization and racism. 
 
I think it is to do with the reason why people are racist now and racism 
against Muslims has changed since September 11th, people are now fearful 
of Muslims and because this fear exist, people are now racist and it is not 
just a few groups. I think a huge part is the lack of knowledge that exists 
about Islam and people think that if Muslims did not exist then the world 
would be a safer place, so I think it’s about security.  
 
The unison of terrorism with Islam has produced fear regarding the compatibility of 
Islam identity and British identity and according to Turner (2007b) humans’ cognitive 
capacities enable them to derive a sense of how others think of them, through reading 
the gestures of others, or through introspection. Most respondents, like Zulfiguar 
talked about fear disrupting commonality to the extent where they think non Muslims 
no longer want them to be part of Britain. 
 
I think if you put the question differently and said to people, ‘do you think 
the UK would be safer without Muslims’, most would reply with a yes and 
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this speaks volumes. So although people may not evidently show they fear 
us, some aspect of fear does exist amongst most people.  
 
The ethics of responsibility denotes that the state has a duty to maintain equality and 
it is through maintaining equality that it is ensured that the state does not harm 
individuals and individuals can then form a sense of responsibility towards each other 
(Brock and Brighouse, 2005; Dower, 2008). The data shows that due to the state and 
the police not practicing equality and associating Islamic identity with fear this has 
impacted the ethics of responsibility in society as respondents now perceive 
marginalization, therefore diminishing the perceived sense of ethics from wider 
society. The impact of the ‘war on terror’ on the ethics of responsibility can be 
considered further through respondents’ Pakistani identity. According to Amin (2004, 
p.2), after the ‘war on terror’ superiority became defined in ‘ethno-religious terms’. 
Interestingly, respondents talked about how the ‘war on terror’ has led to a different 
discourse being associated with their Pakistani identity. Jamil explains how Pakistani 
identity has been associated with terrorism. 
 
It is religion and to some extent ethnicity because there are people who 
think all terrorists are Pakistani and these just shows how ignorant they 
really are.  
 
Therefore, in the prospective interviews data demonstrates how respondents’ Pakistani 
identity, through being associated with terrorism has reduced the existence of 
commonality and negatively impacted the existence of moral responsibility. What is 
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increasingly becoming clear is how respondents believe the ‘war on terror’ has 
impacted societal beliefs about them.  
 
MUSLIM - NON MUSLIM BINARY  
Through the ‘war on terror’ making respondents’ Islamic identity central this has had 
implications for respondents’ sense of commonality because they no longer believe 
that they are perceived with commonality, but rather with negative difference. The 
‘war on terror’ has not only produced negative societal stereotypes but as Mazar 
explains the ‘war on terror’ has produced a Muslim - non Muslim binary in society.  
 
It’s all these people whether they are from African or Caribbean 
background or whether you’re from a white background or Indian 
background it’s all collectively seeing Muslims as separate and distinct and 
to be worried and feared and its manifestation is different from your 
traditional racism and discrimination.  
 
This binary is perceived to exist because of fear being associated with respondents’ 
Islamic identities and this can be understood through considering how terrorism was 
constructed. Terrorism was constructed in terms of a binary because as Brassett (2008, 
p.11) argues ‘straightforward dichotomies between ‘barbaric terrorists’ and ‘civilized 
cosmopolitans’ served to construct cosmopolitanism as a coherent, and united, global 
community’. It is therefore because an Islamic identity has been associated with 
terrorism and terrorists have been constructed as being outside humanity that 
respondents perceive the existence of a Muslim – non Muslim binary in society. This 
has huge implications for perceived citizenship because as the research has discovered 
233 
 
the greater the extent of perceived commonality in society and perceived commonality 
through state policies, the greater the perception of belonging. All respondents like 
Jangir spoke of how they perceive intolerance towards their Islamic identity. 
 
I think society has become a lot more intolerant of difference and I think 
that is going to be its biggest downfall of this country, everyone is different 
and difference has always existed and when your living in a world that’s so 
small how can you just pick on one group of people, because it’s going to 
spread and it is spreading, they are becoming more and more intolerant, 
first they were like we don’t care, you do your own thing and we don’t mind 
but then people go and blow themselves up and drive planes into buildings 
it gives people who are always on the fringe, the right it gives them a voice, 
it gives them a platform, and power and they have exploited it. Society has 
changed its changed for the worse and it’s going to get a lot worse I think, 
and like I said it’s a matter of principles if you can ride the ride then that’s 
it.  
 
Therefore, just as respondents perceived the state and the police as negatively 
impacting their sense of belonging and attachment, respondents’ perceptions of 
societal relations have also negatively impacted their perceived sense of belonging. 
This invariably has implications for perceived commonality and the extent to which 
citizens want to move from the part (minority identity) to the whole (national identity) 
(McPhee, 2005).  
 
ISLAMOPHOBIA 
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With the research investigating respondents’ perceptions and experiences over a two 
decade time span, the data elucidates how racism is a fluid ideology which is deeply 
connected to the socio-political context within which it emerges. According to 
Modood (1992), in the 1990s there was a renewed emphasis on culture, which led to 
‘cultural racism’ and Taguieff (1985, cited in Ratcliffe, 2004, p.20) similarly talks 
about differential racism, where culture replaces biology as the basis of ‘race’. 
Respondents differentiated between previous forms of racism and the racism they 
believed the ‘war on terror’ has legitimized. All respondents felt that their Islamic 
identity was now the focus of racism, that fear and risk are associated with this 
identity and therefore how this form of racism has created a Muslim - non Muslim 
binary in society. Shafquat explains the nature of Islamophobia.  
 
Post 9/11 everybody knows about Islam they are scared of it, it’s in their 
face, I think Islamophobia is more large scale, Islam is seen as a threat to 
peoples lifestyle, they are scared it’s going to change their world, it is 
unique to racism because if you don’t want to be racially abused because of 
the color of your skin you move to another area but if you are Islamophobic 
its impossible because there a billion plus Muslims in the world, you will 
come into contact with them.  
 
This data reveals how Islamophobia should not be conceptualized as a form of cultural 
racism because for respondents, Islamic identity has a very different meaning when 
compared to other forms of identity and therefore to conceptualize it as a form of 
cultural racism is to essentialize how experiences are perceived and to dismiss the 
harm caused by Islamophobia. Secondly, it also dismisses the international dynamics 
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which have led to Islamophobia. Islamophobia incorporates ideas of democracy as 
being progressive and religion as being backwards. It utilizes a Huntington clash of 
civilizations construction of the enemy, in which Islamic civilization is ‘accorded a 
subordinate and inferior status within a hierarchical ordering’ (Beck 2006, p.51) and 
the threat of Islam must be eradicated at all costs. Thirdly, this form of racism is based 
on values; at the international level Islam is constructed as being in direct opposition 
with the west and at the national level, as Wieviorka (2004) suggests this new form of 
racism describes its victims as being incapable of integrating into society and sharing 
the values of the dominant group. Fourthly, this form of racism excludes suspects from 
humanity. Definitions of the terrorist have constructed the terrorist as being outside 
democracy and outside the political process (Tadros, 2007 and Stohl, 2008) and 
outside humanity, with the terrorist being dehumanized (Findlay, 2007; Hudson, 
2008). This construction is relevant to both the discourse associated with Islam and 
Islamophobia because just as the terrorist has been constructed as lacking individual 
autonomy, Lea (2005) argues that, Islamophobia has fundamental to it beliefs that 
Muslims lack individuality and autonomous existence. Thus, as Deustch (2006) states, 
power is derived from the oppressor denying the autonomy of the oppressed. 
Therefore, incompatibility has been constructed in such a way that the humanitarian 
concepts which are a universal point of unity have been translated into ‘the enemy 
within’.  
Sadiki (2002) argues that the events of September 11th are an example of bad 
globalization because they have disempowered Muslims. Gilroy’s uses the word 
diaspora to suggest ‘a diffused experience and understanding of identity’ (cited in 
Hudson, 2008, p.280). The above quote makes a direct reference to the threat 
associated with Islam on the international level with previous quotes showing the 
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perceived threat associated with Islam on the national level. Therefore, the data 
demonstrates how respondents perceive their Islamic identity to be excluded on the 
international level and the national level and how this has in fact led to a different 
understanding of Islamic identity, as now it is understood by respondents in terms of 
constructed risk and threat.  
This chapter has demonstrated the great extent to which society is perceived to 
have changed. It could be argued that because the discourses produced in the ‘war on 
terror’ are strong and exist at the international level and the national level it is likely 
that respondents have a double identity. According to Deutsch (2006), the oppressed 
groups (Muslims) must interact with the dominant group whose culture mainly 
provides stereotyped images of them and the oppressed group is often under pressure 
to conform to and internalize the dominant group’s images of their group. This leads 
to the dominated group often having a double identity, one defined by the dominant 
group and the other coming from membership in one’s own group. The next section 
explores how the ‘war on terror’ and change in societal attitudes has impacted 
respondents’ Islamic identity and therefore the extent to which a reactive identity has 
emerged. 
 
REACTIVE IDENTITY - ISLAMIC IDENTITY AS BECOMING PRIMARY 
IDENTITY  
According to McPhee (2005) there are various consequences of an attack on an aspect 
of identity, firstly this identity can take over the entire identity of the person, secondly 
lead to feelings of togetherness and therefore strengthen community identity and 
finally, through becoming the primary identity asserting this identity can become 
liberating. The ‘war on terror’ has impacted respondents in many ways; it has 
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redefined their structural relationship with the state and the police and has altered the 
once ethnic relations of society to Muslim - non Muslim relations. ‘State-defined 
identity categories can have a profound impact on individuals’ conception of 
themselves’ (Skerry, 2000 cited in Pedziwiatr, 2007, p.275) and state inequality, 
especially where the legal dimension of citizenship is concerned, has had a great 
impact on respondents’ Islamic identities. This research found that due to the ‘war on 
terror’, all respondents identify with their Islamic identity more and this has become 
the primary identity through which all respondents identify themselves. Matloob 
explains why his Islamic identity has become important. 
 
Islam has become more important to me because I now see myself as a 
Muslim and not an Asian person. Before we were seen as Asian but now we 
are seen as Muslims and this part of our identity has become really 
significant for other people first and then this has made us change the way 
we see ourselves. I do feel proud to say that I am a Muslim and try to do my 
duty and tell people what Islam is about.  
 
Interestingly, due to Islam being such a core part of the ‘war on terror’, many 
respondents explained how the ‘war on terror’ had actually made them want to know 
more about Islam. Individuals often rely on religious content to construct identities, 
‘with Muslims increasingly reshaping religion with their own hands (rather than 
relying on ‘crusty’ clerics) (Mandaville, 2007. p.102). Therefore, the ‘war on terror’ 
has not only led all respondents to identify with their Islamic identity more but it has 
also led many, like Sikander to learn more about this identity. 
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After Sep 11th I became more aware of my Muslim identity, before I had 
always defined myself in terms of ethnicity and I am an Asian and I felt that 
I had to know more about my religion. 
 
The issue of ‘choice’ is highly relevant, as the retrospective data revealed the greater 
the extent of commonality, as respondents were constructed through their ethnic 
minority and Asian identity, the lesser the perceived degree of marginalization. The 
‘war on terror’ has restricted the choice of respondents to be constructed according to 
these identities and where choice does not exist, neither does power. Therefore, 
respondents identify with their Islamic identity more because it is through this identity 
that unequal legal status, religious profiling by the police and experiences of 
repression and exclusion exist, as Musarat states.    
 
The incidents have made me stronger and now I do take more of an interest 
in the Muslim community, simply because if you know what is going on you 
then know what your position is. Yes it did what I think it did was it made 
me realise that I was a Muslim before I thought of myself as a British Asian, 
but I realised that people looked at me as a Muslim that’s the major impact 
and you know after 2001 people started to show their prejudice towards me 
being a Muslim I think I’ve said that previously I was just an Asian or a 
Paki but now it didn’t matter what colour I was if I was a Muslim I was 
targeted for following my religion more than my colour. It definitely made 
my identity stronger.  
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Wieviorka (1999, cited in Wieviorka 2004, p.290) uses the example of young Muslims 
she met in France who said ‘their choice in Islam is personal and deliberate and 
secondly, they consider Islam enables them to keep going when confronted with a 
racist society and one in which their living conditions are particularly difficult’. 
Respondents perceive inequality and they no longer believe non Muslims share the 
same experiences, as demonstrated in the prospective police data where injustice was 
perceived as existing towards Muslims alone and therefore respondents identify with 
their Islamic identity as it is through this identity that perceptions and experiences are 
now formed. This has implications for perceived citizenship because it could be 
argued that perceived exclusion at the societal level has negatively impacted 
respondents’ sense of belonging and attachment to their British identity. 
 
POSITIVE ISLAMIC REACTIVE IDENTITY 
Cosmopolitanism warns of the dangers of the state deviating from cosmopolitan law, 
which is about maintaining universal human rights and ensuring that every citizen has 
equal liberty (Kaldor, 2000; Nash, 2009) and secondly, the state imposing a fixed 
identity, whereby inequality is based on identity (Beck, 2006; Hudson, 2008). 
Cosmopolitanism places importance on perceptions. As Beck (2006, p.19) states ‘the 
choice to become or remain an ‘alien’ or a ‘non-national’ is not as a general rule 
voluntary, but a response to acute need, political repression’. Perceptions of repression 
lead to changes in identity, a sense of detachment and therefore a reactive identity. 
The data has explored how, due to the state deviating from cosmopolitanism and equal 
citizenship, Islamic identities have changed.  
The first section considers positive changes to Islamic identities, the second 
section explores negative changes to Islamic identities and the final section explores 
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how respondents have detached themselves from their British identity thus becoming 
as Beck (2006) suggests an alien.   
For some respondents through constructing Islam negatively, the ‘war on terror’ 
has actually made Islam more relevant to their lives, in a way that perhaps would not 
have happened had it not been for their Islamic identity being attacked. As Rafia 
states, her Islamic identity has become something she is proud of, she has wanted to 
learn more about Islam and has started practicing Islam. The negative discourse 
associated with Islam has had a positive influence on her and the role of Islam in her 
life. 
 
I felt like I was defending my faith and my community and in a sense was 
being judged by people who were ignorant. In one sense I now have 
speeches prepared because I know they will ask me those things I have a 
speech prepared as to why we cover up and why we don’t cover up and 
when I meet new people I expect them to come up with these questions and I 
can see that people want to ask certain things but don’t know how to. So you 
do feel like you have to justify, explain and defend and no other group 
would have to answer the kind of questions we do. It’s made me more proud 
of who I am, it’s made me more proud of my faith, I’ve read up more and 
become more practising than I was and I will make sure I sit down and talk 
to my sons unlike my Mum who never had the time so it’s made my faith 
stronger and it’s become more stronger in my life. In my life it’s become 
more important I am like a defender of my faith when I meet people I 
explain my religion, give them a whole ethos whereas before I would have 
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said I’m Muslim, and this is what I believe in, why we pray. So it spreads 
more knowledge and understanding about my religion.  
 
As the quote demonstrates the ‘war on terror’ has not only led this respondent to 
identify more with Islam but it has facilitated religious belonging which, as Woodhead 
(2008, p.55) suggests, can may make life ‘morally satisfying for its members’. Many 
respondents, like Zulfiguar spoke of the pride associated with their Islamic identity, 
and interestingly for these respondents it was because their Islamic identity gave them 
strength, something they felt other identities did not give them. 
 
As I said before its made my religious identity stronger and tested my faith 
because it would be very easy for me to change what I wear, so that I do not 
get the looks and so on but I found that was something I was unable to do 
and instead I became prouder of my faith and of who I am.  
 
Therefore, for some respondents the ‘war on terror’ has made their Islamic identity 
significant, and provided them with the impetus to explore their Islamic identity. 
Within the ‘war on terror’ perceived injustices have politicized Islamic identity and 
unified the umma. The ‘war on terror’ transcends localization and globalization 
leading to what Ehteshami (1997, p.180 cited in Khatib, 2003, p.392) calls “the 
emotional, spiritual and political response of Muslims to an acute and continuing 
social, economic and political crisis’. In this way the ‘war on terror’ has led to a 
stronger sense of shared identity and impacted emotions and feelings. The data 
revealed how some respondents felt an increasing sense of attachment to their Islamic 
identity and this was because the ‘war on terror’ has politicized Islamic identities. As 
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Musarat explained, for her wearing the hijab is liberating because it is black and 
represents her resisting the negativity associated with Islam.  
 
If I walk into a meeting with my black scarf I mean everybody is looking at 
me and now it is about Islam which is why white Muslims are also suffering 
abuse. But it is discriminating and if you walk in no one will look at you, 
and the meeting I had today, everybody was looking at me, there were girls 
like you there they didn’t get looks. My husband said don’t wear black today 
there will be many people there, I said no, let them learn the color black has 
become an Islamic color and if you wear it you somehow, well black has 
become a terrorists color, but I don’t care, I’m going to walk anywhere I 
want with my black clothes on why should I care, I didn’t change myself 
when I was a hippy, smoking cigarettes with flowers in my hair and at that 
time I used to get looks from Asian men saying our girl dressed like that, we 
cannot have that, I used to say go to hell, I don’t believe in this in the same 
way. Tables have turned I said to my husband I’m not going to change my 
scarf because it’s convenient for other people.  
 
Geertz (2000, cited in Werbner, 2007) links the political dimensions of Muslim veiling 
with the quest for personal meaning. Of interest is how Musarat believes black has 
become synonymous with terrorism. Her choice to wear the hijab is about resistance. 
Mitchell (2006) relates religion to spirituality and van Ness (1996 cited in Spalek and 
Imtoual, 2008) states that religion and spirituality react and respond to each other; they 
mutually transform each other. The research demonstrates how Islamic identities are 
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reactive identities, within which there can be ‘a revival of spirituality’, (Mitchell, 
2006) influenced by external events. 
Shafquat talks about how after 9/11 he not only learned more about Islam but 
Islam also became spiritually important for him.  
 
I think it’s more important I’ve taken more time to learn about it, as a 
child my father used to pray five times a day, when you’re young you learn 
about the practical side but now I’m learning about the spiritual side I’ve 
taken it upon myself to learn. You know reading namaz can get very ritual 
you go and perform the actions and done. But what is it suppose to mean 
it’s not suppose to mean standing there its meant to mean a connection 
and I’ve only learned that now, it’s only after, well post 9/11 that I’ve 
become aware of what Islam is really about, well I’ve become more aware 
of what it’s about from the spiritual perspective and not just the ritualistic 
perspective.  
 
This section has demonstrated how even though Islamic identities have been 
constructed negatively these negativities have led to positive changes in Islamic 
identity. However, the concern is that the previous data chapters revealed that those 
who are visibly Islamic are perceived to be at most risk of marginal citizenship. Nash 
(2009) when referring to marginal citizens includes status and racism. The data has 
shown that respondents perceive Muslims as not having equal legal status and 
suffering from racism and therefore although on a personal level a closer relationship 
with Islam maybe beneficial, within the ‘war on terror’ this is also perceived to lead to 
a greater level of marginalization where citizenship is concerned. 
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NEGATIVE ISLAMIC REACTIVE IDENTITY  
Deutsch (2006) states that oppressed groups (Muslims) often have a double identity. 
Although some respondents spoke about how the ‘war on terror’ has increased their 
religiosity and attachment to their Islamic identities, other respondents felt that the 
‘war on terror’ has had a negative impact on their Islamic identities. Of interest is how 
some respondents, due to believing that the politicized construction of their Islamic 
identities could be resisted, not only maintained but asserted their Islamic identities 
more, whereas for other respondents the dominant group’s image of their Islamic 
identity was perceived as being so powerful that they did not think it could be resisted.    
Firstly, some respondents believed that Muslims should move from the part 
(minority identity) to the whole (national identity) (McPhee, 2005). What is of interest 
is how these respondents, like Bilal cited oppression and marginalization as the 
reason, rather than an increased feeling of attachment to their British identity.  
 
I feel disadvantaged in the sense that I can’t grow a beard and go 
anywhere, I want to, well I could do I could grow a beard but then at the 
same time I would have to put up with people saying things to me, I would 
have to put up with potentially being stopped by the police, potentially 
people saying things and throwing things at me. You’ve got to do it in 
moderation; don’t put in people’s faces.  
 
Secondly, Carens (2000, p.141) states that Islam constitutes for many of its members, 
‘something from which they cannot and do not wish to distance themselves’. The ‘war 
on terror’ and its perceived implications for justice and marginalization at the societal 
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level have led a few respondents, like Matloob to believe that although their Islamic 
identity has become their primary identity they should assimilate at the expense of 
their Islamic identity. 
 
 We have to do what we need to do to be accepted in this country because 
this country is not our country, and if you can’t do the right things then you 
need to leave the country, there are mosques and if you want to go and pray 
you pray but these people I can’t believe they want to show they are 
different. Because if we are different we have to go back, god said first my 
law and order and then the countries law and order, so we have to follow 
them and not them follow us.  
 
And finally, some respondents believed that the ‘war on terror’ has demonized their 
Islamic identity to such an extent that they have restricted their children’s right to 
show their Islamic identity in the public sphere. Mazar explains how he believes 
disadvantage is associated with maintaining a visible Islamic identity in the public 
sphere. 
 
Absolutely, it worries me, I’m 50 and it doesn’t matter one way or another 
because I think I’ve lived most of my life but I worry about my children and 
how it’s going to impact them so much so that one of my daughters wanted 
to wear a scarf and she goes to college and I said no, and I actually 
constrained her rights because for her own good and she’s pleased that I 
did that now but back then she said but dad it’s my choice and I said no 
because you’re going to be treated differently.  
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Beck (2006, p.25) argues that within the prison error of identity, ‘people with strange-
sounding names find themselves repeatedly subjected to cross-examination’. This is a 
deviation from cosmopolitanism as within this perspective humanity should exist at a 
higher level than any form of difference and indeed the cosmopolitan should have a 
choice of identities, multiple affiliations and multiple attachments (Kaldor, 2000; 
Hudson, 2008). This section has not only demonstrated how respondents perceive 
Islamic identity is perceived in society but how this has led to a restriction in the 
freedom to practice this identity. The ‘war on terror’ has had a variety of impacts on 
respondents’ Islamic identities and what has emerged from the research is how the 
respondents that perceived the most fear and negative consequences were the ones that 
advocated assimilation.  
 
PERCEIVED DIMINISHING BRITISH IDENTITY 
The chapter has demonstrated how respondents believe it is their hyphenated Muslim 
British identity which is regarded as problematic in society. This section now 
considers how respondents’ own perceptions and attachment to their British identity 
has been impacted. It is through the state providing equal citizenship based on ‘justice, 
human rights and social responsibility’ (Johnson, 2009, p.31) that consensus in society 
is maintained, as only then can the state rely on its people to create an equal and 
tolerant society. Hobsbawn, (1990, cited in Colley, 1992, p.309) states ‘there is no 
more effective way of bonding together the disparate sections of restless peoples than 
to unite them against outsiders’, and the events of September 11th and subsequent ‘war 
on terror’ have been perceived as uniting society against Muslims, restricting the 
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freedom associated with Islamic identities and introducing marginal citizenship based 
on this identity.  
Firstly, the fact that the hyphenated British Muslim identity has been constructed 
as problematic has led almost all respondents to experience pain. This research has 
revealed how, due to the ‘war on terror’, respondents perceive a loss in their status, 
rights and citizenship at the level of the state, the police and society. The next 
experience by Masarat shows how this man has experienced a loss in his British 
identity and is having to explain that he is part of this identity.  
 
 And you know my son is a taxi driver and nearly each and every person that 
went in his taxi blamed him personally for 9/11 and he said look mate, I’m 
British and I’ve been born and bred here, why are you telling me? He took 
it easy but it was hard on him and at times he said you know mum, I think I 
will skip work for a few weeks and I won’t go to work and I said no you 
can’t do that you’ve got to pay your bills, life has to go on and it was really 
exceptionally hard on us.  
 
Secondly, most respondents, like Sophia, spoke about how they now themselves 
perceive differences and a decreasing sense of commonality.  
 
Now I see that we will always be different, no matter what we do and there 
is only so much we can do ourselves as a community, it takes both sides to 
make a difference I think. I think there is a subtle pressure there, before 
9/11 this pressure might have been easier to deal with but now because it is 
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religion that is the issue you can’t just give up your religious beliefs, so the 
conflict is bigger.  
 
McPhee (2005) argues that in order to gain loyalty a state must recognize minority 
groups, both as individuals and as part of their community or group, emphasizing that 
loyalty is established through minority rights and influences the extent to which 
citizens want to move from the part to the whole. Thirdly, the decreasing sense of 
commonality has led many respondents to feel detached from their British identity and 
therefore not want to move from the part to the whole. Matloob explains that Islamic 
identities have been demonized to such an extent that it has made it hard for him to be 
loyal to his British identity.  
 
I question where I belong now, they say that we have split loyalties, but how 
can we be loyal to this country. I have been all my life and this is the way 
they treat us. They are making it hard for us to be loyal and if all they do is 
point out our differences and make us look negative then they are not 
allowing us to be loyal because they are the ones that are putting the 
barriers up, not us. I think they want us to change our religion. Before we 
could be western and we were accepted, or even if we were not that western 
but now even if we change our religion they will still hate us because they 
will think that person is still a Muslim.  
 
Fourthly, all respondents were born in Britain and yet almost half, like Azmat referred 
to no longer calling Britain home.  
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I have now realized just how helpless we, we are helpless when it comes to 
changing people’s opinions and views of us and this has made me feel that I 
can no longer call this country my own.  
 
This suggests that the ‘war on terror’ has produced a substantial sense of detachment 
coupled with an overwhelming feeling of difference. Further, as this research has 
shown, respondents now feel excluded and perceive intolerance towards them, 
impacting the extent to which they want to interact with others. Both 
cosmopolitanism and citizenship place a duty on the state and highlight that where the 
state or apparatus of the state fail in these duties then citizens’ loyalty, sense of justice 
and belonging will be impacted. Fifthly, due to the state failing in its’ duty 
respondents’ loyalty and belonging has been impacted to such an extent that some 
respondents like Younis had concerns regarding their place in Britain, the very 
country in which they were born.  
 
The incidents have me very bitter and feel very unsafe. I now have feelings 
that I never thought I would and I do seriously think sometimes that I should 
just go back to Pakistan. Now this is something that I never thought I would 
feel, but I do and it hurts having to think like this because before September 
11th I wanted to spend the rest of my life here and felt like I was part of this 
country.  
 
Sixthly, the data revealed how respondents had concerns about unequal citizenship, 
Islamophobia and societal relations and as Maria explains these have produced 
concerns regarding the future. 
250 
 
 
Before when our parents came into this country there was racism and they 
felt it and after a while when we were growing up we had a bit of racism but 
we got on and lived with it but you know our youngsters now say like my 
daughter who is nine and I think they are going to have an even harder time 
because the young generation that’s growing up with them is so 
brainwashed with the media that how are they going to adjust so are we 
going back fifty years? So instead of moving forward we have moved back 
because these young children they are going to grow up and they will be the 
next officers.  
 
Deutsch (2006) notes that the oppressed may be less committed to the institutions 
which produce such injustice and this research has shown the reactive nature of both 
respondents’ Islamic and British identities, showing how the ‘war on terror’ has 
significantly impacted both. And finally these factors have produced concerns 
regarding radicalization, as Mazar explains.  
 
I can rationalize and live with it because I have seen that happen to the 
Black community in the 70s and 80’s but the youngsters haven’t 
experienced that and they say hey I’m British, I’m a Brummy and the only 
difference I have is that I might have slightly browner skin and I might pray 
to a slightly different god in a different building but I’m a Brummy and I 
was born here and this is my home and why have I been demonized and they 
are disconnecting. One thing I found shocking was that I was talking to a 
group of young people and one of them said ‘this is not my country’ and he 
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is third fourth generation Muslim and I said ‘I beg your pardon which is 
your country Saudi Arabia?’ And I said ‘you wouldn’t’ get a look in and 
you are free to practice your faith here’ and there was this thinking I don’t 
belong here and if this feeling spreads we will be worried as a community.  
 
This section has demonstrated the negative impact the ‘war on terror’ is having on 
respondents’ British identity and their sense of attachment to this identity. 
Biographical cosmopolitanization has been shown to exist with Islamophobia being 
perceived as existing on the international level and the societal level. The theme of 
ethics is about having a responsibility in ensuring that others are not harmed, however 
the ‘war on terror’ has seriously undermined the extent to which respondents perceive 
an ethics of responsibility towards themselves from non Muslims and towards non 
Muslims. Beck (2006) argues that exclusion can lead to hatred where inequality is 
linked to identity and where biographical cosmopolitanization also exists together they 
can lead to feelings of injustice, repression and hatred which can lead to radicalization. 
The three data chapters have all included data relating to radicalization and of interest 
is how the state construction of Islamic identity, perceived marginal citizenship (Nash, 
2009) and lack of rights have combined to produce concerns regarding the alienation 
of British Muslims. The data thus highlights diversity and how although for some 
Muslims, citizenship has negatively influenced the extent to which they feel British, 
for other Muslims reduced citizenship may not simply impact feelings but lead to 
actions of terrorism based of these feelings.  
 
CONCLUSION 
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This chapter has explored how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted respondents’ 
perceptions of society and their Islamic identities. Firstly, through the ‘war on terror’ 
producing a discourse on Islamic identities it has restricted the choice of respondents 
to be constructed and perceived according to other identities, for which there exists 
greater commonality.  
Secondly, Islamic identities were found to have a greater meaning for 
respondents then other forms of identity, thus resulting in respondents experiencing a 
greater deal of pain than that associated with previous forms of racism. Thirdly, the 
‘war on terror’ has not only impacted respondents’ self ascribed identity but 
respondents identify with their Islamic identity more because of marginalization and 
because it is through this identity that experiences of repression exist. Fourthly, just as 
respondents perceived the state and the police as negatively impacting citizenship, 
interactions between citizens have also impacted upon respondents and respondents’ 
sense of attachment to their British identity. And finally, the significance of this sense 
of detachment is that it can also result in a cosmopolitan sense of detachment.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research was to collect rich data from extensive interviews in order 
to reveal British Muslims’ counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’. More specifically, 
the research explored this counter discourse in relation to the impact of the ‘war on 
terror’ on Muslims’ perceptions of the state, the police and their Islamic identities. This 
chapter explores the counter discourse to emerge, demonstrating how the state centric 
‘war on terror’ has led to the existence of ‘parallel discursive arenas where members of 
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses to formulate 
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs’ (Fraser, 1992, p.123 
cited in Sparks, 1997, p.85).  
The general contribution of this research is the empirically derived counter 
discourse, which through being based on respondents’ perceptions indeed challenges 
state centric perspectives and avoids replicating and contributing to the state centric 
perspective (Breen Smyth, 2007; Spalek, El Awa and McDonald, 2009). It is therefore 
the very fact that the research provides an understanding of counter-terrorism through 
the perspectives and experiences of those experiencing state repression that the research 
is of significance. The significant contribution of the research has been further 
facilitated through the use of cosmopolitanism and citizenship as broad theoretical 
underpinnings within which the data was framed. These perspectives were used as a 
foundation from which the ‘war on terror’ and the role of the state and police in the 
‘war on terror’ could be deconstructed, critiqued and reconstructed according to Muslim 
citizens’ perceptions. This chapter will explore the various significant facets of the 
counter discourse to emerge through relating them to citizenship and cosmopolitanism. 
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Further, although the state centric ‘dominant discourse and paradigm defines the space 
in which scholars research, think and write’ (Breen Smyth, 2007, p.261) this chapter 
through revealing the impact of the dominant state centric discourse will also suggest 
ways in which the space between the dominant discourse and counter discourse can be 
made smaller. The gap between the dominant discourse and counter discourse is 
important and it is through making this smaller that the impact of the ‘war on terror’ 
will not lead to perceptions of marginalization, detachment from British identity and 
concerns within Muslim communities regarding radicalization. It is because the two 
discourses convey understandings and interpretations of the ‘war on terror’ that the 
closer the discourses are the greater the likelihood that understandings are shared.  
This chapter will firstly explore the predominant themes of citizenship and 
discuss their significance in relation to the data and secondly, explore the predominant 
themes of cosmopolitanism in relation to the data.  
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STATE 
A major significant theme to emerge from the data was how respondents have 
expectations of the state and the perceived importance of the state in an era where the 
international level and globalization have become increasingly important. Generally, 
many of the themes which emerged were based on respondents’ pre-existing 
expectations of the state, for example, expectations regarding human rights, civil 
liberties and those pertaining to the state treatment of identities. This suggests that 
citizens have a broad range of expectations where the state is concerned and these 
expectations were similar to the role and duties of the state under cosmopolitanism, 
citizenship and the enlightenment. The significance of this is that in the ‘war on terror’ 
because expectations exist, where the state is perceived to have gone against these 
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expectations then this has impacted respondents’ feelings of belonging and attachment 
to their British identity, as will be demonstrated throughout the chapter. Secondly,  
 
‘Hannah Arendt (1951 cited in Turner, 2009, p.71) criticized the notion of 
inalienable universal rights that are assumed to exist independently of any 
state, but she noted that once the rights of citizenship had been removed, 
there is no political authority left to defend people as human beings’.  
 
Loader and Walker (2007, p.13) argue, ‘states are the main source of capacity, the main 
reference point of legitimacy’. Through the research revealing that respondents have 
expectations of the state, this demonstrates the importance of the state in terms of 
citizens’ perception and identities. Therefore, in the ‘war on terror’ although notions of 
security and risk were informed by broader global discourses, for respondents, 
accountability exists at the level of the state. Thus, in terms of future actions and 
counter terrorism measures the state must acknowledge that although its actions may be 
part of broader global discourses, such actions impact respondents’ perceptions of the 
state. Therefore, state foreign policy can actually domesticate international issues for 
which perceptions of injustice exist, leading to feelings of injustice and hatred towards 
the British state. 
 
STATE POLICIES AND IDENTITIES 
In terms of citizenship, the counter discourse revealed how citizenship impacts British 
Muslim citizens’ identities and how respondents’ expectations of the state were found to 
relate to perceptions of legitimacy. This research makes a contribution to citizenship 
256 
 
through revealing how state policies impact citizens’ identities. Phillips and Bowling 
(2003 cited in Spalek, 2008, p.143)  
 
‘have advocated adopting a method that documents people’s specific 
experiences but which acknowledges that aspects of these can be shared by 
other minorities due to broader structures of ‘race’, class, ethnicity and so 
forth’.  
 
Although the research was predominantly concerned with respondents’ Islamic 
identities, an understanding of the complex interactions between citizenship and 
identities was gained through also considering broader structures and thus other 
identities. In this way it was possible to understand which experiences respondents 
believed only Muslims share and which experiences respondents generally believed 
were shared with non Muslims.  
Respondents were given the choice to use other identities, those of British and 
Asian to show where they perceived equality as being practiced by the state and the 
police. In this way it was possible to establish the extent to which respondents believed 
the ‘war on terror’ and the actions of the state had constructed and demonized their 
Islamic identities and the impact of this on their Islamic identities. The research, 
through considering a variety of identities makes a contribution to citizenship in relation 
to questions of identity in the post 9/11 era. Gaining an understanding of how state 
policies within the ‘war on terror’ are impacting Muslims is important to document and 
relevant to contemporary debates regarding integration and marginalisation (Mueller, 
2004; Lyon, 2007; Thomas, 2009), which have become increasingly relevant since the 
‘war on terror’. 
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Marshall (1950) and Carens (2000, p.162) take the dimensions of citizenship to 
mean a unified entity arguing that the three dimensions of citizenship ‘interact with 
each other in complex ways’. Through conducting the research over a two decade time 
period the data revealed how the political and legal dimension of citizenship interact 
with and indeed impact the psychological dimension of citizenship and thus 
respondents’ ‘sense of emotional attachment, identification, and loyalty’ (Carens, 2000, 
p.166). 
 The first significant theme to emerge was in relation to equality within 
citizenship. For example, in the retrospective period, where negative perceptions of the 
state did exist, although the data revealed equality as being an important principle, a 
great deal of inequality was not perceived. This is because the state was not perceived to 
fail Muslim communities in particular but all ethnic minorities, as the issues which 
respondents felt the state could have done better were issues that impacted all ethnic 
minorities. This suggests that where state inequality or racism is perceived as being on 
the basis of a shared inter community identity then inequality and demonization are not 
perceived.  
 Secondly, the data revealed the relationship between equality and perceived 
inclusion. Where interests in the form of rights existed on the basis of a variety of 
identities, British, racial and ethnic this led to positive perceptions of the state because it 
demonstrated that the state viewed respondents as part of the national community and 
minority community and this increased loyalty and attachment to the state and national 
identity. Policy initiatives, such as services to eradicate poverty which were based on a 
British identity were perceived as inclusive policies and as a way of strengthening 
shared citizenship through highlighting problems which cut across all minority 
identities. This data therefore suggests that although as McPhee (2005) argues, in order 
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to gain loyalty a state must recognize minority groups and loyalty is established through 
minority rights, policies which are developed for the whole are equally as important. 
During the retrospective period respondents used a variety of identities, predominantly 
ethnic and racial and all the identities were based on how the state formulated policies. 
This demonstrates how external factors impact citizens’ identities and how state policies 
are not only a means through which to deliver citizens’ rights but are equally important 
to citizens’ sense of belonging. It is because state policies inform citizens of the extent 
to which the state views them with commonality or difference that they in turn shape 
citizens’ sense of belonging to their various identities. 
 Thirdly, the data revealed how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted the 
psychological dimension of citizenship negatively and respondents’ attachments to their 
Asian and British identities. This research has revealed how, due to the ‘war on terror’, 
respondents perceive a loss in their status, rights and citizenship. Respondents talked 
about how they believe the state constructs British identity as representing freedom, 
equality and liberty and yet in the ‘war on terror’ the state has deviated from these very 
concepts through the introduction of counter terrorism legislation. The ‘war on terror’, 
through producing perceptions of injustice, police targeting and demonizing Islamic 
identity, has negatively impacted respondents’ sense of attachment to their British 
identity. Therefore, although the state has adopted a policy of community cohesion, 
emphasizing concepts which should form part of British identity, the research 
demonstrates how respondents’ perceptions of being part of this identity are in fact 
much more complex than simply introducing concepts of shared citizenship and 
promoting these as the ideals which unite citizens and facilitate belonging.  
This research demonstrated how in the ‘war on terror’ policies have created a 
perceived sense of difference and how although the state has introduced policies based 
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on achieving unity, for respondents once marginalization and inequality are perceived 
then the existence of other policies cannot diminish feelings of detachment. For 
example, to consider the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on respondents, some respondents 
spoke of how they now find it difficult to not only believe in the values of a British 
identity but also find it difficult to be loyal to this identity. Therefore, the research 
revealed a severe sense of detachment whereby although all respondents were born in 
Britain almost half referred to no longer calling Britain home. The concerns regarding a 
detachment from British identity were linked to radicalization and thus concerns for 
young British Muslims and how the state is marginalizing them. Both cosmopolitanism 
and citizenship place a duty on the state and highlight that where the state or apparatus 
of the state fail in these duties then citizens’ loyalty, sense of justice and belonging will 
be impacted. Therefore, in terms of the future relationship between the state and British 
Muslims, although the state has formulated policies at achieving cohesion this research 
suggests that these policies are very ineffective at improving a sense of belonging. It is 
important that the state recognizes that policies which are formulated on the basis of 
minority identities, when perceived negatively can have a negative impact which 
transcends to such severe feelings of exclusion, that such exclusion cannot be remedied 
through the introduction of other policies aimed at achieving unity, such as community 
cohesion.  
 When considering the more intricate ways in which the state has marginalized 
British Muslims, the introduction of counter terrorism legislation was instrumental in 
shaping such perceptions. Further, anger existed because the state was perceived to have 
failed to distinguish between contested interpretations of Islam through highlighting the 
diversity of British Muslims and instead homogenized the Islamic faith and associated 
Islam with terrorism. This suggests that not only are policies important but so are the 
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words used by politicians and those that comprise the state in contributing to 
perceptions of marginalization. Therefore in terms of state policies these should at the 
very least always emphasize a shared identity, whereby the ‘war on terror’ is not created 
as a ‘Muslim problem’ but should be highlighted as one that all humans face, thus 
emphasizing unity. And further, where politicians circulate discourses through the 
media, language should reflect commonality, there should be an acknowledgement that 
British Muslims are also victims in the ‘war on terror’. It is important that the state finds 
ways of bridging the gap between the state centric ‘war on terror’ and the counter 
discourse of British Muslims to the ‘war on terror’ and more effective policies and 
language would benefit this.  
 Fourthly, the research revealed how respondents’ Islamic identities have been 
impacted in the ‘war on terror’. One of the main contributions to emerge from this 
research is that the research explores Islamic identities because Muslims’ Islamic 
identities have been largely absent in the collection of in depth interview data, 
especially prior to 9/11 and in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the state and the 
police. Respondents articulated how their Islamic identity differed from other identities 
in terms of meaning, manifestation and negotiation. The research found that one of the 
most prominent reasons as to why an Islamic identity is different is the way in which it 
penetrates a Muslim’s life. It is an identity that represents choice, where meaning can be 
constructed and where values and morals can be formed. It is also an identity some 
respondents use as a guide through which life is attributed meaning. It is due to Islam 
being a set of beliefs that its potential for significance varies from other identities. Islam 
relates to spirituality and therefore it is not simply an identity but rather in terms of 
significance, manifestation and negotiation represents entities that are deeper than 
identity, such as morals, values and meaning. Religiosity and spirituality were found to 
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be closely associated, as mechanisms which not only provide guidance but comfort and 
inner peace. In the prospective data it was revealed how due to respondents’ Islamic 
identity being attacked, the identity became more associated with comfort and inner 
peace with respondents articulating how the perceived politicization of this identity has 
led to a growing sense of unity and attachment to the identity.  
The ‘war on terror’ has a predominately secular standpoint and the data showed 
that although respondents do not expect their Islamic identity to be accommodated in 
the public sphere, they do not expect their religious identity to be demonized. It could 
be argued that since the ‘war on terror’ the diminishing attachment to British identity 
has been marked with a growing sense of attachment to Islamic identity. For some 
respondents through constructing Islam negatively, the ‘war on terror’ has actually 
made Islam more relevant to their lives, in a way that perhaps would not have happened 
had it not been for their Islamic identity being attacked. Therefore, for some 
respondents the ‘war on terror’ has made their Islamic identity significant and provided 
them with the impetus to explore their Islamic identity. Added to this growing sense of 
attachment was the socio-political context which not only provided the impetus but has 
also shaped the meaning of an Islamic identity. The data revealed how some 
respondents felt an increasing sense of attachment to their Islamic identity and this was 
because the ‘war on terror’ has politicized their Islamic identity. They felt this identity 
was liberating and a way of resisting the negative construction of Islamic identities. 
Interestingly, the growing affiliation with this identity can be understood because it is 
through this identity that perceived unequal legal status, religious profiling by the police 
and experiences of repression and exclusion exist. Therefore, it appears that on the 
policy level respondents are pressed to show their loyalty to their British identity, with 
the state advocating assimilation yet it is also the state that has created the structural 
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conditions by which respondents cannot prioritize their British identity because they do 
not believe they have the same common experiences as non Muslims.  
British Muslims’ counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’ is one which highlights 
perceived contradictions by the state; whereby respondents want to be perceived with 
commonality, as being British but it is the state that is manufacturing structural 
conditions whereby differences are perceived. Due to the state construction of Islamic 
identity respondents feel an increasing sense of ‘push and pull’ in relation to their 
British identity and Islamic identity. The data showed that those who are visibly Islamic 
are most at risk of racism and therefore although on a personal level a closer 
relationship with Islam maybe beneficial, within the ‘war on terror’ this is also 
perceived to lead to a greater level of marginalization where citizenship is concerned. 
This reveals the extent to which British Muslims feel their Islamic identity has been 
problematized by the state.  
 For some respondents there existed a belief that Muslims who choose to overtly 
appear Islamic are damaging Muslim communities, as one respondent stated it is 
‘putting oil on fire’. Interestingly, such beliefs were not based on perceptions that 
practicing Islam is not important or even a secular view but rather these views were 
based on the way Islam has been constructed. The underlying factor was that because 
Islam has been created as a threat, as representing difference and risk, through Muslims 
showing their Islamic identity they are contributing to the construction of difference. 
The respondents who held these views believed that the greater the degree to which non 
Muslims perceived differences between themselves and Muslims the more Muslims will 
suffer. It was therefore anger based on the existence of fear, and this was also the case 
for respondents who advocated assimilation. The issue of choice is essential, as where 
assimilation and the restriction of a public Islamic identity were revealed as being the 
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reactive Islamic identity to emerge, these decisions were present due to fear, 
vulnerability and powerlessness. These respondents believed that if Muslims did not 
hide their Islamic identity they would suffer marginalization. This data reveals the 
impact of citizenship on identities, how respondents perceive marginalization and the 
extent to which they believe the state has demonized their Islamic identity. However, 
although it has been argued that since the inception of the ‘war on terror’ the state is 
demonizing British Muslims’ Islamic identity the research demonstrated how the state 
is also making it difficult for respondents to perceive themselves as British. This 
suggests that although the state has tried to decrease marginalization it is through a 
more inclusive British identity, whereby British Muslims share the same experiences as 
non Muslims that a sense of unity will be achieved.  
When discussing cultural rights, from a criminological perspective the emphasis 
is on the need for state intervention to be legitimate and proportionate, Falkner (2003) 
highlights that at the very least the state should provide the opportunity for voices to be 
heard so that minorities can make decisions based on their communities. Therefore, in 
order for the state and the police to understand the impact of the ‘war on terror’ they 
need to listen to the voices and concerns of Muslims. The real danger is that although 
the state and the police may act on the basis of prevention such actions are interpreted 
very differently by British Muslims. This research demonstrated the existence of a 
strong counter discourse amongst respondents and how the actions of the state are 
interpreted in terms of impact so the state should engage with British Muslims as the 
‘war on terror’ is an indefinite war and therefore finding ways of preventing 
marginalization and radicalization are important.  
 
MARGINAL CITIZENSHIP AND INJUSTICE 
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As already mentioned respondents do not perceive commonality and the main avenue 
through which this perception was formed was through that of legal rights. Since the 
‘war on terror’ the research found that respondents no longer perceive themselves to 
have the same human rights as non Muslim citizens and therefore believe they have a 
reduced legal status, they are marginal citizens, ‘who have full citizenship rights but 
who nevertheless do not enjoy full citizenship status’ (Nash, 2009, p.1073).  
Nash (2009, p.1068) argues ‘human rights and citizenship have long been 
closely entwined’. The ‘war on terror’ has produced concerns regarding suspects’ civil 
liberties and legal rights and also produced questions regarding the conditions in which 
suspects of terrorism have been detained (Amnesty, 2009; Liberty, 2004; 2006 and 
2009). The introduction of counter terrorism legislation has led to the conclusion that 
we now have a system for ordinary decent criminals and one for those suspected of 
terrorist activity (Cheong-Tham and McCulloch, 2006 cited in Pantazis and Pemberton, 
2009). Perceptions of justice are an important part of citizenship and the ‘war on terror’ 
has impacted citizenship through the introduction of counter terrorism legislation which 
has led to an erosion of civil liberties.  
 The concept of justice featured prominently in the prospective data and was 
found to impact respondents’ identities and produce anger. Firstly, injustice was related 
to the state and shaped perceptions of the state, as it is the state that introduced counter 
terrorism legislation. It was due to respondents having expectations of the state that 
many voiced feelings of betrayal because the state has in their opinion introduced 
injustice. This sense of betrayal incorporated what the state had previously done for 
respondents through providing services. One respondent conceptualized this betrayal 
through stating, ‘the government does not care about us’. The research revealed how 
respondents have expectations of the state, and it is due to the state shattering these 
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expectations that strong negative emotions emerged. Secondly, this research found that 
respondents not only perceive unequal legal status but along with this were distressed 
because no avenue to voice concerns exists. The legitimization of inequality has acted 
to repress respondents’ feelings of injustice as although the treatment may be perceived 
as being unjust by respondents it remains legitimized by the law. The data revealed that 
the greater the perception of inequality, especially where the legal dimension of 
citizenship was concerned, the greater the negative impact on the psychological 
dimension of citizenship and feelings of belonging, loyalty and attachment (Caren, 
2000) to both the state and British identity. This research shows how significant legal 
rights are and therefore how the state introduction of preventive counter terrorism 
measures are alienating British Muslims. This suggests that the state should not 
compromise civil liberties and perhaps through engaging with Muslim communities 
more, this might be a more effective way of countering terrorism. Although the state 
implements laws and policies, for citizens these are not simple abstractions but actually 
denote to citizens their entitlements and also their sense of belonging. Therefore, at the 
structural level there needs to be a recognition that for citizens’ laws and policies matter 
and in the ‘war on terror’ these have seriously undermined the extent to which British 
Muslims feel they can call themselves British.  
 
CITIZENSHIP AS IMPACTING SOCIETY 
It has been discussed how respondents have expectations of the state and how these 
expectations have impacted their perceptions of the state. However, the data also 
revealed how respondents hold the state responsible for the racism they have 
encountered in society since the ‘war on terror’. It is through the state providing equal 
citizenship based on ‘justice, human rights and social responsibility’ (Johnson, 2009, 
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p.31) that consensus is achieved in society, as only then can the state rely on its people 
to create an equal and tolerant society. The process of the placement of identities through 
citizenship can unite citizens through emphasizing commonality and the state practicing 
equality or can create communities which are marginalized, criminalized and otherized, 
when inequality is part of state policy and law. Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 
(2003, p.157) argue ‘citizenship rights and legal status promote participation and a 
sense of belonging, which in turn facilitate social cohesion and common political 
projects’. The introduction of unequal rights and a lack of legal status are perceived to 
have damaged social cohesion in society. Firstly, the data demonstrated how the state 
was perceived as making Islamophobia legitimate, as giving far right groups’ legitimacy 
and institutionalizing Islamophobia. Therefore, although the state is mainly considered 
in terms of laws and policies the impact of the state on society is also of significance. It 
has become increasingly important that the state recognizes that disharmony and a lack 
of social cohesion are a result of state actions in the ‘war on terror’ as well as other 
factors. Therefore, the language used by state officials since the ‘war on terror’ is 
perceived to have negatively impacted social cohesion and thus although the ‘war on 
terror’ it is commonly understood in terms of legislation and civil liberties, the wider 
impact on society also needs to be taken into consideration.  
 Secondly, Garland (1996) links governing crime to the creation of the active 
citizen. Garland (1996, p.452) refers to the ‘responsibilization strategy’ whereby the 
state devolves ‘responsibility for crime prevention onto agencies, organizations and 
individuals which are quite outside the state’ leading to the creation of active 
communities and active citizens that take responsibility for crime prevention. The ‘war 
on terror’ has marked an increase in suspicion and fear being attributed onto individuals 
and citizens being cautious of those deemed to pose a risk. The prospective data 
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revealed the greater the perceived fear of Muslims in society the greater the extent of 
marginalization and racism. Many respondents talked about having to explain their 
Islamic identity and also as having to convince people that they are British. Therefore, 
since the ‘war on terror’ respondents feel they have been constructed as no longer being 
British and have had to fight to be perceived with the commonality a British identity 
brings. The counter discourse revealed how respondents felt that they are monitored in 
society, with risk and suspicion shaping interactions and therefore the ‘war on terror’ 
has produced a substantial sense of detachment coupled with an overwhelming feeling 
of difference. Further, respondents now feel excluded and perceive intolerance towards 
them, impacting the extent to which they want to interact with others. It could therefore 
be argued that a reactive identity has emerged whereby because respondents perceive 
intolerance towards them they are becoming intolerant towards non-Muslims. The ‘war 
on terror’ has produced a sense of insecurity in society; it has damaged relations in 
society and made responsibilized citizens and through doing so has negatively impacted 
the extent to which respondents feel they belong in society. Therefore, respondents 
perceive marginalization through the state and in society and it is the fact that counter 
terrorism legislation has increased association offences that the application of risk and 
suspicion onto individuals by the police can lead to exclusion at the societal level with 
British Muslims marginalizing other British Muslims. 
 
COSMPOLITANISM AND THE STATE  
Although the research revealed the importance of the state, the international level was 
also shown to impact respondents’ perceptions since the ‘war on terror’. The research 
shows how wider notions of belonging, justice and humanity – all of which the ‘war on 
terror’ has made relevant - are important and therefore the relevance of 
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cosmopolitanism to the ‘war on terror’. According to cosmopolitanism the state has 
certain duties, firstly that ‘every human being has a right to have her or his vital interest 
met, regardless of nationality or citizenship’, (Jones, 1999, pp.15–17 cited in 
Sypnowich 2005, p.56). Therefore, identities should not lead to differential citizenship. 
Secondly, ‘it rules out positions that attach no moral value to some people, or that 
weigh the value people have differentially according to characteristics like ethnicity, 
race, or nationality’ (Brock and Brighouse, 2005, p.4). Therefore where no moral values 
are associated with certain identities, the extent to which the citizen feels part of the 
national and ‘wider community of ideals’ (Held, 2005) will be damaged. The role of the 
state is therefore essential as it is through the state that political repression and 
fundamental human rights can or cannot exist. Where they do not exist the state can 
then be said to have gone against cosmopolitanism, through deviating from the ideals of 
equal moral worth and human rights. Therefore, within the framework of 
cosmopolitanism’s universalism the concept of domestic state crime can be used, 
‘domestic state crime occurs when a government acts to undermine the social, 
economic, or political rights of its own citizens’ (Kauzlarich et al, 2001, p177).  
 Interestingly, the research revealed that the theme of domestic state crime, 
universal human rights and legitimacy were intrinsically linked. Findlay (2007) states it 
is the interpretation of truth and the legitimacy this conveys which is important. State 
actions, most notably the introduction of counter terrorism legislation, were not 
perceived as being legitimate. It was due to this legislation deviating from human rights 
which led to these perceptions, as all respondents believed that universal human rights 
should not be deviated from. These beliefs led to perceptions of injustice and therefore 
the data revealed how the concept of domestic state crime is relevant to respondents’ 
perceptions of the state since the ‘war on terror’. The research suggests that although 
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citizens expect a direct relationship with the state, as this chapter will demonstrate there 
are broader notions of human rights, belonging and legitimacy which were important to 
British Muslims. These concepts were in fact used to judge the actions of the state since 
the ‘war on terror’ and this demonstrates that citizens’ expectations of the state are 
informed by frameworks, such as human rights which exist beyond the nation state. It 
could therefore be argued that the ‘war on terror’ has accelerated a form of 
cosmopolitan citizenship as respondents’ perceptions prior to the ‘war on terror’ did not 
include broader notions of human rights, belonging and legitimacy.  
 
COSMOPOLITANISM AND IDENTITIES  
Dower (2008, p.9) explains how  
 
‘the Stoics accepted the idea of concentric rings of identity – accepting the 
idea of being a citizen of the world did not involve rejecting one’s identity 
as a member of a family, local community or a larger political community’.  
 
In this way the unity would be the global community of humanity and within this there 
would be diversity, notably those signifying attachments of national identity, cultural 
identity, religious identity and so forth. Beck and Grande (2007), when referring to this 
negotiation warn about the dangers of hierarchy. Differences should be embraced and 
conceptualized as providing fluidity and as adding depth, creation and choice – 
therefore it could be argued that subjectivity and personal freedom are prioritized. 
 The data showed how in the retrospective period respondents’ perceptions 
mirrored the idea of concentric rings, whereby an individual can be a member of 
various communities (Dower, 2008) and because respondents’ perceived their minority 
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identities as being accepted this increased their attachment to the state and their British 
identity. This data signified the ease with which respondents related to their various 
identities. However, since the ‘war on terror’ respondents referred to their identities 
according to a hierarchy and even as binary opposites with Islamic identity being 
constructed and perceived as being in direct opposition to British identity. According to 
Hudson (2008, p.279) ‘the logic of identity/difference imposes a false unity on groups 
defined by difference, and it imposes a false emphasis on a single characteristic’. It 
could be said that the logic of identity has become increasingly relevant in the ‘war on 
terror’ because the discourse associated with ‘new terrorism’ is one whereby Muslim 
citizens are predominantly subject to counter terrorism measures because of their 
Islamic identity.  
Beck (2006, p.25) argues that within the prison error of identity, ‘people with 
strange-sounding names find themselves repeatedly subjected to cross-examination’. 
Whereas in the retrospective interviews the police were thought of as positively 
affording respondents with moral status through their Islamic identities, according to the 
findings from the prospective interviews, counter terrorism legislation has led to 
respondents being treated as a ‘second class humanity’ (Beck, 2006) because of their 
Islamic identities. It could be said that they suffer the logic of identity as assumptions 
are made about their identity which leads to unequal citizenship. Therefore, although 
cosmopolitanism states that differences should not lead to human rights being violated, 
this data revealed that respondents believe differences, those of possessing an Islamic 
identity lead to rights being violated and within this category of difference, those with a 
visible Islamic identity are at most risk of having such rights violated. At the level of 
the state respondents demonstrated how due to their Islamic identity being constructed 
negatively, this impacted their sense of attachment to their British identity. 
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Cosmopolitanism advocates multiple identities as co-existing in harmony and it is 
through the state creating the prison error of identity that respondents have felt a 
growing sense of detachment from their British identity and thus a growing sense of 
disharmony in relation to their identities. 
 
IDENTITIES AND SHARED UNIVERSAL EXPERIENCES - 
COSMOPOLITANIZATION 
Within cosmopolitanism the term cosmopolitanization is used to refer to the 
interconnectedness between the local and the global because as Beck (2002, p.23) 
states, ‘globalization is about localization as well’. Within cosmopolitanism perceptions 
are also prioritized through the notion of ‘biographical cosmopolitanization’ ‘which 
means that the contradictions of the world are unequally distributed not just out there 
but also at the centre of one’s own life’ (Beck, 2006, p.43). Similarly, Ruggiero (2007) 
places importance on the subjective dimension through emphasizing interpretation and 
thus the extent to which the two levels interact is down to perception and subjectivity. 
Sadiki (2002) argues that the events of September 11th are an example of bad 
globalization because they have disempowered Muslims and through the umma, 
‘suffering by Muslims in Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Bangladesh or wherever, is felt 
deeply by those elsewhere’ (Clarke et al, 2009, p.89). The ‘war on terror’ transcends 
localisation and globalisation leading to what Ehteshami (1997, p.180 cited in Khatib, 
2003, p.392) calls ‘the emotional, spiritual and political response of Muslims to an acute 
and continuing social, economic and political crisis’. In this way globalization and 
global events like the ‘war on terror’ do not just lead to a stronger sense of shared 
identity but also impact emotions and feelings thereby meaning that events across the 
globe can feel as personal as events that are local.  
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 The data revealed how the umma and the international level were relevant to 
respondents’ perceptions and thus how the ‘war on terror’ has led to biographical 
cosmopolitanization. Firstly, cosmopolitanization was shown to exist where Islamic 
identity was concerned. Themes of democracy and secularism were cited as being 
reasons for foreign policy and as potentially dividing the world with the creation of 
global terror (Mythen and Walklate, 2008) being perceived as purposeful by many 
respondents. This reveals what respondents think the ‘war on terror’ represents at the 
international level. However, it also reveals the extent and the level at which many 
respondents believe Islam and their Islam identities have been demonized and created as 
a threat. Therefore, the ‘war on terror’ has not only impacted respondents’ perceptions 
of the state but also wider ideas of global governance and power. This demonstrates the 
severity with which the ‘war on terror’ has impacted perceptions and also the extent to 
which respondents perceived the ‘war on terror’ as a threat to their Islamic identities.
 Secondly, in addition to these perceptions the umma was found to be an 
increasing point of reference by respondents. Since, the ‘war on terror’, biographical 
cosmopolitanization has heightened feelings of injustice, because oppression at the level 
of the umma, which transcends national boundaries and incorporates issues such as the 
Palestinian and Israeli conflict has become part of the oppression perceived at the local 
level. Through the umma connecting the local and the global, the strong psychological 
dimension of this identity has amplified feelings of marginalization and ‘double 
standards’ both within the UK context (politically and legally) and outside the UK 
context, with state foreign policy being at the forefront on such perceptions. This data 
revealed the complex interactions between satisfaction on the state domestic policy 
level and dissatisfaction at foreign policy level. Therefore through the umma it is 
possible to note the increasing relevance of cosmopolitanism, since cosmopolitanism 
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refers to individuals’ capacity to live locally while also being connected to global issues 
(Ruggiero, 2007) and their capacity for cosmopolitan empathy – the sympathy for 
fellow humans regardless of geographical territory / distance (Hudson, 2008). Foreign 
policy in the ‘war on terror’ is producing anger and the role of America in the ‘war on 
terror’ has meant the concept of cosmopolitanization is applicable as state actions at the 
international level have infiltrated thoughts and produced anger. The ‘war on terror’ has 
given way to biographical cosmopolitanization because universal values of human 
rights, justice and democracy, have been perceived as being contradicted on both the 
international and the national level. All respondents when talking about how these 
values had been deviated from spoke about their British identity being impacted 
negatively. Interestingly, many of the suicide bombers have cited foreign policy and 
attacks on Islamic nations as being part of their motivation for ‘revenge’, thus the state 
must take note of how the ‘war on terror’ is being perceived as a global attack on Islam 
in order to decrease perceptions of marginalization which contribute to radicalization.  
 
THE IMPACT OF THE STATE PRACTISING INEQUALITY ON IDENTITIES 
Although this chapter has already revealed how the ‘war on terror’ has impacted 
respondents’ identities and therefore the interactions between citizenship and identities, 
the international level and wider notions of belonging were also found to shape 
respondents’ perceptions. Cosmopolitanism warns of the dangers of the state deviating 
from cosmopolitan law, which is about maintaining universal human rights and 
ensuring that every citizen has equal liberty. Cosmopolitanism places importance on 
perceptions and it is perceptions of inequality by citizens which make state deviations 
from cosmopolitan law problematic. As Beck (2006, p.19) states ‘the choice to become 
or remain an ‘alien’ or a ‘non-national’ is not as a general rule voluntary, but a response 
274 
 
to acute need, political repression’. ‘Europe sows the seeds of disappointment from 
which hatred springs’ (Beck, 2006, p.167). Perceptions of repression lead to changes in 
identity and a sense of detachment because they negatively impact the psychological 
dimension of citizenship.  
 However, in conjunction with citizenship a wider sense of belonging and global 
point of unity was also cited by respondents. Kaldor (2000) envisages the global 
identity as being one which is synonymous with human rights and this idea was 
prevalent in the data, as is now discussed. Firstly, it is through themes of domestic state 
crime, ‘laws against laws’ (Ericson, 2008, p.57 cited in McCulloch and Pickering, 2009, 
p.6) and cosmopolitanism that potential radicalization can be understood. Many 
respondents talked about the impact of the ‘war on terror’ as radicalizing Muslims 
because the forces which bind and create unity, such as human rights have been 
compromised in the ‘war on terror’. 
Secondly, cosmopolitan ideas of the state needing to maintain universal human 
rights were significant to the data. The data revealed the link between the state practice 
of inequality and the implications of this in terms of citizens placing themselves within 
humanity. This suggests that even though the ‘war on terror’ has highlighted the 
growing significance of cosmopolitan citizenship through inducing 
cosmopolitanization, it is respondents’ perceptions of the state which essentially 
condition and shape the extent to which respondents perceive to belong to the 
cosmopolitan community. Therefore, a state can breed hatred through the practice of 
inequality and this was of concern to respondents, since all respondents referred to the 
state response in the ‘war on terror’ as contributing to radicalization.  
Thirdly, it is through the ‘war on terror’ being on the international level and the 
perception of Islam being attacked on this level that not only were respondents’ British 
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identity impacted but also their wider sense of belonging to the global community of 
humanity. Respondents talked about the cumulative impact of the ‘war on terror’ as 
leading to radicalization through placing Muslims outside British citizenship and 
universal human rights. Through this the terms of double suffering and doubly deprived 
can be applied to respondents. Frost and Hoggett (2008) use the term ‘double suffering’, 
with Deutsch (2006) using the concept of ‘doubly deprived’. This research 
demonstrated how respondents perceive multiple suffering and disadvantage through 
their various identities and this includes their sense of belonging within the global 
community of humanity.  
 Fourthly, Deutsch (2006) notes that the oppressed may be less committed to the 
institutions which produce such injustice and this research has shown the reactive nature 
of respondents’ identities and also how the ‘war on terror’ has produced a reactive 
cosmopolitan identity. Thus, in terms of identities the data has revealed respondents’ 
British identity is relevant because the diminishing perceived commonality has 
produced pain. Respondents do not want to be constructed and perceived as not being 
British. Further, respondents perceive suffering and disadvantaged through the umma 
identity. Therefore just as respondents attachment to their British identity has been 
impacted because they feel they have been constructed outside this identity, their sense 
of attachment to their cosmopolitan identity has also been impacted and the danger is 
that this sense of detachment can lead to British Muslims being less committed to these 
identities and indeed placing themselves outside these identities.  
 This data is significant for a variety of reasons, firstly, ‘cosmopolitanism 
assumes that people within and between groups will differ in many ways, but that there 
will be sufficient overlap that understandings and accommodations can be achieved’ 
(Hudson, 2008: 289). In this way cosmopolitanism highlights the importance of a 
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counter discourse and one which as Parekh (cited in Dower, 2008) argues considers 
narratives. The state centric discourse is one which refuses to engage with terrorists and 
the legislative response has been one which refuses suspects’ humanity. The research 
suggests that it is important that the conditions for achieving an overlap in 
understandings are maintained within the ‘war on terror’ and such conditions include 
ensuring that human rights exist at a higher level than any form of difference. Further, 
part of ensuring that accommodation is achieved is through considering the narratives of 
others and thus, in the ‘war on terror’ opposing standpoints, interpretations and 
understandings should not be marginalized so future enemies are created but heard so 
that even if small overlaps do exist, such understandings can be built upon. Thus, 
although this research has not engaged with those who have committed acts of terror, 
through considering the perspectives of those who have been marginalized and may feel 
some of the grievances that terrorists have, the research has provided an understanding 
of how future enemies are not created and contributed to understanding ways of 
preventing radicalization and terrorism.  
Secondly, the data has highlighted how respondents’ perceive a more 
cosmopolitan idea of citizenship since the ‘war on terror’. It is the actions of the state 
which have contributed to this and therefore the research highlights how significant the 
state is in terms of impacting a global sense of citizenship. This suggests that although 
the state has been concerned with the national territory the state also needs to consider 
the impact of their role within the ‘war on terror’ on British Muslims’ sense of 
belonging to their cosmopolitan identity and within this take account of how foreign 
policy and a lack of human rights are contributing to radicalization. Thus, this research 
has found that the state needs to go beyond concerns of ‘the enemy within’ and British 
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loyalty and consider British Muslims in relation to the umma and a more cosmopolitan 
sense of belonging.   
 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHICS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Human rights and the ethics of responsibility were found to be the two dominant themes 
when exploring the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on respondents’ cosmopolitan identity. 
These two themes facilitated an understanding of exactly how the ‘war on terror’ has 
impacted respondents’ sense of belonging to a universal identity.  
Firstly, according to Dower (2008) the introduction of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights was aimed at ensuring that responsibility for protecting individuals’ 
human rights resided with the state. Faulkner (2003) summarizes the evolution of rights 
stating that in the contemporary era citizens’ rights are those rights which are 
guaranteed by constitutions and statutes such as the Human Rights Act 1998 and Nash 
(2009) highlights how the emergence of individual autonomy, equality and innocent 
until proven guilty are what we now interpret as human rights. Therefore, to consider 
that understandings of human rights are informed by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and protected in statutes, it is then possible to comprehend how these are 
not simply changeable laws but laws which reflect rights which were perhaps regarded 
by respondents as being rights which would never be deviated from. The data revealed 
that through respondents believing their universal human rights have been violated their 
faith in humanity has been challenged because their expectations have been violated, an 
expectation that the state will and always should maintain universal human rights. In 
this way it is possible to comprehend how and why respondents’ sense of belonging to 
their cosmopolitan identity has been damaged and it is because their human rights, 
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rights which they perceive gave them a sense of belonging to humanity have been 
violated that their own sense of attachment has been negatively impacted.  
Secondly, in conjunction to this the ethics of responsibility were perceived as 
having diminished since the ‘war on terror’. Cosmopolitanism ‘takes seriously the idea 
that we – as individuals and as collectivities such as states or companies – have duties 
not to harm other people in other parts of the world’ (Dower 2008, p.8). Within the 
cosmopolitan perspective the state should maintain equality for the good of humanity, 
as if it is maintained, citizens will feel a sense of responsibility within this humanity – 
an ethics of responsibility. Essentially, it is through the dehumanization of the suspect 
population and the eradication of legal rights that the values which bind and create unity 
on the national and international level are replaced with exclusion, demonization and 
otherization. The ethics of responsibility featured prominently in the data. For example, 
when respondents were asked about legislation to protect religious minorities, those 
respondents who believed legislation should exist, believed it should exist to protect all 
religious minorities. It could be argued that respondents citing equality is an example of 
them displaying their ethics of responsibility towards other human beings, their 
responsibility in ensuring that all humans are protected.  
The theme also featured where perceptions of the police were concerned. 
Respondents emphasized commonality and through this a sense of moral responsibility 
onto Muslims by suggesting that Muslims need to accept the police task within 
countering terrorism and help them in the shared goal of preventing terrorism. What is 
of interest from this data is that it reflects how perceptions are shaped when respondents 
place themselves within the global realm of humanity and how this generates 
responsibility. For example, part of understanding the need for religious profiling was 
due to understanding moral responsibility and therefore that at times inequality will 
279 
 
exist but where it does there is a utilitarian justification, it is for the good of humanity to 
which we all have a responsibility. Further, through respondents considering their role 
in protecting humans and indeed highlighting their own moral responsibility, this led to 
perceptions of the police which were based on empathy.  
Therefore, the research revealed the importance of equality and ethics and 
through using the two examples above it is possible to understand the harm that has 
been caused by the ethics of responsibility and equality being compromised in the ‘war 
on terror’. The ‘war on terror’ has seriously undermined the extent to which respondents 
perceive an ethics of responsibility towards themselves and towards others. And finally 
this can be considered further through respondents’ perceptions of how terrorists have 
been constructed in the ‘war on terror’. The themes of legitimacy and justice were 
linked to perceptions of how respondents believed the state has constructed and 
associated their Islamic identity with terrorism. It was demonstrated how respondents 
believed the state associated their Islamic identity with terrorism, in order to try and 
legitimize the introduction of counter terrorism legislation which deviates from the 
principles of legality.  
The prospective data showed how any negative impact due to the ‘war on terror’ 
was perceived as being due to the state. A great point of anger amongst respondents was 
the way in which politicians and those whom comprise the state used language to 
associate Islam with terrorism, in the aftermath of September 11th. Respondents 
expressed how they want to define how they are perceived and perceive the state to 
have taken this choice away. Due to the state, the police and the media being perceived 
as sustaining Islamic identity with concepts of fear, risk and terrorism, Muslims are not 
active in terms of construction but rather active in terms of the impact of this 
construction. Therefore, in terms of construction the research shows how respondents 
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believe they have been constructed as existing outside humanity and further, the sense 
of powerlessness this has caused. In relation to identities through the state associating 
Islam with terrorism and terrorism with a lack of human rights and as being outside 
humanity, the state has actually damaged respondents’ sense of attachment to their 
cosmopolitan identity.  
 
INJUSTICE 
The research revealed the importance of cosmopolitanism to understanding the ‘war on 
terror’ and also not only that a counter discourse exists, but a coherent counter discourse 
which reflects respondents’ firm beliefs regarding the motivations of the state in the 
‘war on terror’ and how each strand of the multifaceted ‘war on terror’, such as the 
demonization of Islamic identity and the introduction of counter terrorism legislation, 
have impacted respondents’ identities. Therefore many of the themes to emerge are 
linked and the theme of justice was linked to respondents’ identities. According to 
Hudson (2009, p.715) ‘justice has a legal – political aspect, and an ethical aspect. It 
requires keeping the rules of international law, respecting legal and political 
conventions nationally and internationally, but it also demands respect for the other just 
because she is a human’. Bertram (2005) argues it is essential for justice to be perceived 
and for cosmopolitan law to be maintained. 
Data from the retrospective interviews demonstrates that respondents’ pre-held 
beliefs of the police did not determine whether they will interact with the police, but 
these beliefs heavily influence whether the interaction will be viewed positively or 
negatively. Therefore, from a cosmopolitan perspective, perceptions of justice or 
injustice will not just depend on whether the legal and political conventions have been 
adhered to and respect has been shown (Hudson, 2009) but will also be informed by 
281 
 
previous experiences and perceptions of the police. Due to state actions since the ‘war 
on terror’ being perceived as illegitimate, especially where counter terrorism legislation 
was concerned, the state was perceived as introducing injustice. Butler (1997, p.139, 
cited in Frost and Hoggett, 2008, p.449) states, that ‘loss cannot be worked through 
when there is no public recognition or discourse through which it might be named and 
mourned’. There exists no recognition of the loss of legal rights perceived by 
respondents, which has compounded feelings of vulnerability and powerlessness into 
helplessness. It is because procedures which would constitute injustice where non 
terrorism legislation is concerned are legitimized in counter terrorism legislation that 
there is no recognition. This research showed how respondents’ moral mandates were 
closely associated with universal human rights. The data revealed that respondents 
believe procedures such as innocent until proven guilty should never be violated 
because respondents’ interpretation of legal rights are based on universal human rights 
and as will be now discussed it was the very fact that respondents perceived their 
human rights as being violated which conditioned their perceptions of the police.  
 
POLICING AND THE ROLE OF THE POLICE 
It has been demonstrated how the ‘war on terror’ has produced disharmony between 
police – Muslim communities’ relations (Spalek, El – Awa, and McDonald, 2009; 
Klausen, 2009). This research contributes to an understanding of how the ‘war on 
terror’ has impacted police – Muslim communities’ relations through firstly 
investigating British Muslims’ perceptions over a two decade time period, which 
considers the variety of identities Muslims posses. And secondly, through considering 
how the police are perceived since the ‘war on terror’ and relating these perceptions to 
principles of legality, human rights and legislation. Thus, the research explored British 
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Muslims’ perceptions of the police, how these have changed and if in fact ‘the 
categorization of Muslims as suspect may be serving to undermine national security 
rather than enhance it’ (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009, p. 648).  
 Firstly, the research revealed how since the ‘war on terror’ respondents perceive 
the police as serving the state at the expense of accountability to communities. The 
criminal justice system is a tool of social control representing the power of the state, and 
it is the police that are ‘empowered to investigate crime, search for evidence, arrest 
suspected offenders and question them’ (Allan, 2001, p.2). The retrospective data for 
the state revealed that because legitimacy was perceived, citizenship was positively 
impacted as was respondents’ attachment to their national identity. The ‘war on terror’ 
is perceived to have introduced a form of crime control where protection does not exist 
and further contested the source of policing legitimacy. The source of policing 
legitimacy has always been contested. According to Faulkner (2003, p.298), the 
authority and legitimacy of the British police is not derived from the state but rather 
‘from the consent and confidence of the citizens whom they serve’. Unlike Reiner 
(2000), who states that the government invest the authority and power they have under 
the social contract in the police as agents of the law. Within the prospective interviews 
respondents explained how counter terrorism policing is not a form of policing in which 
trust and confidence is prioritized and further, that they perceive the gap between the 
intelligence service and the police as narrowing. 
 The first prominent reason for this perception was the increase in police powers 
under counter terrorism legislation. According to Beck (2006, p.148) the suspicion of 
terrorism gave ‘the most powerful nation in the world carte blanche to construct ever 
changing representations of the enemy and to defend its ‘internal security’. In the UK, 
counter terrorism legislation was introduced which as Amoore and De Goede (2008, p.8 
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cited in McCulloch and Pickering, 2009, p.629) argue went beyond ‘the established 
language and techniques of risk that existed within the criminal justice system’. The 
acceleration of risk and suspicion under this legislation has implications for the suspect 
community, as risk and suspicion alone determine the level of rights that exist. As 
McCulloch and Pickering (2009) argue the preventive counter-terrorism framework is 
concerned with targeting and managing through restricting and incapacitating those 
individuals and groups considered being a risk. 
 In terms of the counter discourse, although the state manufacture of preventive 
policing is to eradicate potential acts of terrorism, for respondents preventive policing 
was conceptualized in terms of impact. Firstly, there was the unison of Islamic identities 
and counter terrorism legislation, coupled with a sense of powerlessness. Due to the 
power of the police under this legislation, suspects have to co-operate and let the 
enactment of suspicion be actualized because if they do not the punishment is arrest. In 
the case of airports for example, Muslims must accept the fact that they are likely to be 
checked and body searched and allow such procedures to take place so suspicion can be 
eradicated. Due to the expansion of control and emphasis on prevention, respondents 
are likely to be placed in situations where they will come into contact with measures of 
counter terrorism policing and this was found to lead to perceptions of targeting. 
Therefore, it was the very fact that new measures have been introduced that were not 
perceived as impacting non-Muslims which has contributed to perceptions of police 
targeting. 
 Secondly, due to the expansion of control and emphasis on prevention, Muslims 
are likely to be placed in situations where they will come into contact with measures of 
counter terrorism policing and these measures, as the research has revealed are 
perceived as being directed at their Islamic identity. For all respondents the existence of 
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these powers were not perceived as isolated or indeed as leading to a minimal number 
of false arrests, detainment and control orders but as representing powers that all 
Muslims could be subjected to. This perception heightens feelings of powerlessness 
which were part of perceptions of injustice. The research showed how respondents 
perceive counter terrorism legislation through the perspective of the potential harm. Due 
to the level of fear thought be associated with their Islamic identities, most respondents 
differentiated the fear from the fear associated with ‘black’ communities. Interestingly, 
there was an association with the constructed level of fear respondents thought the 
police think they represent and the level of fear respondents then felt from the police 
and this was found to lead respondents to no longer want to engage with the police.  
 However, although perceptions of the police were found to have significantly 
changed since the ‘war on terror’, the legislative framework of counter terrorism 
policing was revealed as significantly impacting perceptions of the police. Many of the 
rights as codified in the Human Rights Act 1998 are deeply embedded in the principles 
of legality (Gearty, 1994) and the social contract (Stone, 2004). The legal rights which 
emerged during this period have become known by citizens as their natural legal rights, 
rights which if deviated from would be perceived as injustice and unequal legal 
citizenship. The existence of human rights in the form of statutes was found to be a 
source of security for respondents because in the retrospective period although negative 
perceptions of the police were found to exist, unlike the prospective data where injustice 
is used to describe the actions of the police, during the retrospective interviews, the 
misuse of power by the police was not perceived as being injustice. This could be 
because the law prioritized due process and thus, respondents believed the negative 
perceptions were due to the police misusing their power rather than perceiving the 
existence of structural injustice. However, in the prospective period injustice and a lack 
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of human rights were cited prior to respondents mentioning their perceptions of the 
police, when referring to their perceptions of the state. This suggests that although it has 
been much disputed about how the police foster better relations with Muslim 
communities, to an extent any efforts made by the police are likely to be negatively 
impacted by the existence of legislation which diminishes civil liberties. This research 
therefore highlights the alienation that counter terrorism legislation has induced and 
how it has impacted relations between Muslim communities and the police.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This research has explored British Muslims’ counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’. 
Interestingly, although the aim of the research was to explore counter narratives to the 
‘war on terror’ it was not known the extent to which respondents’ perceptions and 
understanding of the ‘war on terror’ would deviate from the state centric ‘war on 
terror’ discourse. This research has revealed that a strong counter discourse does 
exist, which could be conceptualized as such because it deviates greatly from the state 
centric discourse. The research has demonstrated this through highlighting things 
such as respondents’ beliefs regarding the demonization of their Islamic identity, their 
perceptions regarding this identity being demonized to legitimize foreign policy and 
the introduction of counter terrorism legislation etc.  
Ultimately, through exploring the various facets of the counter discourse 
issues for concern have been highlighted. For example, perceptions regarding how 
Islam is being attacked internationally, the threat of democracy and secularism 
coupled with perceptions of domestic attacks on Islam via legal rights. Linked to 
these issues have been identities, indeed demonstrating the extent to which identities, 
feelings of belonging and even humanity are conditioned by contextual factors. 
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Through considering the inter linkage of these themes it has been shown how the ‘war 
on terror’ is actually alienating British Muslims, likely to contribute to radicalization 
and produce a generation of British Muslims increasingly susceptible to carrying out 
terrorism. Concerns regarding future generations of British Muslims featured heavily 
in the data and it appears that as Muslims are connecting with their Islamic identity 
they are going to continue to endure perceived injustices, which they have previously 
never experienced.  
This research contributes through providing an understanding of British 
Muslims’ counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’, one which considers the 
perspectives of those experiencing counter terrorism measures and provides a 
framework, that of citizenship and cosmopolitanism in which the ‘war on terror’ 
could be critiqued and reconstructed according to broader non state centric notions of 
human rights, belongings and attachments. The research also contributes 
methodologically, exploring the role of religion, status and power in the insider / 
outsider position and indeed the place of emotions in politically sensitive research. 
However, although the research has produced some insightful ideas regarding how 
there is a huge gap between the state centric ‘war on terror’ and British Muslims’ 
counter discourse to the ‘war on terror’ limitation did exist. 
One of the most notable points was the fact that the data was not analyzed 
according to the variables of age, gender and class. Further, the research focused on 
Pakistani Kashmiri Muslims and thus dismissed other ethnicities and localities since 
the research was conducted in Birmingham. Therefore, further research could 
investigate how and if, different counter discourses emerge based on age, gender, 
ethnicity, locality and class. It would be of interest to see if these other identities 
shape experiences and perceptions and further, especially through considering the 
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counter discourses of younger British Muslims, it would be possible to consider the 
extent to which they perceive injustice and detachment from their British identity, 
factors which contribute to radicalisation.  
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APPENDIX I: BIOGRAPHIES 
The purpose of these biographies is to provide additional information on the 
respondents so that the narratives they revealed can be contextualized. All 
respondents were from the Sparkbrook area of Birmingham; due to this details such 
as respondents’ jobs have been omitted. Although respondents’ names have been 
changed in order to ensure confidentiality, I felt that revealing their age, gender and 
job would compromise confidentiality. Therefore, these biographies provide 
information on the age, class and the gender of respondents.  
Mohammed is a 29 year old working class male. 
Jangir is a 21 year old working class male. 
Jamil is a 23 year old working class male. 
Asghar is a 25 year old working class male. 
Zulfiguar is a 32 year old working class male. 
Sikander is a 35 year old working class male. 
Nazim is a 31 year old working class male. 
Nazar is a 44 year old working class male.  
Shafquat is a 26 year old middle class male. 
Ibrahim is a 22 year old middle class male. 
Yaseen is a 22 year old middle class male. 
Adam is a 28 year old middle class male. 
Matloob is a 35 year old middle class male. 
Bilal is a 35 year old middle class male. 
Mazar is a 50 year old middle class male. 
Younis is a 34 year old middle class male. 
Nasrin is a 25 year old middle class female.  
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Bushra is a 22 year old middle class female. 
Sophia is a 30 year old middle class female. 
Sophina is a 25 year old middle class female. 
Nabeela is a 50 year old middle class female. 
Soniya is a 43 year old middle class female. 
Zara is a 42 year old middle class female. 
Rafia is a 39 year old middle class female. 
Safia is a 26 year old working class female. 
Azmat is a 23 year old working class female. 
Rukhsana is a 29 year old working class female. 
Sakeena is a 25 year old working class female. 
Maria is a 44 year old working class female. 
Ashra is a 38 year old working class female. 
Musarat is a 52 year old working class female. 
Aneesa is a 48 year old working class female. 
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APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
A. 1989 – 2000 (Before September 11th) 
How have Muslims experiences and perceptions of the state and the 
police changed since September 11th? 
STATE 
1. During this period what did you think of the government? 
2. In what ways do you think the government were fighting racism and 
discrimination? 
3. And in what ways do you think the government could have been fighting 
racism and discrimination?  
4. In your opinion did a need exist for legislation that specifically protected the 
Muslim community from racism during this period? 
5. If yes, why did a need exist in your opinion? 
6. If no, why do you believe that a need didn’t exist? 
POLICE 
1. During this period what did you think of the police? 
2. How would you describe the relationship between the police and ethnic 
minorities during this period? For example do you think it was the same as 
the relationship between the police and the white community? 
3. What about the relationship between the police and Muslims, how would 
you describe that? For example, was there a difference between ethnic 
minorities relationship with the police and Muslims relationship with the 
police? 
4. Do you think the police were institutionally racist during this time? 
5. If yes, why? 
6. During this period, did you have experiences which involved the police? 
7. If yes, how many experiences did you have? 
8. Can you please tell what happened in each experience?  
9. Did this / these experience/s leave you with a better or worse image of the 
police? 
10. How did the experience / experiences change the confidence you had in the 
police? 
How have Muslims experiences and perceptions of the media changed 
since September 11th? 
MEDIA 
1. What forms of the media do you believe were the most powerful, for 
example, TV, newspaper, radio, or any other in this period? And why? 
2. Can you remember Islam featuring a lot in the media? 
3. What things do you think the media portrayed as Islam’s core beliefs? For 
example, for Muslims the core beliefs could be the five pillars of Islam…. 
4. In your opinion how were Muslim people being portrayed in the media?  
5. Would you say the media actually generated an image or stereotype of what 
the typical Muslim is during this period? 
6. If yes, what would you say the image or stereotype was? 
Have Muslims feelings of being at ‘risk’ of racism changed after 
September 11th? 
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PERCEIVED RISK 
1. To what extent did you believe that you were at risk of racism during this 
period? 
2. Why do you believe you were at risk? For example, which part of your 
identity do you believe was most relevant and made you a potential target of 
racism? 
3. In your opinion did you believe that you were at risk from a certain group or 
section of society? Or did you believe that you could be at risk of racism 
from anyone is society? 
4.  If group, which group do you believe you were most at risk from? For 
example, can you tell me the characteristics of the group, race, religion, 
ethnicity, gender, age? 
5. If perception exists that there is a certain group, ask why do you think 
this/these groups had these feelings? 
6. If from anyone ask, why do you believe you were at risk of racism from 
anyone? 
7. Why do you think these people had these feelings? 
8. Did the fear of racism have a great or not so great impact on your life? For 
example did you avoid certain areas or do anything different to decrease the 
chance of suffering racism? 
9. How much did you worry about being a victim? And what did this worry 
involve, can you describe the feelings? 
10. More generally, do you think Muslims were at a greater or lesser risk of 
racism than other Asian people during this period? 
11. Why do you think they were at a greater or lesser risk of racism than Asian 
people? 
Do Muslims feel that they have been constructed as a ‘risk’ after the 
events of September 11th? 
CONSTRUCTED RISK 
12. Do you think Muslims were constructed as a risk during this time? (someone 
who should be feared because they belong to a certain group) 
13. Why do you think Muslims were constructed as a risk? 
14. How do you believe that Muslims were constructed as a risk? 
15. In your opinion, to what extent do you think society actually believed that 
Muslims were a risk to society and should therefore be feared?  
How has September 11th changed Muslims experiences and perceptions 
of racism? 
1. During this time did you have experiences where someone had said or done 
something to you and you weren’t sure why? For example you couldn’t be sure 
whether it was because of your gender, race, or religion? 
2. During this period did you experience any racism?  
3. Would you say that racism was feature of your life? 
4. How many experiences of racism did you have during this period? 
5. If more than one ask the following questions for each experience, questions 6 – 
21. 
6. Could you describe the experience for me?  
7. What did the perpetrator say? And do?  
8. What was the type of harm involved, for example, did the incident involve 
verbal, written or visual abuse, threats or intimidation, graffiti, property damage, 
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physical violence? Or was it something that you would describe as more hidden 
and less blatant? 
9. If it was verbal, what kind of language was used? 
10. What was the context in which the incident occurred? For example, the location, 
the time of day, and were you alone? 
11. In your opinion did something lead to this incident or would you say the 
incident was spontaneous? 
12. How would you describe the perpetrator? What was their gender? What do you 
believe the perpetrators age to be? What was the perpetrators ethnicity? 
13. Can you describe how you felt during the incident? 
14. And how did you feel after the incident? How did you feel, angry, sad, upset? 
15. Did the incident change you in any way? 
16. If yes, in what way? 
17. Did it the incident impact your identity / or the confidence you had in your 
identity? 
18. If yes, how? 
19. Did you think about the incident often after it happened, did the incident play on 
your mind? 
20. How do you feel about the same incident when you think about is now? For 
example, what feelings does thinking about the incident produce? 
21. Why do you believe you were subjected to racism, what was your interpretation 
of the incident? For example, was it due to culture, race, ethnicity, religion or 
some other factor? 
22. How common was it hear about other people suffering racism? 
23. In your opinion what similarities were there in these experiences? What’s the 
same for example? 
24. Did these experiences change your views of society? If so how? 
25. Did society make you feel or did you feel that a need existed for you to change 
in any way so that you would be more accepted by society and suffer less 
racism? 
26. In your opinion did you felt disadvantaged when compared to a white person? 
27. If yes, how? 
28. And more specifically, did you felt disadvantaged when compared to an Asian 
person?  
29. If yes, how? 
30. Which part of your identity do you believe disadvantaged you in any way? 
31. In your opinion what beliefs existed in society about Muslims? 
32. Why do you think these beliefs existed? 
33. How important and significant was religion for you during this period? 
 
 
B. 2001 – PRESENT DAY (After September 11th) 
How have Muslims experiences and perceptions of the state and the 
police changed since September 11th? 
STATE 
1. What do you think of the government? 
2. In what ways do you think the government is fighting racism and 
discrimination? 
3. And in what ways do you think the government could be fighting racism and 
discrimination?  
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4. In your opinion does a need exist for legislation that specifically protects the 
Muslim community from racism? 
5. If yes, why do you think a need exists? 
6. If no, why do you believe that a need doesn’t exist? 
POLICE 
1. What do you think of the police? 
2. How would you describe the relationship between the police and ethnic 
minorities? For example do you think it is the same as the relationship between 
the police and the white community? 
3. What about the relationship between the police and Muslims, how would you 
describe that? For example, is there a difference between ethnic minorities 
relationship with the police and Muslims relationship with the police? 
4. Do you think the police are institutionally racist? 
5. If yes, why? 
6. Have you had any experiences which have involved the police? 
7. If yes, how many experiences have you had? 
8. Can you please tell what happened in each experience?  
9. Did this / these experience/s leave you with a better or worse image of the 
police? 
10. How did the experience / experiences change the confidence you have in the 
police? 
How have Muslims experiences and perceptions of the media changed 
since September 11th? 
MEDIA 
1. What forms of the media do you believe are the most powerful, for example, 
TV, newspaper, radio, or any other? And why? 
2. Do you think Islam features a lot in the media? 
3. What things do you think the media portrays as Islam’s core beliefs? For 
example, for Muslims the core beliefs could be the five pillars of Islam…. 
4. In your opinion how are Muslim people being portrayed in the media?  
5. Would you say the media is actually generating an image or stereotype of 
what the typical Muslim is? 
6. If yes, what would you say the image or stereotype is? 
 
Have Muslims feelings of being at ‘risk’ of racism changed after 
September 11th? 
PERCEIVED RISK 
1. To what extent do you believe that you are at risk of racism? 
2. Why do you believe you are at risk? For example, which part of your 
identity do you believe is most relevant and makes you a potential target of 
racism? 
3. In your opinion do you believe that you are at risk from a certain group or 
section of society? Or do you believe that you could be at risk of racism 
from anyone is society? 
4.  If group, which group do you believe you are most at risk from? For 
example, can you tell me the characteristics of the group, race, religion, 
ethnicity, gender, age? 
5. If perception exists that there is a certain group, ask why do you think 
this/these groups has these feelings? 
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6. If from anyone ask, why do you believe you are at risk of racism from 
anyone? 
7. Why do you think these people have these feelings? 
8. Does the fear of racism have a great or not so great impact on your life? For 
example do you avoid certain areas or do anything different to decrease the 
chance of suffering racism? 
9. How much do you worry about being a victim? And what does this worry 
involve, can you describe the feelings? 
10. More generally, do you think Muslims are at a greater or lesser risk of 
racism than other Asian people? 
11. Why do you think Muslims are at a greater or lesser risk of racism than 
Asian people? 
Do Muslims feel that they have been constructed as a ‘risk’ after the 
events of September 11th? 
CONSTRUCTED RISK 
12. Do you think Muslims are being constructed as a risk? (someone who 
should be feared because they belong to a certain group) 
13. Why do you think Muslims are being constructed as a risk? 
14. How do you believe that Muslims are being constructed as a risk? 
15. In your opinion, to what extent do you think society actually believes that 
Muslims are a risk to society and should therefore be feared?  
How has September 11th changed Muslims experiences and perceptions 
of racism? 
1. Have you had experiences where someone has said or done something to 
you and you weren’t sure why? For example you couldn’t be sure whether it 
was because of your gender, race, and religion? 
2. After September 11th have you experienced any racism?  
3. Would you say that racism is a feature of your life? 
4. How many experiences of racism have you had since September 11th? 
5. If more than one ask the following questions for each experience, questions 
6 – 21. 
6. Could you describe the experience for me?  
7. What did the perpetrator say? And do?  
8. What was the type of harm involved, for example, did the incident involve 
verbal, written or visual abuse, threats or intimidation, graffiti, property 
damage, physical violence? Or was it something that you would describe as 
more hidden and less blatant? 
9. If it was verbal, what kind of language was used? 
10. What was the context in which the incident occurred? For example, the 
location, the time of day, and were you alone? 
11. In your opinion did something lead to this incident or would you say the 
incident was spontaneous? 
12. How would you describe the perpetrator? What was their gender? What do 
you believe the perpetrators age to be? What was the perpetrators ethnicity? 
13. Can you describe how you felt during the incident? 
14. And how did you feel after the incident? How did you feel, angry, sad, 
upset? 
15. Has the incident changed you in any way? 
16. If yes, in what way? 
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17. Has the incident impacted your identity / or the confidence you have in your 
identity? 
18. If yes, how? 
19. Did you think about the incident often after it happened, does the incident 
play on your mind? 
20. How do you feel about the same incident when you think about is now? For 
example, what feelings does thinking about the incident produce? 
21. Why do you believe you were subjected to racism, what was your 
interpretation of the incident? For example, was it due to culture, race, 
ethnicity, religion or some other factor? 
22. How common is it hear about other people suffering racism? 
23. In your opinion what similarities are there in these experiences? What’s the 
same for example? 
24. Have these experiences changed your views of society? If so how? 
25. Does society make you feel or do you feel that a need exists for you to 
change in any way so that you would be more accepted by society and suffer 
less racism? 
26. In your opinion do you feel disadvantaged when compared to a white 
person? 
27. If yes, how? 
28. And more specifically, do you felt disadvantaged when compared to an 
Asian person?  
29. If yes, how? 
30. Which part of your identity do you believe now disadvantages you in any 
way? 
31. In your opinion what beliefs exist in society about Muslims? 
32. Why do you think these beliefs exist? 
33. How important and significant is religion for you now? 
 
Is there anything that you would like to add?                     
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